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8Many developing countries have become increasingly 
resource dependent over the last two decades. While the end 
of the ‘commodity-super cycle’ may halt this trend in the short 
term, half of the world’s known oil, gas and mineral reserves 
are in non-OECD and non-OPEC countries (Mc Kinsey, 2013). 
For these resource-rich developing countries, the extractive 
industries (EI) sector presents one of the few comparative 
advantage sectors, which will inevitably continue to play an 
important role in their respective economic develop-ment 
strategies. Historically, much emphasis has been placed on 
how developing countries can attract foreign direct invest-
ment in the EI sector to increase domestic revenue collection. 
Less focus has been placed on how foreign EI investments 
can be ‘linked’ to the domestic economy to increase the skill 
level in the country and diversify the economy in the long 
term. This report explains the various linkages that can be 
created to the EI sector, provides case studies that exemplify 
how countries have successfully leveraged the respective 
linkages, lays out the key constraints to linkage creation, and 
provides recommendations to EI companies, governments 
and international development cooperation on how each 
stakeholder can contribute to linkage creation. The report 
has been commissioned in the frame of German Develop-
ment Cooperation, which supports many developing countries 
where the EI sector plays an important role in their respec-
tive economies. Where relevant, special emphasis has been 
placed on the impacts of linkages on employment creation 
and gender equality, given that these two topics are of 
strategic importance to German Development Cooperation.
Linkages to the EI sector
The report differentiates among upstream linkages, which 
are related to the procurement of goods and services that 
EI projects need to operate; downstream linkages, which 
result from further processing of the extracted commodity; 
horizontal linkages, which relate to the development of new 
industries using the capabilities of the EI-related supply chain; 
consumption linkages, which result from increased spending 
of earnings originating from the EI sector; knowledge and 
technology linkages, which relate to the transfer of knowl-
edge and technical know-how within the EI value chain; and 
spatial linkages, which are the benefits from shared use of in-
frastructure investments that the EI sector requires to operate.
The spending of EI companies on suppliers dwarfs royalty 
and tax payments. BP and Anglo American estimate that in 
2014 they respectively spent 87% and 64% of total value 
created on suppliers as compared to 2% and 11% on govern-
ment payments. These figures explain why governments are 
increasingly relying on local content regulations that require 
EI companies to purchase goods and services domestically. 
Apart from increasing the number of companies producing 
goods and services for the EI sector, which in turn creates 
additional indirect employment opportunities, upstream 
linkages also have the potential to improve the expertise and 
quality of goods and services of suppliers, given that EI com-
panies require high international standards that have to be 
met. However, in many resource-rich developing countries 
domestic companies do not have the expertise to produce the 
required goods and services due to lack of experience and  
access to finance, and cannot make the necessary investments  
to meet the standards. In such circumstances, there is a need 
for financial, technical and technological support programmes 
to domestic companies that have the potential to become 
suppliers to the EI sector; long term procurement plans need 
to be provided that lay out the potential opportunities for 
suppliers over the lifetime of the project; tenders have to be 
unbundled and adapted to fit the local context; and local 
content strategies need to place importance on local value-
added rather than ownership and have realistic targets that 
are updated on a regular basis. The upstream sector has the 
greatest potential to promote female employment given that 
it offers the opportunity to outsource activities in areas such 
as catering that have higher female participation rates.
While many resource-rich country governments prioritise 
moving downstream to add value to their commodities 
domestically rather than exporting them in an unprocessed 
form, the literature does not find supporting evidence that 
access to natural resources plays a big role in making the 
downstream industries competitive. In most cases, moving 
downstream therefore requires strong government interven-
tions. Governments may use their negotiating power to 
require further processing when awarding highly valuable 
resource concessions, use incentives to make downstream 
projects economically viable, or use export restrictions such 
as taxes and bans. Governments should be aware that in all 
cases where companies do not move downstream volun-
tarily, government intervention is likely to come at a cost in 
the form of tax revenue losses from the EI project, required 
spending to support the downstream sector and marginal 
mining projects not going ahead or closing. Such a policy 
decision therefore requires a cost-benefit analysis by govern-
Executive Summary
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ments to assess whether the benefits associated with ‘first de-
gree’ downstream processing such as smelting and refineries 
compensate for the costs and whether there is potential for 
the sector to be internationally competitive in the medium 
to long term. These projects tend to be capital and energy 
intensive, while also requiring good access to infrastructure. 
The employment and technology transfer benefits associated 
from moving downstream often only increase at the second 
and third degree downstream industries, such as fabrication 
and assembly, which are equally difficult to attract. 
Whereas it is relatively straightforward to identify upstream 
and downstream linkages, it is harder to assess whether 
horizontal linkages have been created given that it is not 
always clear what the main contributors are for new sectors 
to emerge and whether the experience and expertise from the 
EI sector had a role to play therein. Therefore the literature 
on this linkage type is relatively sparse with few case studies 
from which to learn. However, horizontal linkages provide a 
unique opportunity to diversify the economy away from the 
EI sector. Horizontal linkages can stem both from transfer-
able skills that are not sector – specific (IT, finance, civil 
engineering, etc.) and from the adaptation of the capabilities, 
know-how and technologies developed to serve the EI sector. 
As such, they are more likely to occur in countries where 
upstream linkages have already been created (most horizon-
tal linkages stem from suppliers to the EI sector). To foster 
horizontal linkages, research and development initiatives 
should be created that provide financial incentives for first 
mover companies to explore opportunities in other sectors; 
high skilled training institutes should be built that support 
the transfer of capabilities from one sector to another; and 
the creation of clusters of industries with synergies to the EI 
sector should be promoted. 
Consumption linkages are less relevant today than they were 
during the years when import substitution industrial poli-
cies were widely used, as earnings leak abroad through the 
consumption of imported goods. The ‘natural’ geographical 
barriers have also become less relevant today due to globali-
sation and falling transport costs. The sectors that are most 
suited to create consumption linkages relate to services that 
require local presence such as the transport and restaurant 
industry; goods that have a high transport-to-value ratio 
such as cement, bricks and other construction materials; 
and perishable agricultural produce that cannot be stored 
or transported for long time periods. Apart from benefit-
ting from the geographical advantage, the demand for these 
goods and services is also closely associated with economic 
growth in booming regions. Future demand analyses that 
take into account the EI sector should be part of assessments 
that identify investment opportunities for the private sector 
to create these consumption linkages. Improving financial 
access and attractive interest rates on savings may encour-
age workers and companies in the EI sector to keep earnings 
within the country rather than channelling them offshore. 
Out of all the linkages, consumption linkages have the great-
est potential to create employment opportunities (referred 
to as induced employment). But because the effect of EI 
projects on the growth of local demand is not easy to trace, it 
is difficult to measure induced employment and multipliers 
vary widely. Therefore, care needs to be taken when induced 
employment numbers are provided.
One of the key reasons to attract foreign direct investment in 
the EI sector in the first place is the need for knowledge and 
sophisticated technologies to extract the resources, which are 
often not available domestically. There is a strong incentive 
for host countries to absorb knowledge, skills and technology 
from the foreign investor. Whereas horizontal linkages enable 
actors to adapt their capabilities to other sectors, knowledge 
and technology transfers enable them to improve those skills 
within the EI value chain. There are four channels through 
which knowledge and technology linkages can be transferred: 
(1) the demonstration-imitation channel, by which knowl-
edge and technology is adapted from EI companies, (2) the 
labour mobility channel, by which employees trained by EI 
companies move into the domestic economy and apply their 
acquired knowledge and expertise there, (3) the upstream-
linkage channel, by which the multinational corporation 
transfers knowledge and technology to domestic suppliers in 
order to help them meet certain standards, and (4) the export 
channel, by which EI companies enable local companies to 
access international markets. The key determinant whether 
knowledge and technology linkages can be created is the pre-
existing level of expertise available in the host country or the 
existing ‘absorptive capacity’. If the knowledge and technol-
ogy gap between the EI companies and national employees/
suppliers/state owned companies is too large, transfers are 
likely to be minimal. Therefore partnerships between these 
stakeholders should focus on skill development. Efforts  
need to be taken to build the national expertise by improving 
the education system through targeted vocational trainings, 
integrating courses that will serve the EI sector in tertiary 
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(WTO) creation in 1995 and the subsequent proliferation 
of international investment agreements. Under the WTO 
three new international agreements entered into force that 
set out rules relevant for linkage policies: (1) the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), which 
restricts government measures that require mining companies 
to source domestic over foreign goods and impose export re-
strictions in order to incentivise downstream processing; (2) 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM), which prevent governments from using incentives 
and granting subsidies that are contingent on sourcing goods 
domestically; and (3) the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), which, in scheduled services sectors, can 
prevent governments from providing advantages to domestic 
firms that are not similarly provided to foreign enterprises, 
as well as requiring domestic equity participation and joint 
ventures. International investment treaties, of which pres-
ently roughly 3000 have been concluded, often go beyond 
the restrictions of WTO agreements, e.g. by barring govern-
ments from requiring technology transfer and local research 
and development programmes. These treaties usually also use 
investor-state arbitration rather than WTO’s state-to-state 
arbitration system, which increases the likelihood of actions 
being filed. To avoid being taken to arbitration and to ensure 
they retain appropriate policy tools for promoting linkages, 
governments therefore need to ensure policy coherence when 
signing investment treaties.
Apart from the international legal framework, stakeholders 
also need to be aware of changing production processes with-
in the EI value chain. These are increasingly fragmented and 
unbundled with countries becoming specialized in specific 
tasks and business activities rather than sectors and indus-
tries. Higher value added functions are progressively concen-
trating in technologically advanced countries and lower value 
added activities are located in countries with low labour 
costs. Furthermore, there is a trend towards automation in 
the sector. This will increase productivity and improve the 
health and safety record of the industry, but at the same time 
will further reduce the number of people employed in the 
sector and alter procurement requirements. Resource-rich 
countries therefore need forward-looking policies that have 
education, skill and technology development at their core.
Recommendations by stakeholder
Extractive industry companies
EI companies can play a major role in supporting the cre-
ation of linkages, particularly those that are directly relevant 
educational programmes and promoting research and de-
velopment with national institutions. Intellectual property 
rights should be tailored to the development stage of the host 
country.
Spatial linkages provide an opportunity to address the 
infrastructure-financing gap that developing countries face. 
Given that resources are often located in remote regions, EI 
companies invest in transport, power, water and ICT infra-
structure that is required for their operations. In addition to 
improving infrastructure access to surrounding regions and 
thereby potentially unlocking economic opportunities that 
were previously not economically viable, economies of scale 
and scope can be achieved when this infrastructure is shared. 
Economies of scale, because one infrastructure investment 
with a larger capacity is oftentimes cheaper than investing 
in two separate infrastructure projects (one 400MW power 
plant, for example is going to be cheaper than two 200MW 
power plants); and economies of scope, because costs as-
sociated with one type of infrastructure investment can be 
shared with another type of infrastructure investment (when 
building oil pipeline infrastructure, for example, fibre optics 
cabling can be deployed at a reduced cost, given that up 
to 80% of costs are associated with civil works). However, 
building infrastructure at a higher capacity or adapting the 
infrastructure for additional users is likely to result in higher 
capital, operational and logistical costs, which explains why 
EI companies may be against shared use. Requirements for 
shared use therefore should only be made on a case-by-case 
basis when the associated net benefits are higher than the 
costs for society. To assess how EI infrastructure investments 
can be leveraged, infrastructure master plans should map 
out the economic potential of the regions and population 
centres that may benefit from infrastructure investments. 
Governments need to set aside resources to invest in feeder 
infrastructure to benefit other users. The implementation of 
shared use will require strong public utilities to serve as viable 
partners to EI companies. An independent regulator that 
oversees access and tariffs is also required.
Constraints on creating linkages
International law places some restrictions on the tools 
governments can use to encourage the development of the 
linkages discussed above. These rules have both proliferated 
and become more stringent over the last 20 years, imply-
ing that countries which are now seeking to develop these 
linkages are governed by a legal framework very different 
than the one in place prior to the World Trade Organisation’s 
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ated infrastructure investments and to domestic suppliers of 
the EI project. Apart from requiring high social and envi-
ronmental standards, financial development support often 
comes with technical assistance that may help maximise the 
potential linkages. Technical cooperation can leverage its 
expertise and experience in private sector development pro-
grammes from other sectors to support suppliers or potential 
future suppliers in meeting the required standards of the EI 
sector. Furthermore, technical cooperation is well placed 
to support governments with providing neutral analytical 
assessments that can feed into the long-term development 
strategy and industrial/diversification policy. As highlighted 
throughout the document, cost-benefit analyses are required 
to determine whether many of these linkages are worth 
pursuing. Finally, if looking to support linkage creation from 
the EI sector, international development cooperation should 
consider adapting their development assistance by align-
ing policy advice within and among development partners. 
Measures may include avoiding conflicting advice on local 
content and trade/investment treaties; lengthening project 
timelines given that linkage creation is a long-term process 
and unlikely to succeed in the short run; placing greater fo-
cus on artisanal and small scale mining given that this sector 
provides significant employment opportunities (including for 
women, who make up 30% of the world’s artisanal miners), 
is often neglected by the government, and has devastating im-
pacts on health and the environment; and designing support 
programmes that fit into the political economy of a country 
– the EI sector is characterised by large investment flows 
and rent seeking behaviour, which requires a fine balance 
between good practices while fitting into the local context, 
institutions and politics to have a meaningful impact.
Germany has four characteristics, which make it a good 
candidate to support linkage creation from the EI sector: (1) 
It has various agencies already involved in providing financial 
and technical support to both governments and EI com-
panies in linkage creation; (2) Germany may benefit from 
being perceived as a neutral agent by both governments and 
EI companies given that it has less of a colonial history and 
the large EI companies are not based in Germany; (3) Ger-
many’s experience from its technologically advanced “Mit-
telstand” companies may prove useful in supporting small 
and medium sized companies to become suppliers to the 
EI sector; and (4) Germany is renowned for its dual educa-
tion system and vocational training programmes. These four 
characteristics enable Germany to give targeted support to 
both governments and EI companies that will maximize the 
potential of linkages and contribute to sustainable develop-
ment in resource-rich countries. 
to their core operations, which include upstream, knowledge 
and technology, and spatial linkages. To support the former 
two, EI companies can publish long-term procurement plans 
in order for potential suppliers to have sufficient time to 
prepare for tenders, adapt tenders to local realities for domes-
tic companies to be able to bid for them, provide financial 
assistance to local suppliers, design vocational training 
programmes to train future employees and service providers, 
and create joint research projects with universities to special-
ize and improve the technology suited for the geology of the 
country. To develop spatial linkages EI companies should 
collaborate with government entities and other companies to 
explore potential economies of scale and scope. Lastly, it is 
important for EI companies to manage expectations - espe-
cially when it comes to direct, indirect and induced employ-
ment opportunities. In this regard, EI companies should 
act with care and roll out public awareness campaigns that 
explain whether opportunities are likely to benefit interna-
tional, national and/or local employees/suppliers.
Host country governments
The lack of policy coherence and coordination among 
government agencies is one of the biggest stumbling blocks 
in creating linkages. A long-term development strategy can 
provide a vision and guidance for the development targets 
the country wants to achieve. In resource-rich countries 
industrial, diversification and local content policies can guide 
how the EI sector contributes to achieve these targets. These 
should not conflict with international commitments made 
under the WTO and international investment agreements. 
A significant emphasis should be placed on strengthening 
the absorptive capacity of the local population by improv-
ing education, providing vocational trainings in disciplines 
that are and will be in high demand, and promoting research 
and development programmes. Small and medium sized 
enterprises, especially those that do not qualify for company 
supplier programmes, should be supported. To foster spatial 
linkages the legal framework should allow for governments to 
require shared-use infrastructure access when the benefits are 
larger than the costs for society. Finally, governments should 
consider opportunities beyond their countries’ borders when 
assessing linkages from the EI sector. Unviable linkages at 
the national level may become viable at the regional level 
and costs may be reduced significantly by sharing these with 
neighbouring countries. 
International development cooperation 
Both technical and financial development cooperation have a 
role to play in helping to create linkages to the EI sector. The 
latter can provide financing to the EI project itself, to associ-
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In this context, and given that German Development 
Cooperation has been working to support resource-rich 
low-income countries in developing their EI sectors, the 
Sector Project Sustainable Economic Development (GIZ) 
approached the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI) to provide an overview of the potential linkages to 
the EI sector and to provide recommendations as to how EI 
companies, governments and the development cooperation 
can support the creation of linkages. This report is based 
on an extensive literature review as well as interviews with 
government officials, EI company representatives, develop-
ment cooperation representatives, and academics working in 
this area. Case studies have been used throughout to provide 
examples where EI linkages have been created, both in terms 
of ‘breadth’ (number of linkages) and ‘depth’ (local value 
added). Where relevant, special emphasis has been placed 
on the impacts of the linkages on employment creation and 
gender equality, given that these two topics are of strategic 
importance to German Development Cooperation.
The report is structured as follows: Following this introduc-
tory chapter, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the different 
linkages to the EI sector. It includes a brief summary of the 
theory underpinning each linkage type, a literature review 
of the determinants required to capture the linkage; country 
case studies that illustrate how stakeholders have success-
fully supported the development of this type of linkage; and 
 lessons learned, which are accompanied by a SWOT  
analysis2 of each linkage type. Chapter 3 lays out the con-
straints that resource-rich countries face in creating linkages 
to the EI sector. It includes the impact that trade and invest-
ment agreements have on the policy space of governments 
to support linkage creation; the increasing fragmentation of 
global value chains requiring particular expertise; and the 
increased automation of the EI sector. Finally, building on 
the lessons learned, Chapter 4 suggests a set of recommen-
dations for governments, EI companies and international 
development cooperation, with a special focus on the value 
added that German Development Cooperation may bring. 
The last decades have seen an unprecedented inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in extractive industry (EI) 
projects in developing countries. With the best deposits in 
established resource-producing countries being exhausted 
and high commodity prices in the first decade of the new 
Millennium, EI companies (private, publicly-listed and 
state-owned) have been more willing to venture into riskier 
resource-rich low-income (frontier) countries with the pros-
pect of high profits if successful.1 This trend is likely going 
to continue once commodity prices recover. Given that these 
frontier countries have a comparative advantage in the ex-
traction of resources (often one of the only ones) and that EI 
projects make up a large proportion of their total investments, 
the question arises how to maximize the benefits of these.
While economic diversification is an often stated goal of 
resource-rich countries, developing new industries in sectors 
that are unrelated to current economic activities is more 
difficult than in sectors where the country already has a 
comparative advantage. As stated in the context of promot-
ing development in Sub-Saharan Africa: the question “is not 
whether Africa can industrialize by ‘ignoring’ its commodities, 
but rather how the latter can be used to promote value addi-
tion, new service industries and technological capabilities that 
span the sub regions of the continent.” (UNECA 2013: 95). 
Tackling this question is at the core of the African Union’s 
Agenda, the African Mining Vision, and the Plan of Action 
for Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa. It is also 
subsumed under Goal 9 of the recently adopted Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). Indeed SDG 9 – “Build 
resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation” – gives a platform to 
address the question as to how countries can leverage their 
natural resources to industrialize and diversify. It is note-
worthy that the SDGs place a lot more importance on how 
the private sector can contribute to development than their 
predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals, and this 
report also considers that EI companies have a major role to 
play to enable these linkages.
INTRODUCTION
1 The broader term “resource-rich countries” has been chosen over “resource 
dependent countries”, given that German Development Cooperation also provides 
support to developing countries that may not reach the export or revenue 
thresholds that are required to qualify for the latter term, but where support 
to create linkages to the EI sector may still be an important policy choice to 
consider .
2 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats analysis
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Sidestream linkages (or enabling factors): relate to the sup-
porting services, know-how and infrastructure necessary for 
the EI value chain to function. These can benefit the wider 
economy and can be sub-divided into: 
• Knowledge (technological) linkages: relate to the transfer 
of knowledge and technological know-how. For example 
a mining company may require IT services with higher 
 expertise. Apart from benefitting the mining company 
itself, the developed IT expertise may also benefit other 
sectors in the economy. 
• Spatial (infrastructure) linkages: relate to the benefits 
associated with the infrastructure developed for an EI 
project profiting other actors in the economy. For example 
an iron-ore mine is likely going to require railway infra-
structure. Other companies (from the mining sector and 
non-mining sectors) and passengers will benefit from this 
railway infrastructure if they are granted access.  
The literature refers to three channels through which mining 
projects create employment in resource-rich countries:  
• Direct employment: refers to the people directly em-
ployed by the EI company. For example, this includes the 
mine truck drivers in a mine.
• Indirect employment: refers to the people employed up-
stream and downstream from the EI sector.3 For example 
employees of a catering company that services a mine site.
• Induced employment: refers to the economic activity 
resulting from the spending of direct and indirect employ-
ees of an EI project (see example given for consumption 
linkages). 
The figure on the next page provides an overview of the 
various linkages. Upstream, downstream and fiscal linkages 
are linked with the project itself. Horizontal, knowledge 
and spatial linkages can originate from the whole value 
chain, which is represented by the red arrow. Consumption 
linkages originate from the spending of employees from the 
EI project itself (direct employment) and the upstream and 
downstream businesses (indirect employment). The dot-
2.1  Overview of Linkages
Typology of Linkages
There are seven types of linkages:
Fiscal linkages refer to the payments – such as royalties – 
that EI companies make to governments in order to extract 
and sell the resources. At the request of GIZ, this study does 
not focus on fiscal linkages, since these will be addressed in a 
separate report.
Production linkages refer to the goods and services that 
can be developed as a result of EI operations. These can be 
further divided into:
• Upstream (or backward) linkages: that relate to the pro-
curement of goods and services that the EI sector requires 
to operate. For example, this includes welding services 
needed to maintain mining equipment. 
• Downstream (or forward) linkages: that relate to the 
beneficiation of extracted commodities through refining, 
smelting and further downstream processing of the com-
modity before reaching the final consumer. For example, 
98% of the world’s mined iron ore is used to make steel 
and therefore needs to pass through a steel mill. 
• Horizontal (or lateral) linkages: that relate to the de-
velopment of new industries using the capabilities of the 
EI-related supply chain. Apart from originating from the 
EI project, horizontal linkages can occur from the up-
stream and downstream level. For example, mining trucks 
could be re-engineered and adapted to service the logging 
industry. 
• Consumption linkages: relate to the demand for goods 
and services resulting from the spending of earnings from 
the EI sector. This effect is also referred to as induced 
 employment. For example, when a truck driver employed 
to work at a mine site spends his salary on buying con-
struction materials to build a family house.
LINKAGES
3 Some reports only include upstream linkages when referring to indirect 
 employment .
LINKAGES
14
Linkages depend on: 
1. The commodity being extracted and extraction  
 method:
Some commodities, such as diamonds require limited inputs, 
whereas others, such as copper, may require considerable 
processing. In turn, the type of operation can play a role; for 
example, offshore oil and gas and very deep underground 
mining require high level technical expertise. Depending on 
the local know-how and skills base, the type of commodity 
and extraction method may act as a barrier or enhancement 
of upstream and knowledge linkage creation (Kaplinsky, 
2011). The production processes vary, with precious metals 
often having shorter exploitation periods than basic metals, 
which in turn will also determine whether there is sufficient 
extraction time that makes upstream and downstream link-
ages viable. Spatial linkages around rails and ports tend to be 
larger for bulk commodity projects, such as iron-ore and coal 
mines since these projects require large transport infrastruc-
ture investments to become viable. Fiscal linkages, on the 
other hand are more likely to be larger in oil projects, given 
that these tend to be more profitable.
2. The country context:
The opportunities for upstream, downstream, horizontal, 
knowledge, and technology linkages are highly dependent 
on the existing know-how and expertise in the country and 
region where the EI project operates. If the knowledge gap 
ted yellow line represents those linkages which feed directly 
into the core operation of the project. This is of importance, 
because it indicates whether it is in the self-interest of the 
company to develop that particular linkage (domestically or 
internationally). For example, it is in the self-interest of an 
EI company to procure high quality goods and services from 
upstream companies and therefore it may consider support 
programmes that help transfer knowledge to meet these 
standards However, the company is less likely to be con-
cerned about potential developments in unrelated sectors of 
the economy and therefore the support of horizontal linkages 
would have to be government driven. While consumption 
linkages are not related to the core business of the EI com-
pany, they might still be of interest to EI companies to the 
extent that they might contribute to saving its social license 
to operate (see section 2.7 for further explanations).  
Linkage opportunities are context specific
While each of the following sections sets out some of the 
preconditions for creating linkages and provides concrete ex-
amples of where linkages were successfully created, it must be 
borne in mind that linkage-creation is very context specific. 
Generalised conclusions are therefore of limited applicability. 
Figure 2 .1: Linkages to the EI sector
 Source: Authors
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4. The ownership structure of the EI company: 
Morris et al. (2012) argue that foreign ownership might be 
less conducive to linkage creation than domestic ownership 
for cultural and nationalistic reasons. This is most evident 
with state-owned EI companies that are often established 
with the mandate to spur economic domestic activities 
through upstream, downstream, spatial, and knowledge 
linkages. Their mismanagement can however negatively 
impact fiscal linkages. Among foreign investors, the Chinese 
state owned enterprises (SOE) stand out. These Chinese 
SOEs tend to display little appetite for investing in building 
the capabilities of the local workforce employed to work on 
investment projects. Instead, where skills are lacking in the 
local work force, Chinese companies tend to be quicker than 
their Western counterparts in replacing them with expatriate 
staff.
Employment 
Intimately related to what determines the extent of linkages 
is the question of how many jobs will be created. While each 
chapter tries to address the extent to which each linkage type 
will lead to job creation, it is important to remember that 
multiple factors influence the employment creation potential 
of an investment, including: (1) the type of ownership (pub-
is too large, the opportunities for these linkages are small.  
A country’s history and experience with the EI sector plays 
an important role for all linkage types. With the exception 
of Botswana4, all countries analysed in Morris et al. (2012) 
show a positive correlation between how long the EI sector 
has been in operation and the depth and breadth of linkages. 
Hansen (2014) reports that there is a consensus in the litera-
ture that the time factor is essential. He finds that according 
to several authors (Amendolagine et al., 2013; Merlevede 
et al., 2011) the lack of linkages observed in many African 
countries could, in part, be attributable the “recent nature” 
of the “extractive FDI-based development”. 
3. The life cycle of the project:
Few opportunities exist during the exploration phase given 
that this activity usually only involves a small specialized team 
on the ground. Employment figures peak during the con- 
struction phase, which is also the period in which consump-
tion linkages could be maximized given the large number of 
employees/ contractors who may spend their earnings domesti-
cally. However, this time period may be too short to create 
sustainable upstream linkages if the contractors used for the 
construction phase cannot find additional opportunities in 
other infrastructure projects in the country when the phase 
ends. The production phase, in turn, is more suitable to build 
long-term upstream and downstream linkages to a project. 
Figure 2 .2: Employment opportunities throughout the life cycle of an EI project
Source: ICMM (2014), The Role of Mining in National Economies (2nd edition): Mining’s Contribution to Sustainable Development .
4 In Botswana, downstream linkages only started 2005 despite a long history of 
diamond exploitation .
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induced employment opportunities will depend on the 
extractive region’s ability to offer and ideally produce the 
consumption products that are in demand by employees 
in the resource sector. Multipliers capturing indirect and 
induced employment effects are calculated in different ways 
from one study to the next and are generated by different 
models, principally input-output (I-O) models and com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models (CCSI, 2016 
forthcoming). While the World Bank (2009) estimates that 
on average indirect employment is around 2-4 times larger 
lic versus private, foreign versus domestic); (2) the size of 
the project (small versus large-scale); (3) the life cycle phase 
of the project (see figure below); (4) the type of operation 
(off-shore versus on-shore, or open-pit versus underground); 
and (5) the type of commodity being extracted (as explained 
above) (CCSI, 2016 forthcoming). 
Indirect employment opportunities will largely depend on 
the ability of local businesses to offer services and goods 
meeting the standards required by EI companies, whereas 
Figure 2 .3: Employment multipliers of various analyses
Source: World Gold Council (2015), The Social and Economic Impacts of Gold Mining .
INDUSTRY LOCATION DIRECT  
IMPACT
INDIRECT  
IMPACT
DIRECT AND
INDIRECT IMPACT
SOURCE
Africa (not including South Africa)
Mining Tanzania 1 .0 7 .6 8 .6 ICMM (2007)58
Gold mining Tanzania 1 .0 6 .87 7 .87 Ernst & Young (2013)44
Copper mining Zambia 1 .0 2 .61 3 .61 ICMM (2014)45
Gold mining Tanzania 1 .0 3 .0 4 .0 World Gold Council (2009)59
Gold mining Mali 1 .0 6 .0 7 .0 United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (2007)60
Median Value 6.0 7.0
North America, Oceania, Europe and South Africa
Gold mining Canada 1 .0 1 .92 2 .92 Dungan, P ., Murphy, S . (2014)52
Gold mining Canada 1 .0 1 .44 2 .44 Dungan, P ., Murphy, S . (2014)52
Gold mining Australia 1 .0 2 .13 3 .13 Minerals Council of Australia (2013)61
Gold mining New Zealand 1 .0 1 .19 2 .19 Brent Wheeler (2003)53
Gold mining Romania 1 .0 3 .25 4 .25 Oxford Policy Management (2009)54
Mining USA 1 .0 1 .8 2 .8 Barnett, C (1999)55
Mining South  
Australia
1 .0 3 .0 4 .0 Barnett, C (1999)55
Median Value 1.92 2.92
South America
Mining sector Tanzania 1 .0 4 .0 5 .0 Mining Institute of Engineers of Peru 
(2010)62
Mining sector Tanzania 1 .0 1 .9 2 .9 World Gold Council (2011)46
Mining sector Zambia 1 .0 4 .41 5 .41 McCurdy, K ., Keresztes, T . (2012)46
Large Copper 
and gold mines
Tanzania 1 .0 2 .84 3 .84 Ernst & Young (2013)44
Medium gold 
mining
Mali 1 .0 2 .28 3 .28 Ernst & Young (2013)44
Median Value 2.84 3.84
Asia, Russia and CIS
Mining Mongolia 1 .0 2 .05 3 .05 Stokes, E . (2005)56
Median Value 2.05 3.05
Full sample 
median value
2 .73 3 .73
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than direct employment in the mining sector and 1-4 times 
in the oil sector, it is very difficult to generalize the employ-
ment impact of linkages. This finding is also exemplified by 
the figure on the previous page, which provides an overview 
of the indirect multipliers in various projects in the gold sector. 
Multipliers vary significantly even for gold projects in the same 
country, such as in Tanzania (multiplier estimate of 6.87 vs. 3).
Taking into account the impact of induced employment, the 
multiplier can be as high as 10 or more according to certain 
studies (Apoyo 2009, Kapstein and Kim 2011).5 In fact, as 
shown in figures above and below respectively, induced em-
ployment is always much larger than indirect employment. 
What is less well understood and not reflected in direct, 
 indirect and induced employment figures are the job 
losses that may result from large-scale EI projects. This is 
 particularly relevant for the Artisanal and Small Scale Mining 
(ASM) sector, given that these miners often compete for the 
same deposits. The employment and gender impact of the 
ASM sector is often significantly larger in many develop-
ing countries where precious stones and metals are mined, 
as highlighted in the box 2.1, and should therefore play a 
central role in government policies and support programmes 
of international development cooperation (see recommen- 
dation D9).     
 
Box 2.1: Employment and gender impact of ASM
It is estimated that more than 20 million people are 
working globally in the ASM sector, 30% of which are 
female (World Bank, 2012) . This means that just the 
 proportion of women working in ASM is more than double 
the number of global employees in large-scale mining, 
which has been estimated at 2 .5 million (ICMM, 2014) .  
 
In some countries ASM plays an even bigger role in the 
economy and the female participation is higher . In the 
Central African Republic, for example, two thirds of the 
population are thought to directly or indirectly rely on 
diamond mining . In Uganda it is estimated that 200,000 
people (out of which 45% are estimated to be female) 
were engaged in ASM in gold, tin, coltan, wolfram and 
other industrial minerals in 2012 .  
 
However, the quality of the jobs in the ASM sector is 
often not as high as in the large-scale mining sector . 
Apart from often operating in the informal sector of the 
economy, the ASM sector is often associated with unsafe 
mining practices, low and unsteady salaries, health 
 problems, environmental damage and conflict . 
2.2 Production Linkages: Upstream/  
 Backward Linkages 
Upstream or backward linkages relate to the procurement 
of goods and services that the EI sector requires to operate. 
The Figure 2.6 shows that this makes up the bulk of the 
money spent by EI companies. In 2014 upstream spending 
by BP and Anglo American made up 87% and 64% respec-
tively (BP combined the capital cost spending into the sup-
plier spending in its annual report, whereas Anglo American 
has separated it out). This compares with 2% and 11% of 
total spending on government payments respectively.
Figure 2 .4: Examples of direct, indirect and induced 
employment figures
Source: GIZ (2015), Sustainable Economic Development in Resource-Rich Countries, 
Guidelines for Technical Cooperation .
EMPLOYMENT
Direct Indirect Indirect*
Escondida mine
(Chile - 2004)
2,800 5,270 8,500 
(up to 12,800)
Obuasi mine
(Ghana - 2005)
6,670 1,000
(up to 5,000)
20,000 
(up to 50,000)
Sepon mine
(Chile - 2008)
2,460 2,450 12,300
* The indirect and induced employment figures are based on estimates on the 
assumption that certain multipliers(or multiplier options) apply . they relate 
solely to domestic employment effects .  
Source: ICMM March & July 2007, 2011 .
5 Kapstein and Kim( 2011) find that the employment multiplier for the Ahafo mine 
in Ghana was 28 . 
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Figure 2 .6 Value created by BP and Anglo American in 2014
Source: Own graph with data from Anglo American (2015) and BP (2015)
Figure 2 .5: Upstream linkages
n  Suppliers 
n  Taxes
n  Capex
n  Dividends
n  Employes
n  Interest
n  Suppliers 
n  Employes
n  Communities
n  Governments
n  Capital providers
n  Retaining earnings
Anglo American BP
2%
43%
21%
16%
11%
7%
87%
0%
3%
4%
2%
Horizontal linkages
Knowledge linkages
Consumption linkages
(Induced Employment)
Upstream linkages
(Indirect Employment)
Downstream linkages
(Indirect Employment)
Employment Spatial linkages
Fiscal linkages
VALUE CHAIN
EI‘s sphere 
of interest
EI project
(Direct Employment)
LINKAGES
19
It should be noted that the spending pattern of companies 
and the implications on the supply chain vary depending on 
the type of companies, as highlighted above.
Furthermore, different types of upstream linkage 
 opportunities exist at the different stages of the project life 
cycle, with the greatest scope for upstream linkages during 
Figure 2 .7: Company types and spending patterns
Source: Ramdoo (2015), Resource-based Industrialisation in Africa Optimising Linkages and Value Chains in the Extractive Sector .
the production stage. While varying by commodity and mine 
type, mining companies spend between 75-90% of their 
undiscounted nominal value during this phase of the project. 
This is illustrated in figure 2.8, which also indicates that the 
goods and services procured are predominantly basic materi-
als and manual and low skilled labour.
Type of industries Characteristics and areas of activities Examples of services and equipment needed
Global giants Diversified portfolio, highly integrated Insurance, trading services, consumables, 
transport services, employment agencies, 
market consultants, media relations, mining 
equipment, explosive and accessories
Senior companies Vertical; Strategy (controllers); Commodity 
focus; Acquisitional
Insurance, consumables, employment agencies
Intermediate and 
national companies
Commodity focus; Acquisitional; Production; 
Investor/controller
Insurance, mining equipment, consumables, 
engineering contractors, consultancies
Expansory junior compa-
nies (large firms: assets 
worth > $ 100 million)
Production; Development; Investment;  
Exploration
Risk assessors, camp services, consultan-
cies, computer software, metal analysis, lab 
services, geophysics, drill contractors, mining 
equipment, environmental services
Exploration junior 
companies (small firms: 
assets worth < $ 100 
million)
Production; Development; Investment;  
Exploration
Same as above
Prospectors,  
private firms
Exploration Regional promotion, leagl and fiscal infra-
structure consultants, airborne surveyors, 
mapping services pegging records
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According to a 2012 World Bank report analysing  local 
 procurement in mining in West Africa, the following 
 mining –related opportunities could be realistically seized in 
the short-to-medium term (these opportunities are shown 
graphically along the mine life cycle in annex 1):  
Figure 2 .8: Mining spending on goods and services along the mining life cycle (Share of life of mine cost, %) 
Source: McKinsey (2013), Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies .
6
• Services:
 » Legal and regulatory services when there is a need for 
local knowledge
 » Mining and drilling services (waste haulage, secondary 
crushing, specialized drilling, sample analysis)
 » Transport and logistics services
 » Spare part warehousing
 » Supply of lubricants
 » Analysis and testing, including ore samples, water, oil,
 » Civil works6 Exhibit from “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven 
economies ”, December 2013, McKinsey Global Institute, www .mckinsey .com . Copy-
right (c) 2013 McKinsey & Company . All rights reserved . Reprinted by permission .
Exploration and 
feasibility
Site  
development
Production Closure
0–3 10–25 75–90 0–2
10–170-1 1–39 -12 0–1
8–141–47 –10
0–10
3–100–11 –2 2–6
6–140–11 –3 5-9
10–200-12 -5 8-13 0-1
5–121-44 –8
4–100–11 –2 3-7
7–140–11 -4 6-8 0–1
8–170-11 -4 7–11 0–1
0-1
0-1
Goods
Services
Utilities
Basic materials
Low- to medium-
complexity equipment
and parts
High-complexity 
equipment and parts
Integrated plant
 
equipment solutions
Manual and low-skill
 
labor services
Midtiers killed labor
Technical support 
services
Business support
 
services
Management/EPCM1
Utilities
1 Engineering, procurement, and construction management .
NOTE: Analysis based on expert interviews and quantitative estimates of capital and operational expenditure over the life of 
 
a mine . Figures are subject to variation according to the specific metal and type of mine considered . The totals shown for  
 
each element of the mine life cycle will therefore not necessarily equal the sum of the individual items below .
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 » Supply of metal fabrication
 » Mining village management (including cleaning, main-
tenance, catering, non-hazardous waste management)
• Capital Equipment:
 » Kilns and furnaces
 » Plastic products (pipes) 
 » Cement 
 » Assembly of small motors
• Consumables
 » Tires when there are rubber plantations
 » Lime
 » Cyanide, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and 
activated carbon
 » Crucibles
• Non-core goods and services
 » Food and beverages
 » Local training service providers
 » Sample bags and packaging
 » Uniforms
The spending pattern in the oil and gas sector is more 
geared towards high complexity goods and integrated plant 
 equipment solution, as can be seen in the figure below. This 
can reduce the scope of upstream linkages opportunities in 
 developing countries with a low skill base.
Figure 2 .9: Difference between mining and oil and gas expenditure over goods and services  
(Cost breakdown by cost type, %)
Source: McKinsey (2013), Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-
driven economies .7
7 Exhibit from “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies ”, December 2013, McKinsey Global Institute, www .mckinsey .com . Copyright (c) 2013 
McKinsey & Company . All rights reserved . Reprinted by permission .
Goods
Services
Utilities
Basic materials
Low- to medium-complexity 
equipment and parts
High-complexity equipment 
and parts
Integrated plant equipment 
solutions
Manual and low-skill labor 
services
Midtier skilled labor
Technical support services
Business support services
Management/EPCM
Utilities
Total 100
8–17
10–17
8–14
0–10
3–10
6–14
10–20
5–12
4–10
7–14
100
8–13
2–12
0–5
7–12
2–7
2–7
15–25
12–20
5–10
13–23
Cost categories Metals and mining Oil and gas
Major spend buckets
LINKAGES
22
the upstream opportunities along the value chain of the oil 
and gas sector. 
The evaluation of whether the local economy has seized 
such local procurement opportunities should be done with 
caution. Zambia is a case in point: as shown in the figure 
below, while most of the mining services are provided by 
local entrepreneurs, most of the goods are not manufactured 
in Zambia but imported from abroad through Zambian 
companies. Therefore, while the mining companies would 
present substantive local expenses in terms of local procure-
ment, only a small proportion is attributed to goods that are 
actually produced locally. 
The potential for upstream linkages in the oil sector is likely 
to be limited during the exploration and development stages 
because of the highly specialized and technical nature of 
goods and services required at these stages (Tordo et al., 
2013). The scope for upstream linkages thus tends to be 
greater during the production stage, as the inputs required 
are less specialized than during the previous phases. How-
ever during the further downstream phases, this potential 
becomes limited again given the demand for specialized 
content in inputs. Some temporary opportunities remain in 
the construction of pipes, pipelines and storage facilities and 
some more permanent ones in the primary distribution of 
refined products to customers. The figures in annex 1 set out 
Figure 2 .10: Procurement of goods and services in Zambia’s copper sector .
Source: ICMM (2014), Enhancing mining’s contribution to the Zambian economy and society .
2 .2 .1 . Literature review and case studies
The value chain literature (Akinlo, 2004; Bwalya, 2006; 
Larsen et al., 2009; Fessehaie, 2011; Mjimba, 2011; Mor-
rissey 2012; Morris et al., 2012) suggests that local linkages 
to the African EI sector are “few and shallow” (Hansen, 2014).  
This is often the result of upstream linkages being neglected 
by policy makers. Kaplinsky (2011) suggests two reasons for 
this negligence:
1. The conviction that the EI sector is an enclave sector 
(legacy from the theories of the 50’s); and
2. The underestimation of the EI sector’s potential to 
generate technological spill-overs based on the percep-
tions that either the sector’s technological content is too 
high for successful participation in its supply chain or 
too low to produce spill-overs and enable the creation 
of a knowledge-based industry.
Mining company procurement
Goods Services
Zambian
produced
Direct
imports
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
(2012 data from the four mining companies, US$ million)
Imports
bought from
Zambian
companies
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The breadth and depth of upstream linkages to a country’s 
EI sector are dependent on 1) how long commodities have 
been exploited in that country; 2) the nature of ownership of 
the lead extractive company; 3) the skills level of local suppli-
ers and the extent to which national institutions support the 
technological development of local suppliers or its National 
System of Innovation (NSI);11 4) local suppliers’ access to in-
frastructure and finance; 5) the quality of the policy around 
linkage promotion; and 6) the structure of the sector (Morris 
et al. 2012, Hansen 2014). Determinants 3-6 are reviewed in 
more detail below, given that the first two have already been 
described in section 2.1. 
The capabilities and skills of the local suppliers, 
and the technological support they receive from a 
NSI 
In a report on commodities and development, UNCTAD 
(2013) found that the local workforce’s low absorptive  
capacity12, especially due to a lack of skills, limits the scale 
of upstream linkages. The report concludes that the impact 
of FDI in the EI sector on a host country’s development 
is therefore limited. Fesshaie (2011) finds that low public 
investment in technological capacities leads African suppliers 
into a vicious circle of “low access to investment capital, low 
technological capabilities to start with, low incentives to adopt 
new technologies, and high risk that the market will not reward 
such investment“ (Hansen 2014).13
Peek and Gantes (2008) observe that the shortage of skills 
in the African oil and gas sectors is directly attributable to 
a combination of scarce educational facilities, weak voca-
tional and technical training, which is not targeted at the 
EI sector, and the lack of school accreditation. Morris et al. 
(2012) add that the NSI is often not in synergy with the 
sector, which lacks industry clusters. “[Such clusters] con-
tribute to the  development of a network between government, 
 universities and foreign and domestic firms that allows a progres-
sive  incorporation of domestic firms in the main  activities” 
( UNCTAD, 2012). As demonstrated on the next page by 
the case of South Africa,  suppliers operating in an industrial 
cluster benefit from faster  knowledge dissemination, reduced 
Kaplinsky refutes the first reason with the argument that the 
unique specificity of each deposit requires the creation of 
local skills and technologies. South Africa, Brazil, Angola and 
Tanzania serve as examples. Local suppliers may also have an 
advantage over global suppliers because of the lower cost of 
local knowledge (Ramdoo, 2013). Kaplinsky also debunks 
the second argument by asserting that the production process 
requires considerable inputs involving a broad range of skills 
levels. These range from the provision of basic utilities (water 
and power), food and office supplies over the provision 
of services in internet and telecommunication technology 
(ICT)8 and engineering maintenance9 to more  technological 
inputs such as “the assembly and sub-manufacture of the cables 
link[ing] sub-sea oil wells to surface vessels and to land”, which 
are sourced locally in Angola.
Kaplinsky (2011) therefore concludes that despite the wide-
spread perception that the EI sector operates in an enclave 
model, the potential for upstream linkages when assessing 
the whole range of inputs required by the project is high. If 
the country offers reliable, low cost, high quality suppliers, 
EI companies will prefer to outsource non-core competences 
creating further opportunities to create upstream linkages.10  
Hansen (2014) suggests that the enclave hypothesis is now 
outdated, in particular considering the recent change in the 
dynamics of extractive FDI: 
1. Multinationals evolve towards greater outsourcing of 
their non-core competencies.
2. Multinationals have integrated community-oriented 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies as 
risk-reducing strategies (‘social license to operate’) and 
see linkages as part of those strategies.
3. Western multinationals are now in competition 
with firms from emerging markets and  increasingly 
 competent local African extractive ‘champions’, 
 enabling African governments to strengthen their 
 bargaining power to require local content and the 
 promotion of linkages.
4. The international development cooperation is 
 increasingly looking at the promotion of linkages from 
the EI sector 
8 Nigeria has built up its ICT sector and its EI source these services  locally . 
9 Zambia is seen as a successful case study where engineering services are 
provided locally . 
10 Many authors (Altenburg, 2001; Nunnenkamp, 2002; Meyer & Sinan, 2009;  
 Morris 2001) argue that companies will be reluctant to outsource anything that 
has to do with the companies’ core competencies in order to avoid creating future 
 competitors . Therefore, intra-industry linkages will be less extensive than inter-
industry linkages . 
11 Freeman (1995), Lundvall (1992), and Morris et al . (2012) all use the expres-
sion of a “National System of Innovation” . 
12 The absorptive capacity refers to the capacity of local firms to learn new 
competencies through linkages . 
13 A similar situation is present in Mongolia, where SMEs have little access to 
finance and are hampered by their inability to invest in better machinery, technol-
ogy and training to improve their competitiveness and meet the quality standards 
that would be required to compete with imported goods or in foreign markets . 
Public investment to promote technological advances of SMEs would go a long 
way to support linkages to the EI sector by improving the quality to price ratio 
of Mongolia’s locally produced goods and services . (Interview with GIZ Mongolia, 
August 2015) .
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energy industry, develop business skills in the small and medium 
enterprises, encourage innovation and foster new thinking, help-
ing entrepreneurs to capture supply chain niches” (UNCTAD, 
2012).
South Africa is a case in point to understand the first three 
determinants of upstream linkage creation (long history of 
commodity exploitation, local ownership of the lead com-
panies, and the skills, capabilities and technological support 
given by the South African public-private NSI).
transaction costs, the acquisition of best practices, and in-
creases in competitiveness and innovation capacities (UNC-
TAD, 2012). The links that are created in industrial clusters 
also help establish industry-university collaborations aimed 
at designing educational programmes that serve the needs 
of the industry (as also mentioned in recommendations E8, 
G2 and G5). For instance, the Center for Energy Enterprise 
Development in Trinidad and Tobago was established in 
2004 to “increase local participation in value-added energy 
projects, facilitate the expansion in-depth and scope of the local 
Box 2.2: South Africa’s upstream supplier sector 
South Africa’s large-scale minerals exploitation started 
150 years ago with the discovery of diamonds, followed 
by gold and platinum in the 1870s . As a result, South 
 Africa has built up significant expertise in the mining 
sector and boasts the most developed mining and mining 
supply industry in Sub-Saharan Africa . 
In the early years of the mining sector, South African 
policies were geared towards two main goals: 1) provid-
ing a favourable environment for mining investors, notably 
by keeping costs, such as wages, low and financially 
supporting their technological and training efforts; and 2) 
encouraging upstream linkages by protecting the domestic 
industry through tariffs which lasted until the end of the 
Apartheid regime in 1994 . Those policies were combined 
with an early realisation by mining entrepreneurs that the 
specificity of the geology of the country’s mining depos-
its, which is characterized by great depth, necessitated 
advanced technologies and systems .  
Over time, technological capabilities were also strength-
ened as a result of (Kaplan, 2011):
1 . The scale and longevity of South Africa’s mining 
 sector, which provided the possibility of amortizing any 
 investment in technology over time .
2 . Economies of scope due to the variety of minerals .14 
3 . The structure of the mining industry, which was 
 dominated by large mining houses that cooperated e .g . 
by jointly financing technological improvements .
4 . The development of a NSI in close collaboration 
with the mining industry . The development of spe-
cial expertise in deep gold and platinum mining was 
incentivized by the cooperative research institute of 
the mining industry (COMRO) . This industry association 
undertook several research and development (R&D) 
initiatives in the 1960s to develop technologies that 
were adapted by local equipment manufacturers for 
deep gold mining, which led to the development of 
hydraulic equipment . COMRO also outsourced some of 
its R&D to equipment suppliers, other research orga-
nizations and South African universities (Progue 2008) .
5 . The development of the industry in geographical 
clusters concentrated east of Johannesburg and was 
characterized by frequent interactions between mining 
producers, specialized manufacturers, input providers, 
agents and distributors . The cluster included compa-
nies specializing in metallurgy, machinery, electrical 
equipment, and construction activities (Walker 2005) . 
The share of patents related to mining technology is 
much higher in South Africa than in other resource-rich 
and technologically advanced countries .15 In fact, the 
country has become a world leader in supplying deep 
level mining projects . South African export products in-
clude “spirals for washing coal; pumping up water from 
deep levels; hydropower; tracked mining; underground 
locomotives; ventilation; shaft sinking; turnkey new mine 
design and operation; and many others .,” (Morris et al . 
2012)
14 The same core capabilities were required by mining projects extracting differ-
ent commodities, thus providing the opportunity to realize economies of scope and 
reducing the projects’ development costs .
15 According to the United States Patent and Technology Office (USPTO), the aver-
age share of patents related to mining technology in South Africa between 1976 
and 2006 stands at 4 .5%, compared to 0 .5% in the U .S ., 1 .9% in Canada and 1 .3% 
in Australia . 
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ment contracts, EI companies’ ongoing needs and small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) capacities, as explained in 
the Box below and recommendation G6.
 
Box 2.3: Dealing with access to information
1 . In Chile, the Industrial Association of Antofagasta, 
Xstrata, BHP Billiton, and Barrick developed the Goods 
and Services Supplier Company Classification System, 
which provides an up-to-date database of suppliers 
and contractors (World Bank, 2009) .
2 . In Chad, the IFC helped compile a supplier database of 
over 1,000 vendors for ExxonMobil (World Bank, 2012) .
3 . In Kazakhstan, oil and gas companies are required to 
upload all procurement information and documents to 
the Kazakhstan Contract Agency Register . Brazil has 
a similar system with the Site Opportunities Supply 
Chain of Petroleum and Natural Gas, launched in 2009 
(McKinsey, 2013) .
4 . In Guinea, Rio Tinto and the IFC set up a database 
of over 400 SMEs and an enterprise center providing 
business services in the city of Beyla . Both initiatives 
facilitate the communication between local suppliers 
and Rio Tinto (IFC, 2015) .
5 . In Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, the Subcontractor and 
Partnership Exchanges, a joint effort by the state, 
the private sector and UNIDO, maintain a database 
 containing 450 and 700 SMEs respectively (World Bank, 
2012) .
The quality of local content policy  
According to Morris et al. (2012), the creation of upstream 
linkages is included in the national development visions of 
Angola, Botswana, Gabon and Nigeria, while, by 2012, this 
was not the case in Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania and South 
Africa.16 Even when countries have a vision, it often only 
 encourages local ownership instead of local value addition: 
this can result in a situation of “broad” linkages with very 
little depth, leading to “the localization of the import  
function” 17 (Morris et al., 2012).18 
South Africa’s long history of mining and its successful 
development of upstream linkages as described in the case 
study demonstrates how a mature mining sector as well as 
targeted policy interventions and support mechanisms, such 
as a NSI, can contribute to establishing a globally competi-
tive supplier network possessing specialized expertise regard-
ing the country’s unique geological characteristics. 
An acknowledgment of the success factors through which 
South Africa historically promoted and developed upstream 
linkages to its mining sector is unfortunately missing in the 
current government’s policy to maintain South African sup-
pliers’ comparative advantage. According to Kaplan (2011), 
in order to keep a sustainable comparative advantage, South 
Africa’s supply base is in dire need of government-supported 
investments in R&D, tertiary education institutions and 
science councils. These investments are necessary for South 
Africa to keep up with rising competition in manufacturing 
from Asia as well as in knowledge and innovation (mainly 
from Australia). However, the government is focusing most 
of its efforts on downstream beneficiation. The National 
Industrial Policy Framework and the Industrial Policy Action 
Plan ignore the sectors producing mining equipment and 
offering related services (Morris et al., 2012).
Local suppliers’ access to infrastructure, finance and 
information
While the major EI companies may be in a sufficiently 
strong financial position to be able to construct, operate and 
maintain infrastructure necessary to make the project viable, 
local suppliers are not. Local suppliers therefore often se-
verely suffer from a lack of adequate power, transport, water, 
and/or ICT infrastructure.
Access to finance is crucial for suppliers with limited work-
ing capital. This access to finance is all the more important 
if suppliers are subjected to unfavourable tax and customs 
duties, currency risks (e.g. if contracts are denominated in 
U.S. dollars), and transactional risk (Hansen, 2014). In 
 Azerbaijan, BP set up a Supplier Finance Facility of $15 
 million over eight years to provide financing to suppliers, 
with support from the IFC. BP (40%), the IFC (40%) and a 
local bank holding (20%), financed the Facility jointly (Also 
see recommendations E10, G6, D6). 
In addition to access to finance and adequate infrastructure, 
local suppliers benefit from access to information about 
procurement opportunities. Governments, companies and 
international development cooperation have often overcome 
this issue by putting together a database describing procure-
16 However, Ghana and Tanzania have developed petroleum laws and regulations, 
respectively, in 2013 and 2015, with the objective of clearly defining their vision 
for local content in the petroleum sector (see Local Content - Ghana Petroleum - 
CCSI - June 104 and Local Content - Tanzania Petroleum - CCSI - July 2015) . 
17 The promotion of local ownership often leads to the creation of front com-
panies that import goods from abroad instead of producing goods locally and 
contributing to local manufacturing skills . This leads to “shallow” linkages .  
18 For a discussion on this issue in the context of Nigeria, see Ovadia (2013b) .
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In addition, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) and all other major oil companies are required to 
finance training programmes and scholarships (Oyejide 
and Adewuyi (2011)) . Consequently, a supply of highly 
trained Nigerian engineers, geologists and geophysicists 
has emerged, some of whom have established private oil 
prospecting and services companies . 
 
Nigeria has also recognized the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to implement and monitor local content require-
ments and policies . The National Content Act established 
the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(the “NCDMB”), which is in charge of developing proce-
dures that will guide, monitor, coordinate and implement 
the provisions of the Act . The Act requires the NCDMB to 
manage the Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF), 
which was established to assist in the implementation 
of the Act by guaranteeing lending to Nigerian service 
companies as well as to infrastructure and training 
 projects and is financed by 1% of the value of every 
contract awarded . In 2014 the fund reached $350m and 
it is  projected to reach $700 million over the next five 
years .19 The NCDMB also established the Nigerian Content 
 Consultative Forum as a platform for information sharing 
and collaboration in the Nigerian oil and gas industry . 
 
All of those measures seem to have had some success 
since local content rose from 3-5% in the 1970’s to 20% 
in 2004 to 39% in 2009 (Morris et al ., 2011) . NCDMB has 
released that service companies have invested $5bn20 in 
the last four years thanks to the NCDF .21 This investment 
has led to the creation of 38,000 jobs (Ramdoo, 2015) .
Progress has been made especially in the fields of fabri-
cation and construction, well construction and completion, 
transportation, control systems, design and engineering, 
and ICT . Among those areas, the fabrication of structures 
and parts is the most locally grounded . Many of the sup-
pliers in this sector have technical agreements22 with oil 
companies, local research centres and universities, which 
have enabled knowledge and technology transfer and 
information exchange (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011) .
  
Box 2.4: Nigeria’s local content development
• Nigeria discovered commercial quantities of oil in 1956 
but had to wait for the end of the civil war in 1970 
in order for the oil sector to play a significant role . 
Along with the relatively long history of the oil sector, 
there has been a long history of local content policy to 
deepen upstream linkages, which include: 
• The Petroleum Act from 1969, which protects 
 indigenous Nigerian firms and promotes human 
 capacity development .  
The Production Sharing Contracts of 1991 and 1993, 
which encourage local procurement even if it is at a 
higher cost than international procurement .
• The 2005 directives, which mandate the use of local 
services and low-tech on-shore goods and services 
supplied by indigenous firms .
• The Nigerian Content Act of 2010, which is dedicated 
to local content and promotes value added by Nigerian 
firms .
• The 2020 Vision, which sets targets of 35 .5 % of local 
content in 2010 and 70% in 2013 .
• The First Implementation Plan (covering the periods 
2010-2013), which promotes the participation of the 
private sector in both upstream and downstream 
 linkages as well as the growth of national value  
added (Morris et al ., 2012) .
In addition to the regulations, post-civil war Nigeria 
 created a NSI . In 1973, it established the Petroleum Tech-
nology Development Fund to advance petroleum technol-
ogy education in six national universities and conducted 
several programmes in design engineering and welding . 
Moreover, the government established the Petroleum 
Training Institute in the Delta State to provide low and 
mid-level skills training in engineering aimed at the 
petroleum sector . Later, the National College of Petroleum 
Studies in Kaduna was set up in 1995 to train senior 
and executive-level skills so as to enable local person-
nel to take on corporate and technical responsibilities . 
19 http://www .natlawreview .com/article/nigeria-local-content-update-oil-gas-industry 
20 Nigerian annual petroleum revenues are generally estimated to be $3-$5  billion . 
This would make local content roughly equivalent in significance to petroleum 
revenues for Nigeria (Ovadia, 2014) 
21 Ibid . 
22 The Nigerian Content Act requires oil operators to submit an annual plan 
“setting out a programme of planned initiatives aimed at promoting the effective 
transfer of technologies from the operator and alliance partners to Nigerian indi-
viduals and companies .” 
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The Nigerian case study illustrates the country’s vision of 
developing local content and increasing it over time. Ac-
cording to Morris et al. (2012), the Nigerian government is 
one of few African governments that had an early focus on 
local content. Emphasizing local value added rather than 
local ownership has facilitated the development of upstream 
linkages. In the National Content Act Nigerian content is 
defined as “the quantum of composite value added to or created 
in the Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity 
and capabilities through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian 
human, material resources and services in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry”. (See recommendations G3,G5,G6). Such a 
definition also involves the challenge of adequately mea-
suring local content targets. Ovadia (2013) notes that the 
NCDMB still needs to address the fact that concrete defini-
tions and guidelines for measuring Nigerian content are 
absent; without these, the NCDMB has to rely on informal, 
opaque and discretionary procedures with regard to monitor-
ing local content.
Furthermore, to sustain its advances in local content, 
Nigeria needs to tackle a few challenges that local suppliers 
still confront. Oil companies’ active supplier development 
programmes do not extend to the second or farther tiers of 
suppliers. Suppliers complain about high import tariffs and 
taxation (which are often alleviated for foreigners) hurting 
their participation in the oil and gas sector. Transportation 
and power supply are inadequate for the development of a 
more robust supply chain. Last, the supply chain’s technolog-
ical content needs to be upgraded in order to serve the more 
demanding deep-water fabrication.
Similarly, the recent reform of the petroleum sector in 
Mexico also displays the desire to promote a local content 
policy around value–added, to address the measurement issue 
and to ground it within a strategic industrial policy (see box 
2.5):
Morris et al. (2012) find that upstream linkage policies are 
often inconsistent or even contradictory. For example, poli-
cies granting duty free exemptions to (foreign) EI companies 
but not to domestic suppliers incentivise the import of goods 
and services and may crowd out local sourcing. Policies are 
often also not backed by incentives and if they are, moni-
toring tends to be inadequate due to a lack of resources, 
institutional capacity and/or political will. Kaplinsky (2011) 
notes that the agenda of upstream linkage policies has often 
been “passive“, i.e. limited to the establishment of mandatory 
local content targets on foreign-owned companies. It stands 
in contrast with the agenda of downstream linkage policies, 
which frequently involves heavy commitments of govern-
ment financial support.
The literature concurs that there is both a  tremendous po-
tential for upstream linkages and a high risk of  implementing 
ill-suited policies that fail to foster market driven linkages 
which are in the mutual interest of both the host country 
and the EI sector. Such policies may not only generate ineffi-
ciencies and be costly to implement, but may also slow down 
linkage creation and make the linkages  “shallower” while 
reducing the resource rents from EI projects. 
Successful policies to cope with all the issues mentioned 
above can be clustered into four non-exclusive areas 
 (UNCTAD, 2010a, Hansen, 2014): (1) the strategic and se-
lective attraction of FDI depending on its potential for link-
ages;23 (2) consistent linkage policies and institutions focused 
on the implementation of linkage policies (see also recom-
mendation G1); (3) the development of absorptive capacity 
in the local industry (see also recommendation G4); and (4) 
improving the general investment climate (see also recom-
mendation G2). A 2012 World Bank report adds a fifth area, 
namely regional integration policies. The report highlights 
that poor regional integration increases the costs associated 
with intra-regional procurement even if the demanded goods 
and services are available. In Senegal, for example, water tests 
required for the mining process used to be done in Ghana, 
but the long journey (due to deficient cross border infra-
structure and delays at the border) makes the water results 
inaccurate, so now water testing is done in the Netherlands. 
Thus suppliers miss regional market opportunities and the 
possibility to build on economies of scale and scope to de-
velop their capacities (see recommendations G9).
The case study on the previous page illustrates how Nigeria 
has targeted its local content policy and created dedicated 
institutions to implement it. 
23 Blomström et al ., (2003) explains that developed countries would use subsidies 
to attract a particular type of investors but low income countries are left with tax 
and regulatory exemptions as policy options .
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Box 2.6: The Australian Industry Participation   
 Framework
Australia has a long mining history and has  created 
strong upstream linkages with local and regional 
 suppliers . However, due the competition of low cost 
 supplies from the Asian economies, an increasing number 
of Australian manufacturing and service companies have 
closed or moved offshore . To help its local  manufacturing 
and service sectors compete for procurement and 
 supply contracts in large-scale projects, the Australian 
 Government – at the commonwealth, state and local 
level – has implemented a number of “soft approach” 
 measures . 
 
The Australian Industry Participation Framework (AIP 
National Framework) was signed by Commonwealth, 
State and Territory Industry Ministers in April 2001 “to 
promote, develop and maintain a sustainable Australian 
industry capability by encouraging competitive Australian 
industry participation in investment projects .” 25 The key 
principle of the AIP National Framework is to ensure that 
the Australian industry and especially SMEs have the 
opportunity to participate in major investment projects in 
Australia and overseas . This is achieved through the early 
identification of opportunities and the facilitation of local 
participation through capacity building . The Australian 
Jobs Act 2013 further clarifies the requirements under 
the AIP Framework . Project proponents carrying out a 
project with a capital expenditure of $500 million or more 
are required to meet the following criteria: 
• Notify the AIP Authority of a potential project;
• Complete and submit an AIP plan that outlines how 
the project will provide opportunities for capable and 
competitive Australian businesses to bid for goods and 
services;
• Once the AIP plan is approved, demonstrate and  
report compliance with the plan for the duration of the 
 project .26
 
The Industry Capability Network (ICN) and the Supplier 
Access to Major Projects (SAMP) support the AIP Na-
tional Framework . The ICN is responsible for funding and 
promoting Australian SMEs’ participation in major projects 
and communicating new business opportunities . The SAMP 
funds the ICN to work with project developers to identify 
supply opportunities for capable and competitive Austra-
lian companies both within the country and abroad . 
 
 
Box 2.5: Mexico’s approach to local content as of 2014
In 2014, Mexico passed the Hydrocarbons Act, which re-
formed the country’s approach to the hydrocarbons sector 
and to the promotion of local content . The Act mandates 
the Ministry of Energy to develop a methodology on how 
to measure and monitor the implementation of local 
content, define an industrial strategy for the hydrocarbons 
sector, create a national registry of domestic suppliers to 
identify their development needs, and create an advisory 
board to help formulate policies fostering the develop-
ment of domestic suppliers .   
 
The methodology published by the Ministry of Economy in 
November 2014 defines national content as “a percentage 
that represents the value in Mexican pesos of the goods, 
services, work force (labor), training, transfer of technol-
ogy and physical infrastructure on a local and regional 
basis, from the total value in Mexican pesos of such 
concepts as defined in this Methodology” . 
 
Structure of the sector
The chain of contractors involved in commissioning a mine 
or an oil field plays a role in determining the breadth of 
linkages. Construction is generally sub-contracted to special-
ized construction and installation companies that themselves 
sub-contract companies with which they have established 
long-term relationships. Investment contracts do not always 
impose local content requirements on subcontractors engaged 
by the investor or company and, even if they do, contractors 
might not be diligent in monitoring local content require-
ments. Another reason why companies do not maximize 
the use of local suppliers arises when the mine or oil well 
is located in isolated areas or in harsh conditions. In those 
circumstances “supply chain management staff and the purchas-
ing function characteristically work on short and intensive work 
cycles” (Hansen, 2014). There is no time to create the long-
term personal relationships with local suppliers that are neces-
sary for the successful development of upstream linkages. 
Supporting policies by government, companies and 
international development cooperation
Apart from focusing on local content policy, governments 
can also rely on broader policies to target upstream linkages. 
Australia’s approach is a point in case, as it has developed a 
framework enabling suppliers to seize procurement oppor-
tunities domestically and abroad. This framework applies to 
both the mining and petroleum sectors.24
24 Also see CCSI’s local content profile on Australia, which is available at:  
http://ccsi .columbia .edu/files/2014/03/Local-Content-Australia-Mining-and- 
Petroleum-CCSI-4-December-2015 .pdf . 
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Apart from government policy and support mechanisms, the 
EI companies and international development cooperation 
both have an important role to play in creating upstream 
linkages. The Madagascar case studies below illustrate these 
two actors can work together to increase local procurement.
Australia’s very recent case study illustrates the types of 
policies that may help to create local procurement oppor-
tunities for local suppliers in addition to the local content 
requirements imposed on the private sector to prevent a 
well-established service industry from relocating abroad (see 
recommendation G3).
25 Australian Department of Trade and Industry website, available at: http://www .industry .gov .au/industry/IndustryInitiatives/AustralianIndustryParticipation/Pages/default .aspx 
26 Further information on developing an AIP plan, along with supporting documentation, is available at www .industry .gov .au/aip . The Australian Jobs (Australian Industry Par-
ticipation) Rule 2014 (the Rule) was registered on 6 February 2014 and is published on ComLaw . The Rule details notification obligations, categories of key goods and services, 
and compliance report requirements as well as the functions of the AIP Authority and exceptions to the AIP plan requirements . 
27 https://www .giz .de/en/downloads/giz2014-fr-alliance-strategic-rio-tinto .pdf
Box 2.7: Partnerships between companies and   
 international development cooperation in  
 Madagascar27 
Rio Tinto and GIZ:
Rio Tinto (80%) and the Malagasy government (20%) 
jointly own QIT Madagascar Minerals S .A . (QMM) - a 
$940-million mining operation that started production in 
2009 . To develop an effective local suppliers development 
programme, Rio Tinto entered into a strategic alliance 
with GIZ in 2013 .
GIZ and QMM designed four activities to promote up-
stream linkages, including:
1 . The development of a preferential procurement policy, 
which considers the location and ownership structure of 
the suppliers;
2 . The creation of a cross-departmental local  content 
committee, which regularly convenes directors from 
 operations, procurement, finance and community 
 development;
3 . The identification of the following four low-value/low-
risk areas in which local supply can make a short-term 
impact: facility maintenance and food services, vehicle 
repairs, waste management and fabrication of bags used 
to transport sands; and
4 . Building the capacity of local SMEs via a  Regional 
Business Centre (CARA), which focuses on the 
 development of business skills, access to capital,  
quality standards and responding to tenders .
In 2013, QMM spent around US$ 12 million in purchases 
from local suppliers and organized training programme 
for 335 participants . QMM also established a database of 
900 suppliers (CSRM, World Bank, 2015) .
IFC and Ambatovy
The Ambatovy mining operation is a $5 .5 billion joint 
 venture composed of Sherritt International, Sumitomo 
Corporation, Korea Resources, and SNC-Lavalin . It is 
the world’s largest nickel and cobalt operation, and 
 Madagascar’s biggest investment . In order to realize its 
commitment to local content, Ambatovy, in  collaboration 
with the IFC and Training Management Africa, created 
a business training centre, which provides  vocational 
 training to local SMEs, in 2008 . The company also 
 supported the construction of three bulk  purchasing 
 centres and established a database listing 3,500  potential 
local suppliers .
In 2013, Ambatovy spent over $400 million on local 
goods and services, which accounted for half of its total 
procurement . Specifically, it purchased over 1 .5 million 
kilograms of local fruits, vegetables and dry foods from 
regional centres supplied by over 3,000 small-scale 
farmers, and bought over 13,000 wooden pallets, 20,000 
timbers and 9,000 uniforms from local suppliers . 
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However, a partnership between Rio Tinto and the IFC in 
Guinea has shown that encouraging the participation of 
women among the suppliers is not without challenges.
 
Box 2.8: Rio Tinto, IFC and Women Suppliers in Guinea
Rio Tinto and the IFC launched the Local Supplier 
 Development Project in late 2012 to support Rio Tinto’s 
efforts in building a strong local supply chain for its 
Simandou project in Guinea . While the programme has 
been relatively successful in terms of the number of 
SMEs trained, performance improvement and the number 
of  local SMEs working with Rio Tinto, the project has 
experienced limited success with regard to the inclusion 
of women, even though this was a key component of the 
project .  
 
The IFC concluded that if a programme wants to ap-
peal to women, it needs to specifically target women in 
its advertising and marketing campaigns, hold events 
for women only and design training curricula containing 
modules that address woman entrepreneurship needs in 
particular (IFC, 2015) . 
 
While increased access to jobs directly or indirectly 
linked to the EI fosters the social and economic 
 empowerment of women, the literature explains that an 
“explicit focus on hiring women” has sometimes cre-
ated tensions in families and communities by clashing 
with cultural and social norms . Those tensions might be 
exacerbated if unemployment among men increases as a 
consequence of these programmes . Moreover, to compen-
sate for the absence of working women at home, families 
may require the children and particularly girls to help 
with domestic tasks instead of going to school (World 
Bank, 2009) . 
These case studies illustrate that strategic alliances between 
companies and development partners can help leveraging 
each partner’s expertise. Actors of the international develop-
ment cooperation have experience in private sector devel-
opment and support of SMEs, and the miners know their 
companies’ procurement needs. Both are required to devise 
effective local content programmes (see recommendations 
D5,D7).
Addressing the gender bias in upstream linkage 
creation
The indirect employment opportunities created around the 
EI sector can be particularly significant for women. While 
direct employment opportunities for women at mine sites is 
only slowly starting to increase as a result of focused efforts 
by companies and governments,28 indirect employment 
figures already suggest a proportionally higher participa-
tion of women. Mines often outsource “catering, laundry, 
clothing, and uniform supply and repair, agricultural produce, 
financial services and clerical support”, jobs that are usually 
done by women (World Bank, 2009). Apart from gender 
equality, increased female income is correlated with rising 
expenditures on health, education, and nutrition. This pro-
vides a strong argument for companies to incentivize female 
upstream employment. According to the World Bank, this 
could be achieved by “giving preference in bid evaluations for 
women’s business or businesses with a large proportion of women 
employees” or requiring minimum quotas of female employ-
ment. For instance, in South Africa, Lonmin awarded “a 
45 million rand contract to three companies managed largely 
by black South African women for the conversion of single-sex 
mining hostels to family housing units” (World Bank, 2009). 
However, often businesses owned or operated by women 
have even less access to finance than their male counterparts. 
This is particularly a problem in Africa. An IFC programme 
dedicated to encouraging African banks to make loans to 
women’s businesses has been rolled out in Nigeria, Tanzania, 
and Uganda (IFC, 2008). 
Moreover, governments, companies and development part-
ners can help increase the organizational capacity of women 
by providing support to women’s organizations, e.g. in the 
form of trainings on organizational skills, funding, budgeting 
and management. Helping women’s capacity to support each 
other can lead to further empowerment (World Bank, 2009). 
28 Worldwide it is extremely rare to find any EI companies with higher than 10% 
female participation, with many being less than 5% .” However, lately, many EI 
companies are focusing their efforts on hiring more women . In Newmont’s mining 
operations in Australia, 30% of new hires in 2007 were women, while in South 
Africa companies are making strong efforts to achieve the 10% target that the 
government has imposed (World Bank, 2009, IFC, 2015)
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suppliers’ employees or contractors. Although they are not 
the EI companies’ employees, if any contract workers or 
supplier workers or contractors are provided with poor living 
and housing conditions in worker camps or are not paid a 
living wage, or if any on-site contractors’ staff are subject to 
poorer employment conditions than EI company employees 
and lack access to any grievance mechanism, the EI com-
pany’s responsibility to respect human rights is in violation 
(European Commission, 2012).
2 .2 .2 . Lessons learned from the literature  
  and case studies
While some of the determinants highlighted above, such as 
the history of EI in a particular country, the ownership of the 
EI companies, or the structure of the sector are difficult to 
influence, other determinants, such as local suppliers’ access 
to infrastructure and finance, the robustness of the NSI and 
the quality of the local content policy, can be improved and 
should be targeted by all stakeholders genuinely interested in 
expanding the scope of upstream linkages. 
Governments should devise a local content policy that is 
realistic, increases in ambition over time, seeks to increase 
value added rather than local ownership requirements and 
monitors or enforces the achievements through dedicated 
institutions (herein, Nigeria and Australia can serve as good 
examples). Companies should develop a local procurement 
plan for the lifetime of the project. Companies and govern-
ments should come to an agreement around this plan to 
carry it forward together with complementary interventions. 
Development partners can support this process by support-
ing the convening process and acting as neutral brokers. 
Structural gaps that prevent local suppliers from expanding 
their capacity, including such factors as poor infrastructure, 
lack of access to finance and limited technological support, 
need to be addressed (as demonstrated by the cases of South 
Africa and Australia). The case of South Africa in particular 
highlights the importance of continued governmental sup-
port of innovation, R&D and the development of capabili-
ties to ensure that the supply chain is capable of seizing 
opportunities for upstream linkages. Bridging those gaps 
requires resources and should be a joint undertaking between 
the government, the companies and international develop-
ment cooperation. Last, upstream linkages can exacerbate 
gender inequality as well as compromise the EI’s company 
responsibility to respect human rights. These risks should be 
anticipated and addressed and at worse mitigated through 
targeted interventions.
 
Box 2.9: The World Bank’s Gender and EI Programme
The Gender and EI programme works with governments, 
communities and companies to better understand and 
address the gender dimension of EI . It has gathered 
knowledge through research, analyses, and publica-
tions in order to help mainstream gender in policy and 
 operational activities . The resources of the programme 
include a factsheet and in-depth publications on the rela-
tion between gender and the EI; a study and toolkit on 
gender and artisanal small-scale mining; guidance notes 
on mainstreaming gender in mining; and detailed country-
specific case studies of gender and mining in Peru, Tanza-
nia and Papua New Guinea; a variety of presentations and 
a cartoon calendar to raise awareness about gender and 
mining issues that are often distributed to government 
partners . With the Japanese Social Development Foun-
dation, the Programme has provided women in mining-
affected communities with training in vocational skills, 
business skills, financial literacy, and basic literacy and 
numeracy . The Programme is also launching a new initia-
tive on  combating sexual and gender-based violence in 
mining-affected  territories (GIZ, 2014) . 
Addressing human rights in upstream linkage 
 creation
EI companies have a corporate social responsibility to respect 
human rights. This responsibility is twofold. It requires EI 
companies to (1) “avoid causing or contributing to adverse 
human rights impacts through their own activities, and 
address such impacts when they occur”; and (2) “seek to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their operations, products or services by 
their business relationships, even if they have not contributed 
to those impacts” (UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (II.B.13); 2011). “Business relationships” in 
this context are understood to include, among other things, 
relationships between EI companies and suppliers in their 
value chain. So, in addition to ensuring that their opera-
tions comply with international human rights standards, EI 
companies need to ensure that any contractors they engage 
or suppliers from which they are procuring goods or services 
are complying with human rights. 
Human rights grievances related to contract workers or 
 suppliers can occur in a range of activities related to back-
ward linkages. Examples include contract work related to 
drilling or seismic testing for oil and gas operations, on-site 
construction contract work, or the working conditions of 
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Unfortunately many resource-rich developing countries that 
have only recently started exploiting natural resources lack all 
five of these requirements. 
Opportunities (external):
1. There are development partners interested in this area. 
2. There is an increasing amount of literature and 
guidance around this topic.
3. Regional integration improves the business case for 
local and regional procurement.
Threats (external):
1. The automation of many mine and oil field functions 
will further limit the scope of low skill linkages (see 
Chapter 3).
2. A growing body of investment treaties restrict the poli-
cy space for local content (see Chapter 3).
3. Global value chains require specialization and innovati-
on, which few countries manage to do (see Chapter 3).
4. The structure of the EI sector does not always facilitate 
upstream linkages: contractors might not impose local 
content requirements on their subcontractors.
SWOT Analysis for upstream linkages:
Strengths (internal):
1. Companies may be interested in outsourcing their non-
core business functions and creating further upstream 
opportunities.
2. Companies want to maintain their social license to ope-
rate. Employing locals or nationals indirectly through 
upstream linkages may increase public support for the 
project at the local or national level.
3. Case studies show that with the right combination of 
initiatives, linkages can be fostered. While these should 
not be replicated without taking the local context into 
account, valuable lessons can be learned from past 
experiences when designing programmes to strengthen 
upstream linkages.
Weaknesses (internal):
Upstream linkages require:
1. Access to adequate infrastructure
2. Access to finance
3. A well-educated labour force
4. A well-designed local content policy with resources to 
support it 
5. Time to develop 
Table 2 .1: Summary of key characteristics of upstream linkages
BENEFITS  - Indirect job creation, which is larger than direct job creation .
 - Positive impact on the knowledge and technology linkage and the basis for 
horizontal linkages .
DRAWBACKS  - Non-market-driven linkages will be resisted by companies .
 - Takes time to develop and requires commitment by all stakeholders .
COMMODITY  SUITABILITY  - Precious metals have short exploitation cycles, making them less attractive for 
upstream linkages .
 - Oil and gas require sophisticated development processes that are often not 
 accessible with the level of skills available in developing countries .
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND SKILL LEVEL
 - Oil and gas projects require higher skills to participate in the production .
EMPLOYMENT  - Multiplier is said to be 1 to 4 for indirect job creation in mining and 1 to 3 in 
oil . However, these numbers should not be generalized given that they are very 
context specific .
GENDER  - An increasing number women are employed in upstream industries in sectors 
such as catering, laundry, clothing, uniform supply and repair, agricultural 
produce, financial services and clerical support .
MAIN POLICY MEASURES  - Coherent vision, strategy and dedicated institutions
 - Carefully drafted local content policies and regulations 
 - Targeted support to SMEs
RECOMMENDATIONS  
(CHAPTER 4)
 - EI Companies:              1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10
 - Governments:               1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
 - Development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10
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Figure 2 .11: SWOT Analysis for upstream linkages 
Source: Authors
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Figure 2 .12: Downstream linkages
 Source: Authors
2.3 Production Linkages: Downstream/  
 Forward Linkages
Downstream or forward linkages relate to the processing, 
beneficiation and value addition of the extracted commodi-
ties. While these processes vary by commodity, the figure 
below illustrates what downstream activities in the mining 
and oil & gas sector may entail. 
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Depending on the commodity and the quality of the ore, 
refining and processing (beyond crushing and grinding) may 
be geographically bound. For example, iron ores with a high 
iron content (above ca. 60% iron), which are also called 
‘direct shipping ore’ do not need to be beneficiated prior to 
being used as an input in blast furnaces, whereas lower grade 
iron ores do go through a refining and beneficiation process 
prior to being shipped, irrespective of any linkage policy. Be-
cause of the high transport costs associated with transporting 
low-grade iron ore or coal this downstream process is locked 
to the location of production. Similarly, gas destined to be 
sold on overseas markets far from the gas field has to be liq-
uefied prior to transport, a process that reduces the volume 
to 1/600th of the natural gas in its gaseous state. The down-
stream activities, beyond refining/processing in the case of 
bulky minerals and beyond liquefaction in the case of gas, are 
not geographically bound. For instance it is not uncommon 
for smelting, semi-fabrication and assembly processes to be 
distributed around the world as illustrated by the examples of 
tantalite and cassiterite in the figure 2.14.
The value chain of oil and gas starts at the well. After being 
extracted from the ground the oil/gas needs to be refined 
into various products such as methane, liquefied petroleum 
gas, propylene, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel and sulphur to name 
a few. These products are used for power generation, trans-
port, and as inputs in the heavy and petrochemical indus-
tries. The mining value chain starts with the rocks containing 
the mineral being extracted in an open pit or underground 
mine. The rocks are then crushed and ground before being 
beneficiated through separation, concentration and filtra-
tion methods. These methods increase the mineral content 
to the point where they can be smelted and transformed into 
ingots, cathodes or other forms that feed into the semi-
fabrication sector. There may be many additional steps and 
stages within the semi-fabrication and fabrication process 
before the extracted resource reaches the end user in the form 
of a product. 
Figure 2 .13: Typical EI value chain
 Source: Authors
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intensive, require good infrastructure access and are highly 
competitive at the global level, given that there is not much 
room for product differentiation. While potentially having a 
significant impact on the gross domestic product of a coun-
try and supporting an expansion into activities further down-
stream, such as petrochemical or semi-fabrication industries, 
these industries are difficult to set up in developing countries 
with poor or inadequate infrastructure and are unlikely to be 
large employment providers on their own.30 
2 .3 .1 Literature review and case studies
The literature sheds some light on the determinants of down-
stream linkages and gives a nuanced view on several of them. 
This section reviews the impact of the proximity to resources, 
the government’s negotiating position, the use of export 
restriction instruments and the resort to special  incentives for 
the development of downstream linkages.
Resource-rich countries have placed much emphasis on mov-
ing into downstream segments of the value chain in order 
to capture more value added, create additional employment 
opportunities and diversify their economies. Downstream 
value addition prominently features as a key policy objective 
in the Africa Mining Vision (African Union, 2009). While 
some resource-rich countries have provided incentives for 
and co-financed the construction of refineries (for example 
Angola and Uganda), others have used taxes and restrictions 
on exports to encourage downstream processing. In Africa 
alone 21 countries apply export taxes on EI to incentivise 
local processing (Ramdoo and Bilal, 2014). Indonesia has 
gone a step further and put in place an export ban on miner-
als below certain comparatively high concentration rates. To 
reach these levels of concentration, large-scale investments in 
smelters are necessary. 
It is noteworthy that these government interventions mainly 
target smelting activities in the mining sector and refin-
ing  activities in the oil sector. These industries are capital 
Figure 2 .14: Tin and tantalum in the value chain of Fairphone 2
Source: Fairphone (n .d .), A mass balance model for conflict-free tin and tantalum
29
29 https://www .fairphone .com/2015/08/20/supporting-fairer-mineral-initiatives-
with-the-fairphone-2/ (accessed October 2015)
30 Timor-Leste is a good example for this, as a proposed LNG plant would double 
Timor-Leste’s GDP but account for less than 1% of official employment numbers 
(Maennling, 2012) .
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do not possess many competitive advantages, downstream 
activities in the EI sector may be one of the few opportuni-
ties to diversify their economies and become less dependent 
on raw commodity exports. However, such policies come at 
a cost and require government commitment to support the 
implementation of these decisions.  
Leveraging a government’s negotiating power to 
move downstream
One country that has recently leveraged its extractive sector 
to move downstream is Botswana. The figure below shows 
the value chain of the diamond industry. For many years, 
the Government of Botswana has tried to move downstream 
from mining into the sorting, valuing and polishing sec-
tors. India dominates the polishing sector due to a large 
pool of low cost specialized labour, with 14 out of every 15 
diamonds being polished there. The major manufacturers 
of jewellery are India, China and other countries of the Far 
East, though the top-end pieces are produced in traditional 
manufacturing locations such as Italy and New York. 
Proximity to resources not a major determinant of 
comparative advantage
Proximity to the raw material and lower transportation costs 
of processed materials are arguments put forward as to why, 
from an economic viewpoint, there may be a comparative 
advantage to move downstream locally. In theory, this is 
particularly true for commodities that are bulky and heavy 
to transport prior to processing. However, on an aggregate 
level, empirical analyses of the comparative advantage result-
ing from proximity to the source have not substantiated this 
argument. Using trade data, Hausmann et al. (2008) find 
that raw commodities play a small role in determining com-
parative advantages, even for high volume products that are 
associated with higher transport costs. These findings persist 
for both developing and developed countries.  
The iron-ore/steel sector is a good example that supports 
these results. Australia is one of the world’s largest iron-ore 
producers, but a net importer of steel. Even though Western 
Australia signed downstream processing agreements with 
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton in the mid-1990s which led to 
investments into the A$2.5bn Boodarie hot briquetted iron 
plant and the A$1bn Kwinana Hismelt pig iron venture, 
both operations were never economically viable and were 
ultimately shut down (Klinger, 2011; FitzGerald, 2004). 
Japan, on the other hand, has a long history in steel produc-
tion and was the second largest producer of crude steel after 
China in 2014 but does not have access to the raw materials 
domestically (World Steel Association, 2014). One explana-
tion put forward by Hirshman (1981) is that downstream 
processing requires technologically advanced production pro-
cesses, which commodity-exporting countries are less familiar 
with. Access to cheap and reliable energy and other types 
of infrastructure are also factors that are more important to 
moving downstream than proximity to resources.
Whereas it might not be advantageous to move downstream 
from a comparative advantage perspective, it is a different 
question whether governments should use policy instruments 
(e.g. incentives such as taxes or regulations such as export 
bans on unprocessed goods) or a strong negotiation posi-
tion to promote moving into downstream activities. This 
can be justified if there is a possibility to create a competitive 
advantage in the long run by protecting the industry in the 
short run, which is known as the infant industry argument. 
Benefits of such policy decisions may include increased 
GDP, foreign exchange earnings, government revenues, 
employment opportunities, and expanding into technologi-
cally more advanced sectors, all of which are associated with 
substantial spillover effects. Especially for countries that 
Source: Authors
Figure 2 .15: Diamond value chain
Diamond  
Exploration
Diamond  
Mining
Manufacturing & 
Polishing
Rough Sorting & 
Valuing
Jewellery 
Manufacturing
Retailing
The box on the next page illustrates that diamond polishing 
and manufacturing in Botswana would not naturally occur 
in the country now if the government had not negotiated a 
fixed allocation of rough diamonds for domestic processing. 
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the company’s help with regard to developing a domes-
tic cutting and polishing industry. Given that De Beers 
sources 60% of its diamonds from Botswana, it ultimately 
agreed to this demand. Consequently, a set amount of 
rough diamonds were allocated to the domestic cutting 
and polishing industry, wherein companies were required 
to hire locals and provide training in order to guarantee 
the allocation of diamonds. The target allocation would 
increase over time, with the agreement including fines for 
non-compliance with these targets. Moreover, the govern-
ment would support the industry through fiscal incentives 
and infrastructure investments. De Beers also agreed to 
move its aggregation business – selecting and mixing the 
diamonds from DeBeers mines for its customers – from 
London to Gaborone, in the hope of creating considerable 
spillovers to other industries such as hospitality, finance 
and transportation, since diamond buyers would now 
have to go through Gaborone to buy De Beers’ diamonds 
( Morris et al., 2011). 
Box 2.10: Botswana moving downstream in the   
 diamond value chain
Diamond deposits were first discovered in Botswana 
shortly after independence in 1966, with large-scale 
production starting in 1971. Shortly thereafter, diamond 
mining became the most important sector in Botswana’s 
economy in terms of contribution to GDP (recently around 
30%) and government revenue (recently around 60%) 
(Brook, 2012). In order to increase employment opportuni-
ties, the Government of Botswana first tried to develop 
the cutting and polishing industry in the 1980s. However, 
De Beers, the company that dominates the sales and 
marketing of diamonds both in Botswana and worldwide, 
argued that this was not profitable in Botswana.  
In 2005, when De Beers wanted to renew its mining 
license for Debswana, a 50-50 joint venture between De 
Beers and the Government, the Government insisted on 
Source: GrynberG (2015), botSwana diamond workerS bleed, Graph by John mccann
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when the rough diamond reserves in Botswana will be 
exhausted, resulting in a decrease of Botswana’s bar-
gaining power, which is expected to be in 30-40 years . 
However, Botswana has clear comparative advantages in 
a few other sectors (tourism may be one of them) and a 
30-40 year timeline may be sufficient to create a large 
and skilled labour pool in the polishing industry to make 
Botswana competitive . Even if the polishing sector col-
lapses within the next 40 years, a well-educated labour 
force, is more likely to be able to adapt to structural 
change by developing horizontal linkages from a relative-
ly sophisticated industry like diamond polishing than from 
one purely based on the extraction of the raw material, or 
as Hirschman nicely puts it– ‘one thing leads to another’ 
(Hirschman, 1968) . 
German Technical Cooperation has supported the Govern-
ment’s efforts to move downstream in the diamond value 
chain through the ‘Capacity Development to achieve the 
Botswana Vision 2016’ programme, which ran from 2008 – 
2014 with a budget of EUR4 .2 million . The project strongly 
focused on technical and vocational education and train-
ing, e .g . in jewellery design and manufacturing (GIZ, 2012) .
In 2014, it was estimated that the cutting and polish-
ing industry in Botswana employed 3,750 people with 
salaries above the manufacturing industry’s minimum 
wage . However, it remains to be seen whether the sector 
will be competitive in the long term . In 2015, the coun-
try’s oldest diamond cutting and polishing company shut 
down, causing the layoff of 350 workers, due to falling 
diamond prices and smaller margins in the polishing 
industry . Nonetheless, the more fundamental issue is that 
Botswana cannot compete with the low-cost and high-
productivity producers in the Far East and, especially, 
India (Grynberg, 2015) . The cost of cutting and polishing 
diamonds in India in terms of dollars per carat is three 
to five times lower than that in Botswana (see figure 
on previous side) . This shows that the only reason why 
cutting and polishing happens in Botswana (and even 
more so in South Africa and Namibia) and not in India is 
government policy instead of the existence of a compara-
tive advantage . 
 
The government of Botswana is aware that unless invest-
ments in support infrastructure decrease production costs 
substantially, the diamond-polishing sector is unlikely 
to survive in the long term . This is especially true for 
The Botswana case study shows that the government has 
successfully leveraged its negotiating power to move down-
stream. The Government has understood that in order to 
become competitive, it needs to support its policy decision 
by investing its own resources (see recommendation G2). 
It remains to be seen whether the downstream sector in 
Botswana becomes sustainable in the long term (see recom-
mendation D8). However, even if it does not prove success-
ful, the skills acquired by those employed and trained in the 
sector are likely to be valuable in the future, even if applied 
in other industries. 
Using export restriction policies to move 
downstream
Indonesia has imposed export restrictions and, more 
recently, a ban on the export of raw materials. Such policy 
 instruments are likely going to decrease investment in 
the mining sector and result in the closure of marginally 
 profitable mines that either cannot invest in capital-intensive 
processing facilities or where the operating costs associated 
with the processing facilities are too high. Nathan Associates 
assessment of Indonesia’s export ban on raw materials is a 
case in point. 
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The Indonesian case study shows that the costs associated 
with processing facilities may outweigh the benefits. There-
fore, cost-benefit analyses of the likely impacts of measures 
like export bans are necessary (see recommendations G2, 
D4). One of the key problems with such analyses is that it is 
difficult to quantify some of the long-term potential benefits, 
whereas it is relatively straightforward to estimate the short-
term costs associated with the closure of marginally profit-
able mines. 
Using incentives to move downstream
Countries that do not have a strong negotiating position to 
move downstream or cannot rely on prescriptive measures 
because they do not have a large market share in a particular 
commodity may only rely on incentives to try and move 
downstream. When considering whether to offer invest-
ment incentives, a similar cost-benefit assessment as set out 
further above is required. The Mozal aluminium project in 
 Mozambique, while not directly linked to bauxite mining, 
provides a good example where the government provided 
significant investment incentives and signed a long-term 
low-cost electricity agreement with BHP Billiton in order 
to attract the large scale aluminium smelter. There have 
been concerns that the incentives were (and are) too costly 
and the expected benefits - a domestic supplier base and an 
aluminium cluster around the smelter - did not materialize as 
expected.  
The Mozambique case study illustrates that the smelting 
sector, which is often a sector targeted by policy makers, is 
still a very capital- and energy-intensive industry and further 
downstream linkages take time to materialize (see recom-
mendation D8). The case study further shows that incentives 
should be applied with care and should be linked to the 
profitability of projects rather than granted for the lifetime 
of projects. Special care needs to be taken when providing 
long-term energy incentives in order to attract downstream 
investments. 
 
Box 2.11: Cost-benefit analysis of the economic impact 
of Indonesia’s export ban
Indonesia is the biggest exporter of thermal coal, nickel 
ore and tin in the world and a powerhouse in copper and 
gold production . The country implemented a ban on the 
export of unprocessed mineral resources in January 2014, 
which requires companies to process the mineral up to a 
certain grade prior to exportation . The minerals affected 
by this policy include copper, nickel, tin, bauxite, iron, 
lead and zinc, which are highly relevant to Indonesia’s 
mining sector . During the current phase, companies will 
have to pay high export taxes for unprocessed ores until 
the ban takes effect . 
 
Nathan Associates (2013) prepared a welfare analysis 
of the potential impacts of such a ban and found that 
investments in processing facilities are often unprofitable . 
While the report finds that investments in nickel pro-
cessing could be feasible when modelled in conjunction 
with a mining project, investments in aluminium smelting 
would require large energy subsidies . Copper smelting 
investments, on the other hand, would not be undertaken 
due to excess smelting capacity in world markets, which 
have substantially driven down the margins of the copper 
smelting industry . This would make it difficult to raise 
sufficient capital to finance these large-scale smelter 
investments . Under the medium investment scenario 
that foresees some nickel and aluminium smelters going 
ahead but the copper mines having to shut down, the re-
port estimates that the export ban policy would result in 
a net welfare loss of $5 .2bn a year, with export earnings 
falling by $4 .9bn .  
 
Although the government of Indonesia agrees with the 
report that the policy will lead to short term losses (the 
Minister of Finance, for example, stated that this policy 
would reduce government revenues by $820 million in 
2014), it believes that the policy will result in a net posi-
tive impact in the medium to long term . 25 companies 
have begun constructing processing facilities and, in 2013 
alone, investments into smelting and refining reached $6 
billion . The Minister of Finance anticipates a positive net 
impact by 2017 (Bellefleur, 2014) . 
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The indirect employment benefits and knowledge spill-
overs from the Mozal aluminium smelter have been 
harder to quantify . The IFC has been involved in promoting 
the creation of upstream linkages through SME linkages 
programmes . In 1998/1999, prior to the start of Mozal’s 
operation, the Center of Investment Promotion (CPI) con-
ducted a survey to identify potential upstream linkages . 
It concluded that 90% of the 370 identified SMEs did not 
have the quality standards, technological capacity or 
experience to provide the services demanded by Mozal 
(Castel-Branco and Goldin, 2003) . During the first con-
struction phase, the linkages to the Mozambican economy 
were minimal, mainly because the contracts were bundled 
with components that Mozambican SMEs could not fulfil 
and because the procurement contracts were in English 
instead of Portuguese (Robins, 2009) . During the second 
construction phase and subsequent operational phase, the 
programme identified specific contracts for local sourcing . 
Mozal increased its monthly spending from US$5 million 
with 40 local firms in 2002 to US$17 million with 250 
firms in 2007 (IFC, 2007) . Between 2006 and 2009, over 
140 SMEs were trained in management and technical skills 
and 75 SMEs were actively enrolled in the programme .
 
However, there has been criticism that many of the SMEs, 
while registered in Mozambique, were importing most 
goods from South Africa and not manufacturing them 
in Mozambique itself . On average, about two-thirds of 
expenditure spent on “Mozambican” companies has gone 
into imports of raw materials and intermediate goods, 
spare parts, equipment, energy, and fuel from South 
Africa . Therefore, the expenditure has generated limited 
value-added in the local economy (Castel-Brance and 
Goldin, 2003) . Knowledge spillovers are also thought 
to have been minimal due to the contracted companies 
 servicing a small market niche, which is completely 
 dependent on Mozal (Krause and Kafuman, 2011) . 
 
The expected downstream cluster that would make use of 
Mozal’s aluminium domestically has yet to materialize . Only 
in 2015 – 15 years after operations at Mozal started – has 
Midal Cables invested in a semi-fabrication plant, which 
will process 10% of Mozal’s aluminium ingots . Continu-
ing its support to create linkages to the Mozal aluminium 
smelter, the IFC has provided financing and has acquired 
an equity share in the project . The company will employ 
110 workers directly and receives the fiscal benefits as-
sociated with setting up in the export processing zone .
Box 2.12: Costs and benefits of the Mozal aluminium 
smelter in Mozambique
The $1 .3 billion Mozal aluminium smelter investment was 
awarded in 1997 to a consortium composed of BHP Bil-
liton (47%), Mitsubishi (25%), the Industrial Development 
Corporation of South Africa (24%) and the Government 
of Mozambique (4%) . The IFC provided financing for this 
project . In addition to exemptions from the value added 
tax, excise duties, customs duties, stamp tax, property tax 
and municipal tax on rental income, Mozal is also exempt 
from corporate income tax payments and instead pays 
a 1% turnover tax . It has been estimated that in 2006 
alone, these incentives resulted in foregone public rev-
enues equivalent to 11 .9% of total government revenues 
(Arndt and Tarp, 2009) . These incentives have been grant-
ed for a 50-year time period, with an option for renewal . 
It could be argued that these incentives are not a direct 
cost to Mozambique, because without these incentives 
the smelter would not have materialized . However, there 
is a strong case that the internal rate of return, based 
upon which investment decisions are made, would have 
been sufficiently high for Mozal even without such lengthy 
incentives (Justica Ambiental, 2012) . In addition, Mozal 
also negotiated a beneficial electricity tariff until 2026 as 
part of the investment agreement .31 Access to reliable and 
low-cost electricity is key for the aluminium-smelting 
sector, given that it makes up ca .30% of total operating 
costs . In 2007 peak electricity demand in Mozambique 
was less than half of Mozal’s peak demand . This illus-
trates the opportunity cost that this electricity agreement 
may entail for Mozambique, especially as residential and 
industrial demand for electricity increases and alterna-
tive investments are willing to pay for a higher electricity 
tariff allowing the power utility to achieve cost recovery .
 
The benefits associated with Mozal aluminium smelter 
investments include (a) an increase in GDP by 3 .2%, (b) 
a significant positive impact on the balance of trade, (c) 
a positive impact on the balance of payments, (d) 1,100 
direct employment opportunities, and (e) the financing of 
public infrastructure to support the project, which was 
repaid by the government in the form of amortised deduc-
tions from the turnover taxes . Investments comprised 
roads, bridges, sewage, harbour quays and water connec-
tions (Castel-Branco and Goldin, 2003) . 
31 A portion of the electricity comes from Mozambique, which does not have a power grid connecting the north of the country (the main power source) to its south (the main 
power consumption center) and therefore exports the power from Cahora Bassa damn to South Africa and re-imports it along the Maputo corridor .
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technical assessments are still required in order to make the 
best possible policy decision. 
The downstream sector should be treated the same as other 
sectors in the economy when deciding whether to support 
it through an industrial policy, given that the closeness to 
natural resource does not seem to be a major contributor to 
determining the comparative advantage of the country (see 
recommendations G2, D4). The opportunities of moving 
further downstream from the smelting and refining processes 
should play a key role when deciding to whether these inter-
mediate value addition industries should feature in the in-
dustrial policy. While the smelting and refining facilities are 
capital-intensive investments that do not provide large em-
ployment opportunities, clusters in the semi-manufacturing 
and manufacturing or assembly industries are more labour 
intensive. Most of the benefits from moving downstream 
occur in these sectors. If there is little potential of moving 
further down the value chain, it is questionable whether it is 
worth trying to attract smelting or refining industries. 
2 .3 .2 Lessons learned from the literature  
  and case studies
As illustrated by the various case studies, the downstream 
activities of extractive sectors are very commodity specific, 
while the opportunities of moving downstream are very 
country specific. The costs and benefits of moving down-
stream therefore vary tremendously. The policy tools avail-
able to governments in order to move downstream include 
prescriptive policies like export taxes or restrictions, as in the 
case of Indonesia, the negotiation or re-negotiation of exist-
ing contracts, as in the case of Botswana, or incentives, as in 
the case of Mozambique. All these tools, however, require a 
detailed cost-benefit analysis. Even in the case of Botswana’s 
diamond cutting and polishing industry, the government will 
incur costs from moving downstream, as it has to invest in 
support infrastructure and has given up on tax revenues in 
return for the allocation of diamonds to domestic down-
stream industries. These costs should not be underestimated; 
while it is difficult to quantify all potential benefits and costs 
(even in retrospect as shown by the Mozambican case), such 
Table 2 .2: Summary of key characteristics of downstream linkages
BENEFITS  - Potential of positive impact on GDP, the balance of trade and export earnings .
 - Price swings of downstream products tend to be less volatile than of unpro-
cessed commodities .
 - Skill development in new areas and potential to create further downstream 
industries .
DRAWBACKS  - Takes time to develop .
 - Capital and energy intensive industries .
 - Often expensive for governments to support .
COMMODITY  SUITABILITY  - Oil processing not geographically bound, but LNG processing is .
 - Only few minerals are geographically bound (beyond crushing and grinding) as 
a result of falling bulk commodity shipping costs .
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND SKILL LEVEL
 - High infrastructure and power requirements .
EMPLOYMENT First step beneficiation (smelters and refineries) does not create many employ-
ment opportunities . Need to move further downstream in order to have a bigger 
impact on employment .
GENDER Capital intensive industries do not tend to employ many women .
MAIN POLICY MEASURES Cost-benefit analyses required, 
Policy measures adapted to context (negotiation, export restrictions, incentives)
Required support mechanisms such as industrial parks
RECOMMENDATIONS  
(CHAPTER 4)
 - EI Companies:               2,5
 - Governments:               1,2,4,8,9,10
 - Development cooperation:  1,2,3,4,5,8,10
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2.4 Production Linkages: Horizontal /  
 Lateral Linkages
Horizontal (lateral) linkages: while upstream and down-
stream linkages constitute “vertical links” created along 
the value chain, horizontal (lateral) linkages relate to the 
development of new industries using the capabilities of the 
EI-related supply chain. By enabling the emergence of new 
economic sectors, these linkages play a key role in the diversi-
fication of the economy and lowering the dependence on the 
EI sector. While the upstream and downstream sectors are 
likely to be adversely affected by price downturns or the clo-
sure of projects, horizontal industries will not be impacted. 
SWOT Analysis for downstream linkages:
Strengths (internal):
1. Widespread host government interest to adding value 
to minerals, oil and gas locally through downstream 
processing.
2. In a few limited cases, minerals and gas deposits are 
geographically bound, creating a natural incentive for 
downstream beneficiation.
Weaknesses (internal):
3. Unlike other linkages, moving downstream is often not 
in the self-interest of EI companies.
4. Downstream activities tend to require particular skills, 
are highly dependent on good infrastructure access and 
are often energy intensive. Countries that cannot offer 
these prerequisites will struggle to attract downstream 
industries. 
Opportunities (external):
1. In recent years, mining companies from the global 
South have increasingly played a role in FDI. Chinese 
companies in particular have invested in downstream 
projects in order to gain access to resources.32  
Threats (external):
1. The potential for downstream linkages is related to 
a globally very competitive, low margin industry. In 
a world with excess smelting and refining capacity, it 
would require governments to offer excessive incentives 
in order to setup new smelters and refineries. It does 
not make economic sense for each country that has iron 
ore reserves to have a steel mill or every country that 
has bauxite to have an aluminium smelter. 
3. Continuously falling transport costs due to increases 
in the size of bulk carriers further decrease the benefit 
associated with beneficiation close to the source of 
extraction.
4. Prescriptive export restrictions may be against WTO 
and investment treaty rules (see chapter 3).
32 Examples for this include refineries in Angola, Nigeria and South Sudan . In 
Afghanistan, the Chinese consortium won the bid for the Aynak copper conces-
sion, partly by including a proposal to build a copper concentrator, which not all 
bidders included .
Figure 2 .16: SWOT Analysis for downstream linkages
Source: Authors
Weaknesses 
Missing self-interest
Infrastructure 
 requirements
Energy requirements
Strengths 
Government awarnesses
Availability of raw 
 material (For limited com-
modities
Threats 
Overcapacity
Falling transport costs
WTO/BITs
Opportunities 
New mining actors 
LINKAGES
43
2 .4 .1 Literature review and case studies
Kaplinsky (2011) defines horizontal linkages as capabili-
ties developed for the EI sector and used by other sectors, 
thereby enabling the development of new industries; those 
capabilities are generally relatively high skilled and/or 
technologically oriented. The literature is less expansive on 
horizontal linkages than on Hirschman’s two other pillars 
of the production linkages and therefore there are only few 
case studies. When exploring eight resource-rich countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Morris et al. (2012) observed conclu-
sive evidence for the creation of horizontal linkages only in 
South Africa (see box 2.13); in two other countries, Ghana 
and Zambia, the existence of such linkages could be assumed 
but no supporting evidence was found. While providing 
macroeconomic evidence for horizontal linkage creation is 
difficult, a number of papers provide anecdotal evidence of 
how the EI sector may have created horizontal linkages. Teka 
(2011), for example, finds that in Angola the manufacturing 
and assembly of oil rig control lines between the sub-sea and 
the surface require basic metal working capabilities, which 
could be adapted to spur development in the construction 
The key concept at the core of horizontal linkages is the 
adaptability of capabilities. As Kaplinsky (2011) put it: “the 
probability that a country will develop the capability to be good 
at producing one good is related to its installed capability in 
the production of other similar, or nearby goods for which the 
currently existing productive capabilities can be easily adapted”. 
While horizontal and knowledge transfer linkages are related 
concepts, this report differentiates between the two. Herein, 
the key difference is that whereas knowledge and technology 
transfers enable actors to improve their capabilities within 
the EI value chain, horizontal linkages enable them to adapt 
those skills to other sectors. This may be another sub-sector 
within EIs (for instance from coal mining to tar sands as in 
South Africa) or another sector away from the EI altogether 
(from gold mining to construction, agriculture, and gen-
eral manufacturing, as in South Africa, or from forestry to 
electronics, as in Finland). Focusing on horizontal linkages is 
a particularly attractive policy for countries that have already 
established upstream linkages and developed good capabili-
ties in their supply base (given that horizontal linkages are 
most likely to occur from upstream activities).
Figure 2 .17: Horizontal linkages
 Source: Authors
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More recently, horizontal linkages to South Africa’s mining 
sector weakened. Kaplan (2011) attributes this to 1) a grow-
ing knowledge and information gap between the mining-re-
lated companies and the non-mining sectors and 2) a market 
failure problem whereby first mover companies take the risks 
of venturing into non-mining sectors while much of the suc-
cess falls to follower companies. 
The case of South Africa shows that governments should ad-
dress market failures associated with first mover problems by 
offering technologically more advanced suppliers incentives 
to branch out of the mining sector into new markets and 
products. This could be achieved through a fund financing 
training, market research and support infrastructure, all of 
which encourage the sharing of technological competen-
cies. Such support could be given on a competitive and on a 
matching grant basis (see recommendations G5, D7).  
While not linked to mining or oil & gas projects, the case of 
Finland shows how the country used its expertise in forest-
based industries to move into engineering and later into ICT 
and electronics.
The Finnish case study highlights the key role that the 
Government played in the various phases of the country’s 
development, placing high importance on tertiary education, 
knowledge, R&D, and forward-looking industrial policy34 
(see recommendations G2, G4, G6, D4, D7).
 
and other manufacturing sectors. In Nigeria, the oil sector 
has outsourced information technology (IT) services; Oyejide 
and Adewuyi (2011) report that those IT skills are being ap-
plied to other sectors in the economy. More generally, Perkins 
and Robins (2011) claim that engineering skills developed 
during the construction phase of EI projects can be leveraged 
for other infrastructure-intensive industries. These experi-
ences suggest that certain skills are particularly conducive for 
creating horizontal linkages. In Madagascar, GIZ’s linkage 
creation programme determined that welding was particularly 
suitable to develop the skills in unrelated sectors as well.33 
Kaplan (2011) and Morris et al. (2012) argue that because 
every mining or energy resource is location-specific, the cre-
ation of horizontal linkages out of upstream linkages should 
be possible. The specificity of the resource leads to the devel-
opment of specialized local skills and knowledge aimed at the 
EI sector. Those special capabilities can then serve specific 
niches in the market, both domestically and abroad. South 
Africa is a case in point.
 
Box 2.13: South Africa and horizontal linkages
In South Africa, the coal deposits suffer from impurities, 
which require specific coal washing capabilities . “Arising 
from the development of capabilities by supplier firms 
to meet this challenge, horizontal linkages developed 
enabling the supplier firms to penetrate new and different 
markets, for example washing spirals for utilization in the 
Canadian tar sands” (Morris et al ., 2012) .  
 
South Africa has also developed special expertise in deep 
gold and platinum mining . When mining activity declined 
at the end of the apartheid era in 1994, South Africa’s 
highly specialized equipment manufacturers diversified 
by either expanding abroad or by modifying and adapting 
their generic technologies for use in other industries such 
as the construction, agriculture, and general manufactur-
ing sectors (Walker, 2005) . 
33 In Madagascar, GIZ worked with the Chamber of Mines, which was made up 
of 27 members including mining companies and suppliers, in order to develop a 
training programme that would provide skills not only applicable to the mining 
sector but also to other sectors of the economy relevant in the present and future 
(Interview with GIZ South Africa, August 2015) .
34 Already in the 1960s, the government first set up the “Advanced Data 
 Processing initiative” to review how the public sector was processing  information 
and then the Advance Data Processing Board under the Ministry of Finance to 
 analyze at the consequences of automation technologies for employment . In 
 addition, in 1979 the Council of State appointed the Technology Council to explore 
this issue . In 1992, the parliament created the Committee for the Future, which 
became permanent in 2000 . Recently, the committee refocused its analysis on 
globalization and competitiveness (Dahlman et al . 2006) .
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by adopting foreign technologies and further developing 
them . Expertise was developed in the fields of engineer-
ing, energy technology and papermaking machinery . A 
strong national consensus emerged in favour of invest-
ment over consumption . Capital was channelled towards 
particular industries, which also benefited from tax 
incentives . During this period, the Research Innovation 
Council (OKM) was established, which was chaired by the 
Prime Minister and mandated to advise the government 
on questions relating to science and technology . In 1983, 
the National Technology Agency was created under the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry to “formulate the Finnish 
innovation and technology policy“ . It provided funds in the 
form of grants and loans to incentivise R&D in private 
companies, institutes and universities .35 
 
Phase 3: The knowledge-driven stage started in the late 
1980s with the emergence of a strong electronics sector, 
which was originally developed in the 1960s to serve the 
traditional forest industry by providing process control, 
factory automation, and information technologies . During 
the knowledge-driven stage, the economy also opened 
up, supported by policies shifting from traditional mar-
ket interventions36 towards the creation of competitive 
capabilities and the improvement of Finland’s business 
environment . “A national innovation system in the context 
of industrial clusters”, was prioritized, as highlighted 
by the National Industrial Strategy White Paper (1993) . 
A component of this strategy was to promote “networks 
among companies; and among companies, universities, 
and research institutes” . Additionally, in 1997, 15 Employ-
ment and Economic Development Centers, publicly owned 
institutions providing various business-related services 
and financing to SMEs, were created . The emergence of 
the (former) world’s largest telecommunications company, 
Nokia, exemplifies the success of these measures
 
Box 2.14: Finland’s leadership in electronics arose 
from its forestry sector 
Finland went through three phases of development 
( Dahlman et al ., 2006) . The first two phases created a 
knowledge base for the forestry sector based on knowl-
edge transfer from foreign technologies and the build-up 
of its absorptive capacity . During the third phase, this 
knowledge base was used to form an electronic sec-
tor serving first the forestry sector through upstream 
linkages and then other sectors and markets through 
horizontal linkages . 
Phase 1: The resource-driven stage of the economy 
started in the mid-1800s and lasted until the 1930s . 
 During this stage, Finland relied on its abundant timber 
resources, some minerals and hydropower . It produced 
very few equipment goods and the economy relied on 
technological imports . The economy grew due to the 
export of timber and wood products . The growing export 
revenues were reinvested into infrastructure, financial 
systems and educational institutions . Among the latter, 
the Academy of Finland was created in 1918 in order to 
promote high-level scientific research . It benefited from 
15% of the Government’s research funding . In 1943, the 
Technical Research Center of Finland was established as 
an applied research organization to develop new applied 
technological solutions and promote knowledge and tech-
nology transfers by participating in national and interna-
tional research programmes and collaboration networks .
 
Phase 2: The investment-driven stage lasted from the 
1950s to the late 1980s when national companies started 
to invest in modern and efficient production technologies 
35 In 20 years, TEKES’ budget for R&D activities increased eightfold and 
 constitutes now about 28% of the government’s total R&D budget (Dahlman et al . 
2006) . 
36 The Finnish government used aggressive exchange-rate policies to boost 
exports in the 1960s .
2 .4 .2 Lessons learned from the literature  
  and case studies
The case studies from South Africa and Finland suggest that 
horizontal linkages can be created if the skills and knowledge 
used to address specific needs of the domestic EI sector are 
leveraged and adapted to serve other markets at home or 
abroad. In order to incentivise this positive externality and 
diminish the first mover market failure, broad government 
support is needed. This support can take the form of en-
couraging the formation of clusters with industries that have 
synergies with the EI sector, related industries, and techno-
logical institutes (as recommended by the Finnish National 
Industrial Strategy White Paper (1993)); the creation of high 
skills training institutes supporting the transfer of capabili-
ties from one sector to the other (such as the Finish TEKES); 
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to raise initiatives aiming at the transfer of capabilities from 
one sector the other (see recommendations E7, E8, G4, 
G5).  Development partners have a major coordination role 
to play, while financial cooperation could help financing 
 technological institutes (see recommendations D1, D7).
the creation of a “new product” development fund that 
supports horizontal linkages (as recommended by Kaplan 
in South Africa); and the creation of a conducive environ-
ment for public-private partnerships involving economic 
research organizations, industry federations and companies 
Table 2 .3: Summary of key characteristics of horizontal linkages
BENEFITS  - Diversification with less reliance on extractive industries & associated price 
swings 
DRAWBACKS  - Requires an existing supply base with technical expertise 
 - Necessitates new strategies that are not yet designed in developing countries
COMMODITY  SUITABILITY  - Bulky commodities and LNG projects, which require significant construction of 
infrastructures, will generate civil engineering skills that may be transferable 
to other sectors .
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND SKILL LEVEL
 - Only once the skills have been developed through upstream linkages, 
 horizontal linkages are likely to occur . 
EMPLOYMENT  - Dependent on the sector to which horizontal linkages are created (Capital vs . 
labour intensive)
GENDER  - Dependent on the sector to which horizontal linkages are created (high vs . low 
female participation rate)
MAIN POLICY MEASURES  - Develop upstream linkages first (if not already in place)
 - Build transferable skills
 - Promote industrial clusters that may benefit from technologies applied in the 
EI sector
 - Set up funding mechanisms that encourages first mover companies to venture 
into new sectors
RECOMMENDATIONS  
(CHAPTER 4)
 - EI Companies:              7,8
 - Governments:               1,2,4,5
 - Development cooperation: 1,2,4,7,8,1
SWOT Analysis for horizontal linkages:
Strengths (internal):
1. The location and geology of ore and hydrocarbon 
deposits often require specialized tools and skills to be 
extracted. These can become a comparative advantage 
of the country and provide the opportunity to be adap-
ted in order to serve niche markets at home or abroad. 
2. The EI sector requires the development of engineering 
skills and metallurgy capabilities, which are sought after 
by other sectors.
Weaknesses (internal):
1. Governments lack an awareness of the potential for ho-
rizontal linkages, which translates into a lack of policies 
targeting those linkages and of institutions facilitating 
them.
Opportunities (external):
2. Economic diversification looms large on resource-rich 
countries’ agenda, thus more attention might be placed 
on the promotion of horizontal linkages.  
Threats (external):
1. Development partners have not paid much attention to 
horizontal linkages so far as compared to the other types 
of production linkages.
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2.5 Side-stream Linkages: Knowledge  
 and Technology Linkages
Knowledge or technological linkages are related to transfers 
in know-how and skills. One of the key reasons to attract 
FDI in the EI sector in the first place is the need for knowl-
edge and sophisticated technologies to extract the resources, 
which are often not available domestically. There is a strong 
incentive for host countries to absorb knowledge, skills and 
technology from the foreign investor. An optimal policy 
would convert the depleting natural resources into produc-
tive human and capital assets over time, which can be the ba-
sis for expanding the production possibility frontier. One of 
the objectives of state owned companies – more  prominent 
in the oil and gas sector than in the mineral sector – is to 
acquire foreign expertise, which will allow the country to 
have greater leverage and control over future projects in the 
EI sector. 
Figure 2 .18: SWOT Analysis for horizontal linkages 
Source: Authors
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Figure 2 .19 Knowledge and technology linkages
 Source: Authors
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 channel, by which knowledge and technology is adapted from 
EI companies (Wang and Blomström 1992; Blomström and 
Kokko 1998; Sönmez 2013); (2) the labour mobility  channel, 
by which employees trained by EI companies move into 
the domestic economy and apply their acquired knowledge 
and expertise (Fosfuri et al., 2001); (3) the upstream-linkage 
channel, by which the multinational corporation transfers 
knowledge and technology to domestic suppliers in order 
to meet their required standards (Bwalya, 2006; Javorcik, 
2004; Kugler, 2006); and (4) the export channel, by which 
EI companies may enable local companies to access inter-
national markets (Aitken et al., 1997; Clerides et al., 1998; 
Greenaway et al., 2004).
Apart from learning about the extraction phase, there are 
also opportunities for knowledge and technology transfer 
throughout the value chain. The extraction process is likely 
to require inputs (upstream) that require knowledge and 
technology not available domestically. Similarly, there could 
be knowledge and technology transfer opportunities at the 
processing stage (downstream). Finally, other sectors of the 
economy could benefit from knowledge and technology 
spillovers from the EI value chain (horizontal). 
The channels through which knowledge and technology 
can be transferred are illustrated in the figure below and can 
be categorized as follows: (1) The demonstration-imitation 
Figure 2.20: Channels through which knowledge and technology can be transferred
 Source: Authors
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2.5.1 Literature review and case studies
It is difficult to measure the extent to which domestic 
economies benefit from knowledge and technology spillovers 
from FDI and the literature is inconclusive in this regard. 
Studies find positive, neutral or even negative impacts of FDI 
on knowledge and technology spillovers37. However, the lit-
erature shows that the pre-existing level of know-how in the 
economy (also referred to as the absorptive capacity) is a key 
determinant of the level of spillovers (Ghebrihiwet, 2016). 
If the technological or knowledge gap is too great between 
the FDI and the host country, the opportunities will be few. 
To maximize the potential for knowledge and technological 
spillovers, the FDI know-how should be slightly above that 
of the host economy (see for example Findlay, 1978; Wang 
and Blomström, 1992; Kokko, 1994; Lapan and Bardhan, 
1973; Kinoshita, 2001; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). 
One policy tool available to governments to influence private 
sector R&D, knowledge and technology transfers is the level 
of protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). There is 
much debate around how stringent these should be in order 
to foster R&D and maximize knowledge spillovers. Pro-
ponents of strong IPRs suggest these are the basis to assure 
companies that their research investments provide adequate 
returns (Maskus, 2004; Foray, 2009), and that they provide 
ownership advantages to companies in developed countries 37 For an overview of empirical studies, see Knell and Rojec (2011).
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Demonstration-Imitation Channel
Brazil, Chile and Norway have been relatively success-
ful at benefiting from the imitation channel through their 
respective state-owned companies. Petrobras imitated the 
Early Production Systems39 approach from the North Sea 
to develop Brazil’s deep and ultra-deep offshore oil deposits 
(Dwyer et al., 2013), Codelco enhanced and ultimately ex-
ported copper smelting technologies to Zambia, which were 
first introduced in Chile by Japanese and Canadian investors 
in the 1970s (Gana, 1992), and Norway’s Statoil acquired 
management practices from Mobil as explained below.
 
Box 2.15: Statoil acquires management practices from 
Mobil
After the discovery of oil in the late 1960s, Norway cre-
ated the state-owned enterprise Statoil in 1972 with the 
primary purpose of participating 50% in all allocated 
production licenses . Two years later Mobil discovered 
Statfjord, one of the largest oil fields in the North Sea . 
Statoil partnered with Mobil, which was the operator of 
the field, and followed its management practices until 
taking over its operations in 1986 . Apart from replicating 
the company structure and recruiting foreign nationals for 
top management positions that would later be substi-
tuted by Norwegians, the Government required foreign 
companies to closely collaborate with local universities 
and required that at least 50% of research done by IOCs 
on developing oil from the Norwegian continental shelf 
be done domestically . This led to the creation of research 
centres such as Sintef, Christian Mechelsens Research, 
and Rogaland Research, which specialized on applied ge-
ology, well drilling technology and enhanced oil recovery 
(Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum, 2007) . Licensing rounds were 
used to reward companies that offered R&D partnerships 
and preferential treatment was given to those that would 
source from domestic companies . This policy contributed 
to Norway today exporting its offshore service expertise 
to the rest of the world . 
The case study from Norway highlights the role that state-
owned companies (see recommendation G8) and R&D 
requirements with domestic universities (see recommenda-
tions E8, G5,) may play to foster knowledge and technology 
linkages. 
that are less inclined to invest abroad if their technologies 
are not protected (Hassan et. al, 2010). Opponents argue 
that strong IPRs increase market power for investors, who 
will seek to sell the technology at a higher price than the 
social optimum (Hassan et. al, 2010) and that weak IPRs 
can encourage ‘non-market based’38 involuntary international 
technology transfers through reverse engineering and imita-
tion (Foray, 2009).
Empirical studies have mainly focused on market-based tech-
nology transfers. Smith (2001) finds that strong IPRs give 
incentives to firms in developed countries to license their 
technologies to other companies in developing countries. In 
weaker IPR jurisdictions, companies prefer to keep technolo-
gies within their foreign affiliates, given that they have less 
control over the technology transfer process. Using U.S. FDI 
data, Nicholson (2007) finds that capital-intensive industries 
are more likely to keep control over their technologies in 
countries with weaker IPRs. The likelihood of companies 
with high R&D expenses contracting unaffiliated companies 
increases with more stringent IPRs. Leger (2007), on the 
other hand, finds that IPRs and past R&D investments have 
a positive and significant impact on innovation in developed 
countries, but not in developing countries. This is in line 
with several studies that have found a non-linear U-shaped 
relationship between IPRs and economic development 
(Maskus, 2000; Braga et al, 2000; Chen and Puttitanun 
2005) suggesting that less developed countries are harmed 
by stringent IRPs up to a certain point in their develop-
ment where the relationship changes. The benefits from less 
stringent IPRs are likely to result from the non-market-based 
technology transfer channel via involuntary dissemination of 
technologies that are copied and reverse engineered. Foray 
(2009) provides several historical case studies that show 
how developed countries have used weak IPRs to boost the 
development of their own industries. The empirical literature 
suggests that proper attention must be given to the level of 
existing IPRs in the country and the economic circumstanc-
es; it also argues that blanket rules may actually be harmful if 
they are set too high. To address the specificities of particular 
industries, the IPRs might also have to be adapted by sector. 
While much research has been done on industries such as 
the pharmaceutical sector, little research has been done on 
EI. Hence, lessons learned from this linkage type have to be 
deducted from anecdotal evidence and case studies. 
38 Market based channels being trade, FDI and licensing
39 Early Production Systems are used to reduce reservoir risks . They involve the 
production of oil through a temporary processing system and an export of the 
processed crude to a storage vessel for subsequent transport to market .
LINKAGES
50
Upstream-linkage channel
When sourcing locally, EI companies have an incentive to 
support the supplier in reducing the cost and improving the 
quality of the procured goods and services. This may enhance 
the competitiveness of both the multinational and the local 
suppliers. The Anglo Zimele programme by Anglo American 
in South Africa provides a good illustration of how transfer 
of knowledge from the mining company to the suppliers can 
create benefits for both and create technological spillovers. 
Labour mobility channel
With its long mining history, South Africa is thought to 
have benefitted from the labour mobility channel. Many of 
the senior and skilled workers in the mining supplier sec-
tor – that does not only serve the mining industry in South 
Africa but also exports its services to neighbouring countries 
– were previously directly employed by mine sites where they 
acquired their skills and expertise (Walker, 2005). However, 
by hiring the most qualified and knowledgeable people in the 
country, the EI sector can also create a ‘brain drain’ in other 
sectors, thereby creating negative knowledge spillovers in the 
economy (Sinani and Meyer, 2004). 
 
Box 2.16: Anglo Zimele Programme in South Africa
Anglo Zimele is the enterprise development and empow-
erment initiative of Anglo American in South Africa, which 
started in 1989 with the aim to develop small businesses 
that were owned by black entrepreneurs . The Supply 
Chain Development component supports the creation of 
SME that will provide goods and/or services to the mine 
site . It acts as an incubator helping to create the neces-
sary expertise and financial start-up capital before exit-
ing the partnership . 
 
If the initial investment proposal is accepted,  Anglo 
Zimele enters into an equity partnership  (between 
10-49%) and provides additional loans for the 
 implementation of the project . A business development 
officer is appointed as non-executive director to moni-
tor the development of the SME and to provide support 
in management, marketing, operational and financial 
 decisions . Training courses are also offered in areas such 
as financial management, computer literacy, business 
management, production management and accounting . 
The exit phase entails the sale of Anglo Zimele’s shares 
to the entrepreneurs based on commercial terms and 
conditions as set out in the shareholders’ agreement . This 
phase usually commences 3 to 5 years after the initial 
investment and should be completed within a year after 
commencement (Anglo American and The IFC, 2008) . A 
survey from 2005 showed that 72% of the companies 
 Anglo American had invested in, survived 8 years or 
 longer (Wise and Shtylla, 2007) . 
The South Africa case study highlights how mining com-
panies can contribute to the knowledge and technology 
spillovers through the upstream linkages channel. Apart from 
providing the suppliers with start-up capital, the programme 
also foresees support to the management of the company 
during the initial phases (see recommendations E7, E10)
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Chile’s case study exemplifies how changes in procurement 
strategies can lead to innovative solutions by suppliers and 
how the EI sector may support suppliers to access foreign 
markets. Furthermore, it shows the benefits of collaboration 
between EI companies in order to achieve economies of scale 
(see recommendations E3, E9, G8, D6) 
2 .5 .2 Lessons learned from the literature  
  and case studies
The level of expertise available in a country is a key determi-
nant of which technologies and knowledge can be trans-
ferred: if the gap between the company and the foreign inves-
tor is too large, the domestic companies will not be able to 
replicate the technologies required by the EI company. From 
a policy perspective, the first step should therefore be to 
identify the current technological boundaries of the domestic 
labour force and companies, and to perform a needs assess-
ment of the skill requirements of the EI company. Support 
programmes will have to be tailored to push the production 
possibility frontier outwards. The IPRs will also need to be 
tailored to the development stage of the country and the 
absorptive capacity of the industrial base. 
The case studies have shown several ways in which govern-
ments can promote knowledge and technology transfers, in-
cluding partnerships between state owned companies and the 
EI companies (as seen in Norway and Chile); joint ventures 
between domestic suppliers and the EI companies (as seen in 
South Africa); and joint R&D centres and programmes (as 
seen in Norway and Chile). Furthermore, governments need 
to design academic courses that elevate the technological 
level of the workforce according to the labour requirements 
within the EI sector and adapt the intellectual property rights 
to the economic circumstances.
Export channel
The presence of foreign EI companies may also enhance 
the export capacity of local companies. Apart from provid-
ing valuable information about export markets and learning 
about the requirements necessary in order to access those 
markets, EI companies can act as channels to help local com-
panies accessing these markets (Greenaway et al., 2004). One 
third of domestic suppliers in Ghana and 42% of domestic 
suppliers in Chile that were servicing foreign mining com-
panies were also found to be exporting their services to other 
jurisdictions (Farole and Winkler, 2014). The World Class 
Suppliers Programme (see box 2.17) is an illustration of the 
export channel. 
 
 
Box 2.17: World Class Suppliers Programme in Chile
The World Class Suppliers programme, launched by BHP 
Billiton in 2009 and joined by Codelco in 2011, aims to 
provide the right collaborative environment for  suppliers 
to innovate . The collaboration is based on the  supplier 
proposing new technological solutions to problems 
faced by the mining company, financing the R&D, and 
 acquiring the intellectual property if the research results 
in a  successful product . The mining company provides 
 technical, managerial and financial support; offers the 
mining operations as testing grounds for the new tech-
nologies; and offers assistance in accessing international 
markets . By 2013, BHP Billiton had operated 43 innovation 
projects with 36 suppliers participating . These  suppliers 
with around 5,000 employees had combined sales of $400 
million . BHP Billiton has invested around $50 million in 
the programme, which is less than half of the estimated 
savings resulting from the innovations of around $121 
million .  
 
In 2012, suppliers participating in this programme were 
more likely to export to other markets than those who 
supplied to the mining sector that did not have the same 
support mechanisms . Of the suppliers who did not par-
ticipate, 34% of them exported compared with 51% that 
were part of the programme (Innovum, 2014) . Prodinsa, 
for example, which developed steel cables for BHP Bil-
liton that resulted in the shelf life of the cables being 
extended by 40%, started exporting these to BHP Billiton’s 
Antamina mine in Peru, thereby accessing a new market . 
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2. The development of knowledge linkages highly 
 depends on absorptive capacity. Most of the resource-
rich developing countries supported by development 
cooperation have a significant knowledge gap, which 
makes technological transfer very difficult to achieve.
Opportunities (external):
1. The recent commodity slump has meant that EI com-
panies are looking to cut costs and increase efficiencies 
by embracing new technologies. This may provide an 
opportunity for making the sector technologically more 
advanced, which in turn may result in increased spill-
overs. 
2. Increasing focus on technology transfer in international 
development frameworks such as the recently adopted 
SDGs (see SDG 10). 
SWOT Analysis for knowledge and technology 
 linkages
Strengths (internal):
1. The upstream-linkage and export channels of know-
ledge and technology transfers are in the self-interest  
of EI companies. The former leads to a reduction of 
operating expenditures in the country of operation 
and the latter leads other mine sites of international 
EI companies to benefit from potential technological 
advances as well. 
2. It is hard for EI companies to prevent technology 
 transfers through the demonstration-imitation and 
labour mobility channels.
Weaknesses (internal):
1. This linkage does not feature high on the government 
agenda. Illustrative of this observation is that only a 
limited number of local content legislations specifi-
cally and effectively address the need for technology 
transfers. This can partly be explained by the fact that 
technology transfers are not associated with tangible 
results and therefore politically less appealing.
Table 2 .4: Summary of key characteristics of knowledge and technology linkages
BENEFITS  - Knowledge and technical expertise are the basis for economic development
 - Labour force with technical expertise more adaptable to structural changes
DRAWBACKS  - EI companies will try to prevent knowledge and technology transfers to 
 domestic competitors . 
COMMODITY  SUITABILITY  - Precious metals have short exploitation cycles, which result in less time to 
develop linkages
 - The oil and gas sector is characterised by more state owned companies, which 
may be used as a tool to create knowledge and technology linkages
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND SKILL LEVEL
 - This linkage is mainly dependent on existing expertise and absorptive capacity .
EMPLOYMENT  - Highly adaptable workforce will avoid long term unemployment due to struc-
tural changes in the economy
GENDER  - N/A
MAIN POLICY MEASURES  - Tailor intellectual property rights to the country context
 - Promote joint research centers and programmes with universities
 - Encourage joint ventures with technologically advanced companies
RECOMMENDATIONS  
(CHAPTER 4)
 - EI Companies:              1,2,3,4,7,8
 - Governments:               1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
 - Development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10
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Threats (external):
1. Investment treaties as explored in more depth in 
 Chapter 3 can contain clauses that restrict prescrip-
tive measures to leverage knowledge and technology 
 transfers.
2. Knowledge and technology transfers are difficult to 
measure, which explains the lack of consensus in the 
academic community about whether technology trans-
fers are occurring and how stringent IPR rules should 
be in order to foster technology transfer. This topic 
clearly needs more research.
3. While the EI sector’s search for technological solu-
tions is an opportunity for technologically advanced 
countries, it might be a threat for countries that suffer 
from low absorptive capacity, given that the knowledge 
gap may increase even further, thus making it more 
difficult to transfer knowledge and technologies (as also 
discussed in Chapter 3).
Figure 2 .21: SWOT Analysis of knowledge linkages
Source: Authors
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2.6 Side-stream Linkages: Spatial/  
 Infrastructure Linkages
Spatial (infrastructure) linkages relate to the benefits associ-
ated with the infrastructure developed for an EI project for 
other actors in the economy. Sharing or opening up access 
to essential resource-related infrastructure is one of the most 
viable ways by which the EI – and particularly mining or 
onshore oil & gas activities – can support the establishment 
of industries that will survive long after a country’s mineral 
resources are fully exhausted. 
EI projects require considerable infrastructure to meet their 
power, water and transport needs to extract, process and 
export the commodity. Traditionally, extractive companies 
build and operate their own infrastructure in an enclave 
model. The capital investment required to build or rehabili-
tate the required infrastructure can amount to a sizable por-
tion of the overall capital expenditures required to develop an 
EI project. For example, it is estimated that, for bulk mineral 
projects – such as iron ore, which requires a railway line and 
port for export purposes – the development of transport in-
frastructure alone represents around 60% of the total capital 
expenditure for developing a greenfield project (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2013). At times of depressed commod-
ity prices, such huge capital requirements can render an EI 
project economically unviable. 
At the same time, resource companies often operate in 
resource-rich, low- to middle-income countries where there 
are huge infrastructure gaps that can make it more challeng-
ing to transform resource wealth into long-term development 
(CCSI, 2014). The resource-related infrastructure invest-
ments therefore present an opportunity to leverage such 
extractive companies’ investments in infrastructure for broad-
based economic development. This can be achieved by either 
investing fiscal revenues in long-term infrastructure assets 
(fiscal linkages), or by requiring the shared use of or open ac-
cess to resource-related infrastructure. In addition, where the 
shared use of transport-related resource infrastructure (roads 
or optic fibre cables along the accompanying right-of-way40 
of a railway line or pipeline) results in the development of re-
source corridors, investments in last mile or feeder projects to 
connect actors that operate along such resource corridors can 
further widen the scope of the anchor resource infrastructure, 
thereby multiplying the spatial linkages (Ramdoo 2015). 
40 A right-of-way or servitude is a type of easement granted or reserved over the 
land for transportation purposes . An example of a right-of-way would be the land 
on which a railway line or pipeline is located . There is scope to lay other types of 
infrastructure (optic fiber cables, power lines, etc .) along these rights-of-way .
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distances. Similarly, offshore oil deposits will not require 
much onshore infrastructure to be built and may have little 
scope for developing spatial linkages.
Similarly, different types of commodities have different water 
and power requirements. As illustrated in the figures on the 
next page, while some commodities that require consider-
able processing like copper and gold are both water and 
power intensive, other commodities like iron ore and coal 
only require water for dust suppression and, in the case of 
coal, washing of the coal, thus requiring much less water and 
power overall. 
It is also very important that a careful cost-benefit analysis is 
done before imposing shared infrastructure requirements on 
a particular EI project. As can be seen in the figure on the 
next page, the benefits and related costs of sharing different 
types of infrastructure vary substantially across projects  
and commodity types. For rail and port infrastructure, the 
costs of sharing are among the highest, whereas for power 
(and ICT, which is not reflected in the figure), the range of  
benefits from adopting a shared-use arrangements is often 
larger than the associated costs. 
The concept of “shared use” in an EI context refers to the 
opportunity to have resource-related transport, power, 
water, or ICT infrastructure benefit multiple (resource 
and non-resource) users. Multi-purpose projects, whereby 
infrastructure is designed and operated to accommodate both 
EI and non-EI users allows a wider range of stakeholders to 
access and benefit from the infrastructure. This, in turn, can 
facilitate the development of upstream and downstream link-
ages where the lack of adequate infrastructure has prevented 
SMEs from being able to manufacture or transport their 
goods, or to communicate with the mines in an affordable 
manner.41    
However, not all types of commodities provide the same 
opportunities for shared use or open access infrastructure 
given that different EI projects have different infrastructure 
requirements. As illustrated in the figure on the next page, 
for example, not all types of minerals require the construc-
tion of railway lines. Rail transport is generally only suited 
for bulk commodities that need to be transported over long 
Figure 2 .22: Spatial linkages
 Source: Authors
41 In a 2013 report, McKinsey Global Institute estimated that as much as US$2 
trillion of EI-related investments in infrastructure could benefit from some form of 
shared use between 2013 and 2030 . It estimates that nearly 70 % of infrastructure 
investment could be multi-user, and the remaining 30 % could be multi-purpose 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2013) .
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Figure 2 .23: Transport linkage potential by commodity
Figure 2 .24: Water linkage potential by commodity Figure 2 .25: Power linkage potential by commodity 
Source: “IFC presentation at Indaba (2013), Fostering greenfield mining-associated shared transport infrastructure through PPPs: Challenges and Solutions for sub-Saharan Africa
Source: Frost & Sullivan (2012), CEO 360 Degree Perspective of the Global Mining 
Water and Wastewater Treatment Market .
Source: World Bank, Banerjee, S . G ., Romo, Z ., McMahon, G ., Toledano, P ., Robinson, 
P . and Pérez Arroyo, I (2015), The Power of the Mine .
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Transport infrastructure
Opening up access to the resource-related transport infra-
structure built by mining companies or the roads located in 
the rights-of-way upon which oil and gas pipelines are lo-
cated can support SMEs by facilitating the transport of their 
goods or personnel around areas inadequately serviced by 
public infrastructure as well as trade more generally. This can 
have a particularly positive impact from a gender perspective, 
as women, who are less likely to be directly employed in EI 
projects, can benefit from the infrastructure to transport of 
agricultural produce or supply services they are more likely to 
be involved in.
However, while very attractive in principle, the financing, 
coordination and regulation of shared railway infrastructure 
in particular can be difficult to execute and there are few 
successful examples of shared mining-related rail infrastruc-
ture. From a financing perspective, shared railway infra-
structure can render a project less “bankable” if there is a 
risk that opening up access to that railway line to other users 
could result in operational inefficiencies and delays. This is 
particularly important if the ownership of the infrastructure 
2 .6 .1 Literature review and case studies
Adequate public infrastructure is an essential component of 
the type of enabling environment required to foster business 
development and productivity (Sigam and Garcio, 2012). 
Inadequate infrastructure prevents the expansion of local 
industry and limits the scope of upstream and downstream 
linkages developing around the EI sector (Ireland, 2015).43 
However, many governments lack human and financial re-
sources to construct, rehabilitate and maintain the transport, 
power, water, and ICT infrastructure required to meet the 
demands of their rising populations and foster the develop-
ment of local industry, in particular through upstream and 
downstream linkages (as explained in Sections 2.2 and 2.3). 
In such a context, negotiating and implementing shared use 
or open access arrangements with EI companies  regarding 
the infrastructure they require to operate can help to 
 facilitate spatial linkages from EI investments. 
Figure 2 .26: Costs and benefits of sharing infrastructure 
Source: McKinsey (2013), Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies .
42
42 Exhibit from “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven 
economies ”, December 2013, McKinsey Global Institute, www .mckinsey .com . Copy-
right (c) 2013 McKinsey & Company . All rights reserved . Reprinted by permission . 
43 The lack of adequate infrastructure also affects investors’ decision to develop 
natural resources to begin with . In the current climate of low and volatile com-
modity prices, the huge capital costs associated with the construction of the rail 
and port infrastructure required to exploit and export some of the greenfield iron 
ore and bauxite reserves in West Africa, for example, has resulted in their devel-
opment being delayed or put on hold indefinitely (Ireland, 2015) . 
While infrastructure sharing is generally beneficial,
the related costs of projects vary substantially
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A prime example of such a shared-use transport 
 infrastructure arrangement are railway line, port and feeder 
roads planned to be built in connection with Rio Tinto’s 
 Simandou iron ore project in the Republic of Guinea, 
wherein the IFC has a 5% equity stake in the Guinean-in-
corporated company, Simfer SA, that holds the development 
mining licence for the project. 
is separated from that of the mining concession, and the 
major mining company loses some operational control over 
the infrastructure. Shared use of transport infrastructure also 
requires a strong regulator to moderate access, set tariffs and 
adjudicate disputes. 
44 Government of Guinea, Rio Tinto, Chinalco and the IFC Joint Press Release: 
“Simandou South: Signature of the Investment Framework Marks a Significant 
Move Forward,” May 26, 2014, available at: http://www .riotinto .com/media/
media-releases-237_10508 .aspx .  See also: Di Boscio N, Slade M,Ward J: “Digging 
deeper for development: the case of Simandou and the Southern Guinea Growth 
Corridor .”(2014), available at: http://link .springer .com/article/10 .1007%2Fs13563-
014-0052-x .
Box 2.18: The Simandou Southern Growth Corridor  
in Guinea
The Simandou mountain in northwest Guinea range is 
home to some of the most substantial premier grade and, 
as of yet, untapped iron ore reserves in the world . First 
discovered in 1997, the infrastructure challenges associ-
ated with extracting and exporting the ore has meant 
that the deposits have yet to be developed . The shortest 
export route for the iron ore would be through Liberia . 
However, at the insistence of the Government of Guinea 
and with the assistance of the IFC, Rio Tinto agreed to 
build a railway line through Guinea instead of Liberia to 
export the iron ore along the “Southern Guinea Growth 
Corridor” . The Southern Guinea Growth Corridor is an area 
wherein linkages between agriculture and aquaculture, 
services, trade and other export industries and Rio Tinto’s 
anchor railway, port and road infrastructure are planned 
to develop (Bastida 2014) . 
In May 2014, Rio Tinto – which holds a majority stake 
in the company, Simfer SA, which holds the develop-
ment license with respect to blocks 3 and 4 of the 
Simandou iron ore deposits – entered into an Invest-
ment Framework with the Government of Guinea, the 
Aluminium  Corporation of China (Chinalco) and the IFC to 
develop the Simandou deposits . A separate infrastructure 
 agreement was signed between the parties to procure 
the financing for, construct and operate a 650km multi-
purpose trans-Guinean railway line from Simandou in the 
northwest of the country to a greenfield deep-water port 
south of Conakry, thus linking up a highly fertile agricul-
tural region and adding shipping capacity .44 Over 1,000km 
of roads are also planned to be constructed or rehabili-
tated along the corridor, which will be open to use by the 
public and will serve to connect passengers and SMEs to 
the railway line from local villages . Preliminary estimates 
suggest that this Southern Guinean Growth Corridor could 
unlock US$ 3 billion worth of economic activity per year 
(Rio Tinto, 2015) .
However, since the conclusion of the Investment Frame-
work and infrastructure agreements, little progress seems 
to have been made to raise the capital required to devel-
op the project, which is anticipated to cost around US$20 
billion . The rail and port infrastructure alone accounts for 
nearly two-thirds of the estimated costs and, given the 
current slump in commodity prices, there is little appetite 
for a project that requires such a high capital investment . 
Whether this project does indeed create the spatial link-
ages it has set out to create therefore remains to be seen 
when the mining project is eventually developed . 
Multiple lessons can be learnt from the Guinea case study: 
(1) it shows the role that financial development coopera-
tion can play in developing resource projects and associated 
infrastructure (see recommendation D3); (2) it highlights 
potential that spatial linkages have in terms of contributing 
to economic development, but also how complex and costly 
these are to implement (see recommendations E2, E3, G7); 
and (3) it shows the political economy that is at play in such 
large projects, which has resulted in the Guinean government 
not allowing for the railway line to go through Liberia, which 
was the route preferred by the investors (see recommendation 
D10). 
The case study also exemplifies the challenges of raising the 
financing for the transport infrastructure requirements of 
a large bulk commodity mine when the ownership of the 
 infrastructure is separated from the mine assets and the juris-
diction lacks a strong or independent regulator to 
implement the shared-use arrangement. While requiring all 
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Power infrastructure
Mining demand for power can be leveraged to either 
improve or expand the transmission and generation capac-
ity of the national or regional grid or a power generation 
plant constructed for a mine can be used to supply low-cost 
electricity to local communities or the nation’s grid, thus im-
proving living standards and fostering the business environ-
ment. The case study below describes how Katanga copper 
mining’s power requirements have been leveraged to improve 
the power system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).
transport infrastructure to be open access, governments need 
to carry out a proper cost-benefit analysis before requiring 
shared use of all types of shared infrastructure, and particu-
larly railway lines. The tax concessions a government will 
need to make for a major mining company to agree to shared 
use may outweigh the benefits of a multi-purpose railway 
line. In such a case, a host government may be better off just 
retaining the right-of-way on which a railway line is located, 
so that roads and other types of infrastructure can be built 
alongside it. 
Box 2.19: How Katanga copper mining’s power 
 requirements have been leveraged to improve the 
power system in Democratic Republic of Congo
The DRC has great hydropower potential; the Inga hydro-
power site on the Congo River alone has an estimated 
potential to produce 40,000MW . However, at present, the 
DRC only has an installed capacity of 1,775MW, with an 
electricity grid that reaches 11% of the population and 
suffers from intermittent electricity supply and regular 
power outages (World Bank, 2014) . Therefore, the country 
relies heavily on back-up diesel generators, which are 
significantly more expensive and limit the growth po-
tential of small businesses that cannot afford to sustain 
the losses associated with regular power cuts or operate 
generators for long periods of time . The power short-
ages and unreliable power supply have also affected the 
energy-intensive copper mining industry in the south-east 
of the country, which accounts for 30% of the DRC’s GDP 
and 80% of its export revenues and exploits one of the 
largest copper deposits in the world .45 
The regular power outages, coupled with the high cost 
of diesel, mean that less copper is produced at a higher 
cost . This in turn means that the country forgoes tax 
revenues that would otherwise have been generated 
from copper exports . In a recent study, the World Bank 
 estimated that in 2012 power shortages resulted in a 
loss of 250,000 tons of copper, which translated into lost 
exports worth US$1 .8 billion, a loss in GDP of US$700 
million (4 .4% of GDP) and a loss in tax revenues of 
US$250 million (1 .6% of GDP) (World Bank, 2014) .  
Given the long-term nature of the mining operations and 
their consistent power needs, a number of mines, includ-
ing those operated by GlencoreXstrata Plc, have agreed 
to invest in SNEL as well as to upgrade the national 
electricity grid through a series of measures including the 
repair of two turbines at SNEL’s 1,424MW Inga 2 hydro-
power plant and improve about 2,000 km of transmission 
lines to provide power to Katanga . By doing so, the mines 
will ensure they have a better, cheaper and more reliable 
power supply . At the same time, SNEL will benefit from 
improved infrastructure and will be better placed to sup-
port the supply of cheap hydropower to other sectors and 
users in the economy .
The DRC case study highlights the potential benefits of 
public-private partnerships or cooperation between the 
Government and the EI sector to improve power access to 
the country and at the same time lower the operating costs 
for the mining companies (see recommendations E2, E3, 
G7, G8). 
Water infrastructure
Similar economies of scale can be achieved with regard to 
water distribution and treatment infrastructure, whereby 
mining-related investments in water infrastructure are made 
with a view to benefit a wider range of stakeholders than 
just a single mine. Large volumes of water are required at 
each phase of the mining process to suppress dust, process 
and mine ore, cool and wash mining equipment, manage 
waste tailings, and for consumption by mining communities. 
Yet, mining companies increasingly find themselves operat-
ing in water-stressed environments where there is a physical 
45 More information can be obtained here: http://www .mineweb .com/mineweb/
content/en/mineweb-political-economy?oid=232081&sn=Detail
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and  distribution capacity of the local water authority as 
was the case with Freeport McMoran’s Cerro Verde mine in 
 Arequipa, Peru (see case study below). While such arrange-
ments can go a long way for a mine to obtain a social license 
from the surrounding communities, the initiatives do not 
necessarily need to be done on a CSR basis. As in the cases of 
Anglo American and Freeport McMoran, the treated water 
can be provided for a small fee (covering at least the opera-
tion and maintenance costs of supplying such water). Instead 
of making the investments or upgrades themselves, mining 
companies could also provide the necessary demand by way 
of a long water off take agreement46 to a water authority in 
order to help the water authority obtain the external financ-
ing for an upgrade of its water infrastructure required to 
serve both the mines and other users.  
shortage of fresh water, and considerable investment in water 
infrastructure is required to ensure a reliable water supply for 
mining operations (CCSI, 2014). Estimates suggest that the 
mining sector’s global annual expenditure on water-related 
infrastructure in 2011 was $7.7 billion (Thomas, 2011). 
In the context of community concerns that mines are 
 draining available water resources or are polluting or altering 
the course of existing water sources in areas where access 
to adequate and safe water resources for the local popula-
tion may be inadequate, there may be scope for mines to 
collaborate with local or national water utilities to supply 
mine treated water to a local authority for onward distribu-
tion (such as Anglo American’s eMahlahleni reclamation 
project in South Africa), or to upgrade the water treatment 
46  An offtake agreement is an agreement between a producer and a buyer to 
purchase/sell portions of the producer’s future production . It is usually negotiated 
prior to the construction of a facility such as a mine in order to secure a market 
for the future output of the facility .
47  Fibre to the Home Council Europe: “White Paper: Innovative FTTH Deploy-
ment Technologies,” (2014), available at: http://www .ftthcouncil .eu/documents/ 
Publications/DandO_White_Paper_2_2014 .pdf . Also see http://www .unescap .org/
sites/default/files/6_Cross-sector%20ICT%20Infrastructure%20for%20Asia_Abu%20
Khan .pdf 
48 Interview with corporate expert, July 2015 .
Box 2.20: The experience of Freeport McMoran in Peru 
with shared water infrastructure
Freeport McMoran’s Cerro Verde mine is an open-pit cop-
per and molybdenum-mining complex located near the 
city of Arequipa in southern Peru . The mine is a zero-
discharge facility that recycles approximately 85% of the 
water used in the mining process . The company, however, 
plans to expand and triple its production; in order to do 
so, the project will require an 85% increase in its water 
requirements . At the same time, access to clean water in 
the region is a major challenge . The main source of water 
supply, the Rio Chili, has become contaminated because 
of untreated sewage discharge and there is insufficient 
wastewater treatment capacity in the region .
In 2011, the mining company thus proposed to supply the 
additional water requirement through a new wastewater 
treatment plant with excess capacity reserved for com-
munities . By avoiding a deterioration of Rio Chili’s water 
quality due to polluting discharges, the project would 
also improve agricultural productivity in the area and re-
duce water-related diseases . It will also be a long-term 
source of treated water for mining operations . The Re-
gional Government of Arequipa, the National Government 
and SEDAPAR (Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado 
de Arequipa S .A) agreed with Freeport McMoran that the 
mine will finance the engineering and construction of the 
wastewater treatment plant and that the plant will be 
operated by SEDAPAR . Construction started in 2013 .
The Peru case study shows how spatial linkages can be 
 created in the water sector. Close collaboration with national 
and local authorities is necessary for such linkages to be 
 created (see recommendations E2, G7, G8). 
ICT infrastructure 
Economies of scope can be achieved when one type of infra-
structure facilitates the development of another type, such as 
placing fibre optic cables or utility lines alongside power lines 
or in the right-of-way of a railway line, road, or oil & gas 
pipeline to benefit a greater number of economic actors. In 
fact, with regard to fibre optic networks, it is estimated that 
civil works represent around 80% of total roll-out costs, so 
co-locating fibre optic cables alongside existing infrastructure 
can result in a reduction of the capital investment costs of 
using a fibre optic network.47 Examples of this include CEC 
Liquid Telecom’s laying of fibre optic lines along the power 
lines of the mines in the Zambian copper belt.48  Similarly, 
in Malaysia, Celcom, a major telecommunications company, 
partnered with Petronas, Malaysia’s state owned oil company, 
to build Celcom Petro Network, an installation of fibre optic 
network cables that addressed Petronas’ telecommunication 
needs and provided spare capacity that could be leased to 
other mobile operators, ISP and corporate customers. The 
system runs parallel with the National Gas Pipeline and 
contains nearly 1,400km of extension (covering nearly 90% 
of the country) (Toledano & Roorda, 2014).
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along pipelines is important. An example of a country with a 
strong regulator is Brazil, which uses regulation and adjudi-
cation to facilitate and implement shared use arrangements, 
as can be seen with regard to the Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline. 
In the oil & gas sector, the right-of-ways along pipelines 
are particularly suited to being shared with other types of 
infrastructure, although a clear regulatory framework to both 
allow and facilitate the leveraging of economies of scope 
Box 2.21: The use of rights of way in Brazil along the 
Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline
The Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline (GASBOL) provides a good 
example of the scope for cross-border shared infrastruc-
ture in the oil and gas context as well as the importance 
of strong regulatory oversight .49 The 3,150km long pipeline 
transports natural gas from Bolivia to Brazil .50
Bolivia’s and Brazil’s cooperation with respect to the 
cross-border pipeline was formalised on August 17, 
1992 with the conclusion of a Brazil-Bolivia Agreement 
on Natural Gas Supply .51 In addition to setting out that 
the countries’ state-owned oil enterprises, Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (“YPFB”) and Petroleo 
Brasileiro S .A . (“Petrobras”), would establish by contract 
the terms for the construction of the pipeline and the 
sale of natural gas, the agreement specifies regional 
integration as one of its aims and states that the Bolivian 
Government will allow the transit of natural gas from 
other countries towards Brazil by giving the transit the 
right-of-way in Bolivia .
GASBOL became operational in February 1999 and is 
managed by Gas Transboliviano S .A . (GTB) on the Bolivian 
side and by Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolívia-
Brasil S .A . (TBG) on the Brazilian side . In Brazil, natural 
gas as well as the infrastructure associated with it are 
regulated by the Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum, 
Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP), which has collaborated 
with other regulators to leverage economies of scale 
from GASBOL, among else by ensuring that electricity and 
telecommunications lines can be built alongside the gas 
pipelines . Most notably, in 1999 ANP and its counterparts 
in the electricity sector, ANEEL, and in the telecommuni-
cations sector, ANATEL, issued a joint resolution on the 
shared use of infrastructure which determines the sharing 
of rights-of-way for utility lines, pipelines, posts, and 
towers . More recently, ANP issued another resolution in 
order to regulate shared use of the right-of-way of pipe-
lines between the oil & gas sector and biofuel compa-
nies .52 Pursuant to this 2012 resolution, TBG is required to 
guarantee access to GASBOL’s easement over the land on 
which the pipeline is located as long as there is excess 
capacity for shared use . Any party wishing to request 
access to the easement for the construction of additional 
infrastructure just has to submit a request to TBG, and 
can then appeal to ANP for intervention if TBG refuses to 
grant the request .53
49 The 1992 Note on Natural Gas Sell Agreement states that “the decision of 
both the Bolivian and Brazilian governments to enter into the gas pipeline will 
not only benefit the development of both countries, but also decidedly contribute 
to Latin America regional integration . Therefore, a project like this pipeline is a 
priority for the South Cone region,” available at: http://dai-mre .serpro .gov .br/ atos- 
internacionais/bilaterais/1992/b_38_2011-10-14-15-30-18/  
50 TBG, “Gas Pipeline – Technical Information,” available at: http://www .tbg .com .
br/pt_br/o-gasoduto/informacoes-tecnicas .htm .   
51 See: Brazil . 1992 Note on Natural Gas Sell Agreement, available at:  
 http://dai-mre .serpro .gov .br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1992
/b_38_2011-10-14-15-30-18/ and Brazil . Decree 681/1992 that provide the Brazil-
Bolivia Agreement on Natural Gas Supply, available at: http://www .planalto .gov .br/
ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/D0681 .htm  
52 ANP . Resolution 42 of 12/10/2012, available at: http://nxt .anp .gov .br/NXT/
gateway .dll/leg/resolucoes_anp/2012/dezembro/ranp%2042%20-%202012 .
xml?fn=document-frameset .htm$f=templates$3 .0 
53 Art . 22 of ANP Resolution 42 of 12/10/2012, available at: http://nxt .anp .gov .
br/NXT/gateway .dll/leg/resolucoes_anp/2012/dezembro/ranp%2042%20-%202012 .
xml?fn=document-frameset .htm$f=templates$3 .0  
The Brazil case study highlights how cross-border infrastruc-
ture projects may help realize potentials for regional integra-
tion (see recommendation G9). It also shows the importance 
of a regulatory framework that allows enforcement of shared 
infrastructure use and the necessity of a strong regulatory 
authority (see recommendations G7, D1)
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to require shared use. By anticipating different scenarios and 
circumstances, governments can also assess other options, 
such as negotiating for higher tax revenues to invest in public 
infrastructure projects. 
While there is considerable scope for sharing at least some 
of the infrastructure required for EI projects to operate, the 
scope for shared use can vary substantially, depending on 
the type of infrastructure and industry it was developed for. 
A full cost-benefit analysis therefore needs to be undertaken 
to determine to what extent the imposition of shared use for 
each type of infrastructure should be required. For more in-
formation on the types of issues to take into account for each 
type of infrastructure in such a cost-benefit analysis, please 
see CCSI’s “Framework to Approach Shared-Use of  Mining 
Related Infrastructure.”55 There is often a lack of local 
capacity to carry out this cost-benefit analysis and technical 
cooperation could help enhance this capacity. 
2 .6 .2 Lessons learned from the literature  
  and case studies54 
Failing to leverage EI-related investments in infrastructure to 
address the lack of public infrastructure is a missed opportu-
nity for governments to maximize the development gains of 
such projects. Leveraging EI-related investments to benefit 
a wider range of stakeholders than just a single EI company 
could help narrow this gap. However, given that the EI sector 
often operates in an enclave model, investments in physical 
infrastructure are often uncoordinated with national infra-
structure development plans. The country therefore misses 
the opportunity to promote the shared use of the infrastruc-
ture and to take advantage of potential synergies. 
A master infrastructure plan or national planning across 
sectors that takes into account the infrastructure require-
ments of the EI sector can mitigate some of the risks by 
identifying multiple opportunities, users or purposes before 
contract negotiations or tendering the concession. Once 
there is a single user for infrastructure, it is more challenging 
54 For more detailed recommendations, please consult: CCSI: “A Framework to 
Approach Shared-Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure” (March 2014), available at: 
http://ccsi .columbia .edu/files/2014/05/A-Framework-for-Shared-use_March-2014 .
pdf . 55 Ibid .
BENEFITS  - Help address the infrastructure financing gap
 - Infrastructure is key to develop the economy and other linkages
 - Social benefits from access to infrastructure
DRAWBACKS  - Sharing is not always economically feasible and difficult to implement – 
 especially when it comes to railway infrastructure 
COMMODITY  SUITABILITY  - Bulky low value commodities require railways 
 - Precious metals will require a lot of water
 - Oil and gas least suitable for spatial linkages other than through economies of 
scope along roads and pipelines
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND SKILL LEVEL
 - Requires strong public utilities to serve as viable partners to the companies . 
EMPLOYMENT  - Improved infrastructure access is likely to lead to increased economic activity 
and thereby more jobs . 
GENDER  - N/A
MAIN POLICY MEASURES  - Develop a national infrastructure master plan that takes EI sector investments 
into account
 - Devise shared-use and open access policies
 - Prepare cost-benefit analyses to determine in which cases EI sector infra-
structure investments should be shared
 - Setup an independent regulatory agency to oversee and implement open access 
policies
RECOMMENDATIONS  
(CHAPTER 4)
 - EI Companies:               1,2
 - Governments:                1,2,7,8,9
 - Development cooperation:  1,2,3,5,10
Table 2 .5: Summary of key characteristics of spatial linkages
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2.7 Consumption linkages 
Consumption linkages relate to the demand for goods and 
services resulting from the spending of earnings from the EI 
sector. 
Little analysis has been done on consumption linkages. This 
is partly because they are notoriously difficult to identify 
and quantify, and the types of consumption surveys that are 
sometimes carried out – such as in relation to the Escondida 
copper mine in Chile – are usually too limited in scope. 
This limitation occurs either because the surveys just focus 
on resident employees rather than including commuters or 
because they only have examined workers that arrived when 
EI activities began and did not include residents that pre-
dated EI activities to see whether they had benefited from 
induced employment. The creation of jobs in the informal 
sector is also not adequately considered in these assessments 
( Östensson, 2014).
SWOT Analysis for spatial linkages in Africa:
Strengths (internal):
1. In many cases, resource –related infrastructure offers 
clear economies of scale and scope, which in turn enab-
le spatial linkages.
2. To save their social license to operate, companies may 
be willing to share infrastructure. 
Weaknesses (internal):
1. Lack of coordination between the mining sector’s infra-
structure investments and national infrastructure plans.
2. Not all types of mining projects are suited for infra-
structure sharing.
3. Mining companies prefer to operate infrastructure in an 
enclave model.
4. Weak regulatory institutions to regulate shared use 
infrastructure.
Opportunities (external):
1. High on the agenda of international development 
cooperation.
2. Increasing guidance on how to operationalize shared-
use infrastructure.
3. Regional integration improves the business case for 
cross-border resource corridors.
4. Low commodity prices may push EI companies to share 
the costs associated with infrastructure investments.
Threats (external):
1. Banks may be less willing to finance mining projects 
where the infrastructure assets are being shared with 
other users.
2. Extractive companies are cautious due to concerns 
about operational inefficiencies.
Figure 2 .27: SWOT Analysis for spatial linkages
Source: Authors
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considerably higher employment numbers than employment 
created directly by the EI sector. For example, the Interna-
tional Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) has reported 
high induced employment at mines like the Sepon mine in 
Laos (13,110 induced jobs as compared to 3,155 directly 
employed by the mine)56 and the Obuasi mine in Ghana 
(20,000-50,000 induced jobs versus 1,000-5,000 directly 
employed).57 However, the induced effect of direct and 
indirect employment is lessened if an EI company provides 
its employees with accommodation, food, and other ser-
vices, which reduces the amount that workers spend on such 
services (but may increase upstream linkages if sourced from 
local suppliers).58 
2 .7 .1 Literature review and case studies
Writing in the context of the 1970s when markets were 
 heavily protected, Hirschman (1981:75) noted that the 
demand for goods and services generated by employees – and 
those owning the means of production – in the EI sector had 
the potential to provide a major incentive for local industrial 
production and manufacturing (Kaplinsky, 2011). This is 
not only because the incomes generated in the EI sector were 
high, but also because of the sizeable share of domestic cash 
incomes they represented when other sectors were relatively 
underdeveloped (Kaplinsky, 2012). 
In addition to consumption linkages created from the in-
comes of those directly employed in the EI sector, Hirschman 
argued that consumption linkages could also be generated 
indirectly through the incomes of both those providing 
upstream inputs for the EI sector and those processing com-
modities domestically downstream. To the extent that such 
suppliers are local, there is a multiplier effect as incomes gen-
erated in the EI sector are spent in the domestic economy. 
Thus the incomes –both direct and indirect – generated by 
the EI sector have, as Hirschman concluded, the potential 
to drive the creation of a domestic market for goods and 
services (Kaplinsky, 2012) (and what is also referred to as 
induced employment). Induced employment can account for 
Figure 2 .28: Consumption linkages
 Source: Authors
56 ICMM, “Utilizing Mining and Mineral Resource Endowments to Foster 
 Sustainable Development of the Lao PDR,” (July 2007), available at:  
http://www .icmm .com/document/1841 . 
57 ICMM, “Ghana Country Case Study: The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using 
Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development,” ICMM (July 2007), 
available at: http://www .resourcegovernance .org/sites/default/files/Country%20
Case%20Study%20Ghana .pdf . See also the forthcoming CCSI working paper: 
 “Employment from Mining and Land-Based Agricultural Investments: How Much 
Myth, How Much Reality?” 
58 Forthcoming CCSI working paper: “Employment from Mining and Land-Based 
Agricultural Investments: How Much Myth, How Much Reality?”
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consumption linkages by increasing the price of imported 
goods through tariffs and non-trade barriers , as set out more 
fully in the box below (Sachs, L. and Maennling, N., 2015; 
Silva, 2007). 
As explained above, at the time Hirschman wrote his hypoth-
esis, most resource-rich developing countries were inward-
focused with import-substitution industrialization policies 
that sought to limit imports. Chile, for example, targeted 
Box 2.22: Chile’s import substitution industrialization 
policy
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) in Chile, as in 
other Latin American countries from the 1930s to the 
1960s, replaced the commodity-export-led development 
model that had been in place during the first half of 
the 20th Century . The Great Depression of 1929, followed 
by the Second World War, resulted in flat demand from 
Europe and the U .S . for the primary goods being exported 
from Chile . It was determined that, in order to grow the 
economy and address high unemployment, Chile would 
need to start its own industrial base .
ISI relied on state-led efforts to develop local industries 
and manufacturing to replace imported manufactured 
goods, coupled with high tariff barriers, quotas and ex-
change controls to protect its nascent industries (Sapelli, 
2003) . In 1939, the Chilean Government of Pedro Aguirre 
Cerde created the Corporacion de Fomento de la Produc-
cion (Chilean Development Corporation – CORFO), which 
designed and implemented Chile’s industrial policy in the 
1940s and 1950s . The Chilean Government associated 
the expected increase in production and competitiveness 
with consumption linkages from other local industries . It 
built up a portfolio of non-traditional manufactured goods 
in textiles, clothing and footware, chemical products, 
non-metallic mineral products, and metallic products by 
planning and subsidizing targeted industries, encouraging 
public private partnerships to develop infrastructure, and 
protecting these nascent local industries with high tariffs 
and exchange rate policies . 
However, in planning which local industries to support, 
CORFO did not adequately assess which goods and ser-
vices would benefit the country’s mining sector or could 
be targeted to foster upstream and downstream link-
ages around it . Given that, at the time most inputs like 
machinery and parts were imported, the impact of ISI on 
the mining sector was therefore reflected in the higher 
prices the sector had to pay for those imports . However, 
as many of the mines were largely in U .S . hands at the 
time and were benefitting from preferential tax treatment, 
they were mostly able to absorb the additional costs of 
imports . Other sectors that had not been internation-
ally competitive prior to the imposition of ISI policies 
fared less well . Chile’s agricultural sector, for example, 
stagnated in the context of less competition from imports 
and more expensive agricultural inputs . Therefore, the 
expected increase in production and competitiveness of 
the agricultural sector associated with consumption link-
ages from other local industries such as mining did not 
materialize . 
The Chile case study shows that while consumption linkages 
are more likely to occur when domestic goods are protected, 
ISI policies may actually harm the sector in the long run as 
companies are not exposed to competition and inputs need 
to be imported. 
Once trade regimes were liberalized in the 1980s and 
1990s, after Hirschman had drawn his conclusions, many 
of these consumption linkages “leaked abroad” through the 
importation of less expensive or higher quality goods and 
services, rather than reinforcing the demand for goods and 
services domestically produced (Kaplinsky, 2012). In such 
cases, the EI sector has fuelled consumption demand for 
industrial  sectors in other countries rather than in the host 
country, showing a classical effect of Dutch Disease, whereby 
the appreciation of the domestic real exchange rate makes 
the import of foreign goods comparatively less expensive. 
The consequence of this drop in support for the domestic 
industry has been a rapid rise in import intensity in virtually 
all resource-rich developing countries, exacerbated by the in-
tense competition of cheap manufactured goods from China 
in particular, which in turn has been helped by the global 
decline in transport and logistics costs. In the case of Chile, 
by the early 1960s, most of the easy substitutions of simple 
imported goods had been made, and the process of import 
substitution was growing less dynamic. For example, between 
1950 and 1960 the annual growth rate of real industrial 
production amounted to 3.5 %, less than half the growth of 
the previous decade.59  
59 50 years afterwards, it is clear that the opening of the Chilean economy as 
well as its powerful supplier programmes have been far more effective than the 
presented ISI policies in promoting linkages .
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prices in the domestic market – often fuelled by the EI itself 
– or the absence of policies to facilitate the establishment 
of agricultural or manufacturing sectors to provide such 
produce or goods means that it even becomes cheaper, or 
sometimes even inevitable, to import such goods rather than 
producing them domestically. For example, one interviewee 
noted that in Liberia, where most farming is carried out on a 
subsistence basis, mines tend to source food from neighbour-
ing Guinea and further afield to ensure a reliable supply of 
foodstuffs.60 The box below illustrates what could be done to 
facilitate consumption linkages targeting agriculture produce. 
The degree of consumption leakages abroad depends on the 
extent to which tradable goods and services are produced 
domestically. Some products and local services benefit from 
various forms of “natural protective barriers” (Kaplinsky, 
2011). For example, perishable food products are best 
consumed close to the point of production. Service indus-
tries that require local presence such as restaurants or local 
transport are not going to be sourced from abroad. Heavy 
low-cost products such as construction materials (cement, 
bricks, etc.) have a high transport to value ratio, which makes 
local production more attractive. Nevertheless, despite these 
examples of natural protective barriers, the effect of high 
60 Interviews with GIZ, West Africa, August 2015
Box 2.23: Targeting agricultural productivity of 
 smallholder farmers in Mozambique 
Mozambique’s Zambezi Valley includes the area in and 
between resource-rich Tete Province and the Nacala 
and Beira ports, which are connected by railway cor-
ridors . Low-income rural communities along the two 
corridors comprise about 80% of the population in the 
Zambezi valley, with farming being the main source of 
food and income for most households . However, most 
of the agriculture is farmed on a smallholder basis and 
agricultural productivity remains low . This population is 
unlikely to benefit from the development of Mozambique’s 
coal resources in Tete province unless investments are 
made to promote inclusive and diversified agriculture-led 
growth along the corridors . By targeting the productiv-
ity of smallholder agriculture in the region in particu-
lar, such smallholder farmers could move from largely 
subsistence farming to producing produce for the national 
market (including upstream and consumption linkages 
from the EI sector) . A number of multi-stakeholder initia-
tives and notably the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor 
- a collaboration between government, mining companies, 
farming organizations and international development part-
ners – have been set up to identify local potential supply 
opportunities along the Beira corridor and invest in them 
to develop linkages . However, only modest improvements 
have been evidenced to date (CCSI, 2011) . 
Mozambique’s case study illustrates that given the high 
proportion of the labour force involved in agriculture in 
most African countries (estimated at around 65% of the total 
labour force) and the high reliance of household incomes 
on this sector (estimated to be around 50%), government 
and company policies, as well as donor-related assistance 
to improve agricultural productivity in rural areas – and 
particularly in the resource corridors connected to extractive 
projects - could facilitate consumption linkages (Ramdoo 
2015). Such policies could include the provision of access to 
finance, fertilizers, and seeds, for example, as well as R&D in 
agriculture.
It is noteworthy that such policies are also in the interest of 
EI companies to the extent that it can help save them their 
social license to operate. Companies usually can help support 
a range of economic activities that are not directly related 
to their core business. The decision about which economic 
activities to support should depend on existing expertise and 
prospects for those economic activities to succeed - both as-
pects that should be addressed in a social impact assessment. 
Given that in developing countries EI projects are often 
situated in regions where farming is prevalent and demand 
for agriculture produce is likely to increase resulting from 
increased economic activity, supporting farmers may be in 
the self-interest of EI companies. 
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in skilled/ managerial positions in the EI sector to keep 
their earnings within the country rather than taking them 
offshore.
• Using fiscal linkages to create the infrastructure and public 
service delivery around the sector necessary to sustain 
the creation of a local economy which could be further 
expanded by EI-related consumption linkages. 
There is little literature on what EI companies can do in 
relation to their core activities to target consumption link-
ages. However, EI companies may (1) collect better data on 
local consumption linkage potentials through social impact 
assessments prior to the start of mining activities (Östensson, 
2014); and (2) support initiatives to foster local agricultural 
productivity growth and mining employees’ consumption of 
local produce. Investing in the collection of better data and 
local produce initiatives could support not only the creation 
of consumption linkages but also the creation of upstream 
linkages. 
SWOT Analysis for consumption linkages:
Strengths (internal):
1. Can be generated both directly (from the incomes of  
EI sector employees) and indirectly (through 
the  incomes of those employed in upstream and 
downstream sectors). 
Weaknesses (internal):
1. Reliant on availability of competitively priced domestic 
goods and services.
2. Dependent on development of upstream and 
downstream linkages.
3. The Dutch disease can hurt the competitiveness of a 
country’s non-extractive sectors, thereby having an ove-
rall negative impact on domestic consumption linkages, 
which are replaced by cheaper imports.
4. Limited self-interest for EI company to support.
Opportunities (external):
1. The attention given to boosting the productivity of the 
agricultural sector in international policy frameworks 
(such as the SDGs) and agendas of development part-
ners can contribute to the development of an agricultu-
ral sector.
Threats (external):
1. Availability of cheaper goods and services from abroad.
Gender and consumption linkages
Gender can have both a positive and negative impact on the 
creation of consumption linkages. This is because the direct 
employment created by the EI sector traditionally favours 
men who are less likely than women to spend money on the 
family or household and more likely to spend disposable 
income on luxury goods such as alcohol, which, if imported, 
results in leakages abroad.61 A 2009 World Bank study 
on gender dimensions of the EI sector found that where 
women’s livelihoods have been displaced by the EI sector and 
they are forced to rely on a male provider, overall household 
consumption may decrease. On the flip side, the low skill 
jobs indirectly created around the EI are often in profes-
sions dominated by women, e.g. catering, laundry, cloth-
ing, uniform supply and repair, agricultural produce, and 
administrative support.62 Where women have access to these 
jobs, consumption of household goods and provisions for the 
household has been found to increase. 
2 .7 .2 Lessons learned from the literature and  
  case studies
Kaplinsky argues that consumption linkages probably will 
not create a major source of industrial potential. The linkage 
relies on the availability of competitively priced domestic 
consumption goods and services, which are often not avail-
able in resource-rich developing countries. 
To foster consumption linkages, governments could focus 
on: 
• Requiring mining companies to carry out social im-
pact assessments as a pre-condition for the issuance of a 
mining licence in order to gather better baseline data on 
local economic conditions. This would in turn provide 
governments with a basic understanding of what could be 
demanded as a result of the EI project spurring economic 
growth in the region (Östensson, 2014).
• Improving agricultural productivity of smallholders. The 
majority of the rural work force in most developing coun-
tries is engaged in small-scale farming, which could supply 
the EI sector directly or indirectly (Ramdoo, 2015).
• Supporting local industry in providing goods that have a 
high transport-to-value ratio such as cement, bricks and 
other construction materials for domestic consumption.
• Adopting initiatives such as tax credits or higher interest 
rates in saving accounts63 to incentivize those employed 
61 Eftimie, A ., Heller, K ., Strongman, J .: “Gender Dimensions of the Extractive 
Industries: Mining for Equity,” World Bank (2009), available at: http://siteresources .
worldbank .org/EXTOGMC/Resources/eifd8_gender_equity .pdf . 
62 Ibid . 
63 Further research into such policies is needed .
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BENEFITS  - Largest potential for job creation (induced employment) among linkages .
DRAWBACKS  - Dutch disease as a result of the EI sector may adversely affect other sectors 
that could benefit from consumption linkages . 
 - Limited role for EI companies to promote consumption linkages .
COMMODITY  SUITABILITY  - Precious metals have short exploitation cycles that do not leave much time to 
develop linkages .
 - Given that direct and indirect employment numbers are higher in mining as 
opposed to oil and gas, the total induced employment numbers are also likely 
to be higher . 
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND SKILL LEVEL
 - Requires a relatively diversified local economy that produces enough goods 
and services that can be consumed . Such economy will generally emerge from 
the existence of relatively good infrastructure and a diversified skill base . 
EMPLOYMENT  - Induced employment, when correctly measured, is higher than direct and indi-
rect employment . The multiplier in Ghana, for example, has been estimated at 
28 .
 - Better baseline data of local economic conditions collected prior to the start 
of mining activities would provide for better information on how to promote 
induced employment . 
GENDER  - In developing countries, the construction and agriculture sectors can be 
 targeted by policies seeking to increase consumption linkages . The former 
tends to be male dominated, while in many cultures the latter may see female 
employment increase . 
MAIN POLICY MEASURES  - Improve collection of baseline consumption data,
 - Support sectors that are geographically bound - Encourage workers and 
 companies to keep earnings domestically .
RECOMMENDATIONS  
(CHAPTER 4)
 - EI Companies:               1,2
 - Governments:                1,2,8
 - Development cooperation:  1,2,3,4,10
Table 2 .6: Summary of key characteristics of consumption linkages
Figure 2 .29: SWOT analysis for consumption linkages 
Source: Authors
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The key message is that over the past 20 years, these rules 
have both proliferated and become more stringent, creating a 
legal framework which governs countries seeking to develop 
these linkages now very differently than before the mid-
1990s. These developments in international law can have 
significant implications for governments’ ability to adopt 
local content policies in domestic laws, regulations, and 
investor-state contracts. Because international law sits above 
domestic law in the general hierarchy of legal rules, govern-
ments adopting local content measures that conflict with 
WTO law or the rules set forth in international investment 
treaties may have to abandon those local content measures 
and/or pay compensation to companies subject to those local 
content rules. 
This section highlights these issues. 
3 .1 .1 WTO Rules 
When the WTO came into being in 1995, three new inter-
national agreements entered into force that set out certain 
rules relevant for linkage policies. One is the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement); 
the second is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (the SCM Agreement); and the third is the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In brief, these three 
agreements prevent various measures that had been used by 
countries (with varying degrees of success) to promote link-
ages. Table 3.1 illustrates the relevant measures, the WTO 
agreements restricting its use, and the linkage policies that 
may be affected. 
This chapter focuses on constraints on linkage policies. 
These can be either domestic (internal) or related to interna-
tional liberalization and globalisation (external). Domestic 
constraints have been discussed in the previous chapters, 
summarized in the weaknesses of the SWOT analyses, and 
are also addressed in the recommendations in Chapter 4. 
Especially the lack of an educated and skilled labour force, 
underdeveloped infrastructure and a limited access to finance 
are key domestic constraints. Institutional weaknesses related 
to the assessment and planning of linkages as well as to the 
monitoring and enforcing of agreements and regulations 
further hamper the development of linkages. Short political 
cycles and rent-seeking behaviour associated with the exploi-
tation of natural resources can partly be attributed to the lack 
of effective policies.64 
With this in mind, this chapter will focus on external con-
straints. Indeed promoting industrial development today is 
not the same task as when developed countries embraced 
their industrial development a few decades ago. Liberaliza-
tion through international legal frameworks such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, globaliza-
tion and the slow but sustained race to automation in the 
EI sector present unprecedented challenges for developing 
countries today. These three phenomena have an impact 
on the scope of linkages that can be reasonably targeted by 
resource-rich countries.
3.1 International Legal Frameworks
International law places some restrictions on the tools gov-
ernments can use in order to encourage the development of 
linkages between EI investments and the domestic economy. 
These rules are enshrined in several WTO agreements and 
numerous bilateral and multilateral trade and investment 
treaties. 
3CONSTRAINTS ON LINKAGE POLICIES
64  Jesse (2012) speaks about the ‘dual nature’ of local content alluding to its 
role in both fostering development and as a mechanism of elite accumulation and 
rent-seeking .
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3 .1 .2  Investment Treaties
There are presently roughly 3,000 investment treaties 
concluded by countries all around the world, which contain 
rules regarding government treatment of foreign investors 
and their investments. These treaties, often referred to as 
“international investment agreements” or “IIAs”, include 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and bilateral or multilat-
eral free trade agreements with investment chapters. While 
the pace of negotiating these treaties has slowed over the past 
15 years from a peak during the 1990s, data indicate that 
the treaties are still being concluded at the notable pace of 
roughly one every two weeks. 
While these restrictions are significant and – according to 
at least some countries – too stringent, they are weaker in 
a number of respects than the restrictions emerging from 
international investment treaties. The next section briefly 
discusses those agreements and their implications for linkage 
policies. For an expanded discussion on WTO agreements 
please refer to Annex 2.
65 These GATS national treatment obligations only apply if and to the extent a 
country has committed to liberalize the relevant services sector 
66 These GATS market access obligations only apply if and to the extent a country 
has committed to liberalize the relevant services sector 
67 These GATS market access obligations only apply if and to the extent a country 
has committed to liberalize the relevant services sector
Table 3 .1: Overview of WTO measures and impacts on linkage policies 
RESTRICTED MEASURE WTO  
AGREEMENT
EXAMPLES OF LINKAGES POLICY AFFECTED
Measures that require or favour the use of 
domestic over foreign goods
TRIMs Agreement Prevents governments from requiring mining 
companies to source goods from local providers; 
countries may also not condition incentives such as 
tax benefits on requirements to use local goods 
Measures that impose quantitative restrictions 
on exports
TRIMs Agreement Prevents governments from restricting exports of 
raw materials in order to encourage or require 
downstream processing or beneficiation
Measures that grant subsidies to domestic 
companies but make those subsidies  contingent 
on sourcing inputs of goods from local 
 producers 
SCM Agreement Prevents governments from encouraging EI firms 
to source goods from domestic firms by  prohibiting 
governments from providing fiscal, financial, or 
other benefits to companies based on their use of 
domestic products 
Measures that provide subsidies, tax breaks, 
or other preferential treatment to  domestically 
owned and/or domestically established 
service providers but do not provide those 
same benefits to foreign-owned and/or 
 foreign-established service providers 
GATS65  Prevents governments from providing benefits to 
locally owned and/or locally established upstream 
or downstream service suppliers in order to help 
improve their competitiveness and ability to serve 
EI firms (unless those benefits are similarly 
provided to foreign-owned and/or -established 
services firms) 
Measures that limit the participation of foreign 
capital in a services provider 
GATS66   Prevents governments from requiring a certain 
amount of domestic equity in EI firms, a tool 
that may be employed in order to help promote 
 technology transfer to domestic individuals or 
 entities 
Measures that require foreign investors in 
 services to invest through certain types of 
legal entities 
GATS67  Prevents governments from requiring that foreign 
companies investing in the EI form joint ventures 
with local partners or establish local corporations
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In the majority of investment treaties, these obligations 
only apply “post-establishment”, meaning that governments 
are free to treat foreign investors differently than domestic 
investors with respect to whether and how they can enter the 
domestic market. Nevertheless, a growing number of treaties 
also include “pre-establishment” protections, meaning that 
foreign investors have the right to enter and establish opera-
tions in the “host” country, and to do so under the same 
conditions and terms as domestic investors. This thereby 
frees those foreign investors from special conditions such 
as domestic equity requirements or requirements to form 
contractual joint ventures with local companies. 
While the post-establishment national treatment obligation 
in investment treaties is similar to the national treatment 
provision in the GATS, and the pre-establishment national 
treatment obligation is similar to the GATS’ market access 
rule, there are two important differences between those 
investment treaty provisions and the GATS: 
First, while the GATS is a “positive list” agreement, invest-
ment treaties are typically “negative list” agreements, mean-
ing that they apply to all investments in all sectors  unless 
governments have specifically indicated otherwise. Thus, the 
scope of the commitments under investment  treaties is, as a 
rule, considerably broader than under the GATS.
There are three key ways how these treaties can prevent 
countries from implementing linkage policies, namely, (i) 
national treatment provisions, (ii) specific restrictions on 
“performance requirements”, and (iii) obligations preventing 
states from interfering with foreign investors’ “expectations” 
for their operations (e.g. the “fair and equitable treatment” 
obligation). Whereas the national treatment provisions are 
common throughout the thousands of treaties that exist, 
restrictions on “performance requirements” are less common 
but impose much stronger restrictions on the use of indus-
trial policy tools.
1 . National Treatment
The national treatment requirement in investment treaties 
prevents governments from treating foreign-owned invest-
ments differently than domestically owned investments. This 
means that it can prevent governments from adopting any 
policies that aim to increase the competitiveness of locally 
owned goods and services providers, or to encourage the use 
of goods or services produced by locally owned companies, if 
those measures result in less favourable treatment of foreign-
owned companies. 
Figure 3 .1: Annual and cumulative number of IIAs concluded
Source: UNCTAD (2015), World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance 68
68 From World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance, by UNCTAD, © 2015 United Nations . Reprinted with the permission of 
the United Nations .
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While some of these measures would already be prohibited 
under the WTO agreements, investment treaties commonly 
go beyond WTO prohibitions. 
In addition to prohibiting governments from adopting 
measures that require or incentivize compliance with perfor-
mance requirements, treaties also often prevent governments 
from enforcing prohibited performance requirements. One 
interpretation of this prohibition on “enforcement” of per-
formance requirements is that, if a government enters into a 
contract with a foreign investor in which the investor agrees 
to achieve domestic content or other similar targets, the gov-
ernment cannot take any steps to enforce those contractual 
commitments. 
Investors have used these treaty obligations to challenge a 
number of performance requirements imposed by states, 
including taxes imposed on producers of goods that sourced 
raw materials from abroad rather than from domestic pro-
ducers,69 and requirements on oil companies to make local 
expenditures on education and training and R&D (See box 
3.1).70
The Mobil vs. Canada case study shows that EI companies 
have already sued countries successfully under multilateral 
investment treaties for R&D and E&T provisions. The pro-
vision at issue in this dispute – which prevents governments 
from imposing or enforcing commitments to purchase, 
use, or accord a preference to local service providers – can 
be found in a growing number of IIAs. This highlights the 
importance of assessing with care what investment treaties 
entail (see recommendations G10, D2).
Second, while the GATS is enforced through a state-to-state 
mechanism under the WTO’s rules of dispute settlement, 
investment treaties usually provide for investor-state arbitra-
tion. Under the WTO’s state-to-state system, many measures 
may go unchallenged. This may be mainly because the conse-
quences of the breach for the country are not severe enough 
to warrant the time, expense, or political cost of litigation or 
because the state that might complain also adopted offending 
measures and does not want to face similar WTO claims. In 
contrast, investors do not necessarily face the same disincen-
tives to threaten or file actions under investment treaties 
alleging that the national treatment obligation has been 
violated.
2 . Restrictions on Performance Requirements
The second way how investment treaties limit efforts to 
develop and strengthen linkages is through their express 
restrictions on “performance requirements”. As used in IIAs 
and described further below, “performance requirements” 
can include a wide range of mandatory and incentive-based 
measures, including measures requiring or encouraging the 
use of local providers of goods and services or the conduct 
of R&D in the host country. As noted above, most treaties 
do not include these types of provisions; nevertheless, the 
obligations, when included, are often “multi-lateralized”, and 
tend to be exceptionally strong. 
Multilateralisation
While investment treaties are usually bilateral, provisions 
restricting the use of performance requirements often state 
that each country party to the treaty is barred from imposing 
performance requirements on investors from any country, 
not just investors from the other country party to the treaty. 
Scope of prohibitions
Investment treaties often bar a range of performance require-
ments, including those 
• Requiring investors to export a given level or percentage of 
a good or service;
• Requiring investors to favour the use of local goods and 
service suppliers;
• Requiring or incentivizing foreign investors to achieve a 
certain amount of domestic content (through expenditures 
on local labour, service providers, and goods providers); 
and
• Requiring the transfer of technology.
69  Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc . v .  
Mexico, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, November 21, 2007; Cargill v . 
Mexico, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, September 18, 2009; but see Corn 
Products International, Inc . v . Mexico, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/04/01, Award, 
January 15, 2008 (finding no violation of the performance requirements  provision 
because, inter alia, it was not directly imposed on the claimant, but on the 
 purchaser of the claimant’s goods) . 
70 Mobil v . Canada, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and 
 Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012 . 
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3 . Substantive Treatment Standards
The third key way how investment treaties can limit the use 
of linkage policies is through substantive standards of treat-
ment on expropriation and “fair and equitable treatment”. 
In one relatively well-known dispute, several Italian nation-
als used investment treaties to sue South Africa, challenging 
aspects of its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) mining 
policy. The investors asserted that the BEE’s requirement 
that mining companies sell 26% of their shares to Black or 
Historically Disadvantaged Individuals at market prices con-
stituted an unlawful expropriation of the investors’ property 
and violated the fair and equitable (FET) obligation. The 
proceedings were discontinued before the tribunal reached 
any decision on the merits of the investors’ claims.73
 
In another dispute, mining companies initiated a dispute 
against Indonesia under the investment treaty signed be-
tween Indonesia and the Netherlands. The investors chal-
lenged various government measures aimed at increasing 
the domestic processing of copper, including new export 
conditions, a new export duty, and a 2017 ban on the export 
of copper concentrate. The dispute was discontinued shortly 
after it had been initiated.74
The line between, on the one hand, a legitimate regulatory 
act (that has a negative impact on an investor) and, on the 
other, an expropriation or violation of the FET obligation, 
can be difficult to draw, not least because of the varying 
interpretations tribunals, states, investors, and other com-
mentators have given to those provisions. Consequently, it 
may be difficult for a state to know in advance whether a 
given measure will prompt a treaty claim and, if so, whether 
that claim will succeed. 
4 . Exceptions
Some treaties contain exceptions that can enable states 
to maintain and even adopt new measures aimed at the 
development of linkages, even though those linkages would 
otherwise be inconsistent with the treaty.
 
Box 3.1: Mobil vs. Canada: IIA dispute challenging use 
of “performance requirements”
In 1979, oil was discovered off the coast of Newfound-
land (NL), Canada . At the time, unemployment in NL was 
15%, nearly twice the national rate, and GDP was roughly 
half the national average . With the discovery of oil, the 
“Government of NL quickly recognized that the resource 
could be used to promote the sustainable development 
of NL, but only if it was used properly . The Government 
realized that any development resulting from the oil 
would only be sustainable if the oil was used to develop 
skills and expertise in NL .” 71 The Government of NL and 
the federal government thus adopted legislation requir-
ing, among other things, any petroleum operator looking 
to be licensed for activities in the area to submit and 
secure approval of a Development Plan laying out how an 
oil field would be developed and a Benefits Plan explain-
ing how NL and Canada would benefit from the project . In 
one component of the Benefits Plan, the company had to 
set forth its plans for conducting R&D and education and 
training (E&T) in the area . 
 
The claimants, two US companies, each indirectly owned 
minority shareholdings in two offshore oilfields in NL that 
were governed by Development and Benefits Plans . In 2007, 
the companies filed a case against Canada under an IIA, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, arguing that 
the requirements to conduct R&D and E&T in Canada 
violated the IIA’s restrictions on performance requirements . 
More specifically, the companies argued that the  measures 
violated the treaty’s provision prohibiting states from 
“impos[ing] or enforc[ing] … requirements … to purchase, 
use or accord a preference to goods produced or services 
provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services 
from persons in its territory .” (NAFTA, Art . 1106(1)(c)) . 
 
The tribunal of three arbitrators appointed to decide 
this dispute agreed with the claimants . The  arbitrators 
concluded that R&D and E&T are “services”, and that 
 requirements to make local expenditures on those 
 services constituted requirements to purchase or use 
services in the host country in violation of the NAFTA .  
The tribunal subsequently ordered Canada to pay CDN$ 
17 million to the companies as compensation for the 
 unlawful performance requirements .72   
 
70 Mobil v . Canada, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/07/4, Canada’s Counter-Memorial, 
December 1, 2009, para . 14 . 
71 Mobil v . Canada, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/07/4, Award, February 20, 2015 .
73  Piero Foresti et al . v . South Africa, ICSID Case No . ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 
August 4, 2010 . 
74 See, e .g ., PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara, Press Release: Arbitration Filed Over 
Export Restrictions in Indonesia (July 1, 2014); Nusa Tenggara Partnership B .V . and 
PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v . Indonesia, ICSID Case No . ARB/14/15, Order of the 
Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceedings, August 
29, 2014 .
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States might exempt a 
• particular sector (e.g., mining, oil & gas),
• policy aim (e.g., aiding the development of historically 
disadvantaged groups),
• government domain (e.g., taxation),
• level of government (e.g., local government),
• type of measure (e.g., subsidy), or 
• actual measure (e.g., rule requiring local processing of raw 
materials)
from all or some of the treaty’s substantive obligations. 
 Usually, these exceptions restrict the treaties’ articles on 
national treatment and restrictions on performance require-
ments. It is much rarer for states to include such exemptions 
from the obligations relating to expropriation and FET. 
States might also or instead exempt matters from their 
 treaties’ investor-state dispute settlement provisions, and sub-
ject certain claims to special rules of adjudication, including 
a mechanism whereby the state parties to the treaty can agree 
to block an investor’s arbitration claim.  
Table 3 .2: Restrictions on local content measures under international investment treaties 
RESTRICTIONS Depending on the treaty, investment treaties can e .g . prevent:
Measures barred by the TRIMs Agreement
Measures that require or incentivize foreign investors to make expenditures on domestic goods, 
services, and labour
Requirements to establish a joint venture with domestic entities or to have a certain amount of 
domestic equity
Requirements to locate headquarters in a specific region 
Requirements to transfer technology, production processes or other proprietary knowledge to 
individuals or entities in the host country 
Requirements to invest in R&D 
Measures (e .g ., subsidies) that are only provided to or that otherwise treat locally-owned 
 enterprises more favourably than foreign-owned enterprises
Measures that have negative impacts on the operations or profitability of investments such that 
they constitute an expropriation or violation of FET
DISPUTE  
SETTLEMENT
Investor-State
3 .1 .3 Lessons Learned
Governments need to ensure policy coherence when signing 
investment treaties. For governments wishing to have the 
broadest set of tools possible to foster linkages, it is impor-
tant to ensure that these treaties do not prohibit the adop-
tion of measures desired by the state. This is particularly the 
case in light of both the growing number of IIAs going well 
beyond WTO agreements in terms of the types of domestic 
policies they bar and the investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism embedded in IIAs, which makes it relatively easy 
for companies to challenge and seek compensation for gov-
ernment measures that violate treaty provisions. Options for 
governments to consider include not concluding IIAs, nar-
rowing the substantive obligations by, for example, excluding 
restrictions on performance requirements, and including 
exceptions for particular sectors, activities, or policy goals. 
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3.2 Changing production processes
3 .2 .1 Fragmentation of the global value chain
“The growing importance of global value chains in the produc-
tion process is today at the heart of the world’s economic system” 
(Ramdoo, 2013). Production processes are increasingly 
fragmented as the organization of global value chains leads 
countries to be more and more specialized in specific tasks 
and business activities (rather than in specific goods and 
services) (Ramdoo, 2013).75
The EI sector is a latecomer to adopting these fragmented 
production processes. However, the past decade has seen a 
transformation of the mining sector with a combination of 
heightened commodity price volatility and increased com-
petition from emerging market players, driving the necessity 
to lower costs and focus on core activities. In the 1990s, the 
downturn in oil prices had also led to a similar restructura-
tion of the oil and gas industry. Global EI companies have 
now put in place leaner supply chain management, which 
implies the outsourcing of non-core activities to low-cost 
suppliers subject to high and demanding standards. While 
the number of these suppliers decreased within the last years, 
the remaining ones hence grew in size. (Ramdoo, 2015) 
Furthermore, higher value added functions concentrate 
in the global centres situated at the technological frontier, 
whereas lower value added activities are performed in coun-
tries with inexpensive low skill labour. Thus, if EI multina-
tionals outsource more non-core competencies to suppliers in 
Africa (Morris et al., 2012), they tend to do so for low value 
added functions.
Due to the fragmented production processes, EI companies 
are in a stronger position to 1) decide which functions will 
be located in which countries, 2) set the standards to be met 
by supplier companies in order to stay in the value chain, 
and 3) manage suppliers that meet the standards. Some 
developing countries will benefit from this pattern and oth-
ers will not: the former will get assistance from companies to 
upgrade their capabilities and participate in the global value 
chain, while the latter that do not meet the requirements to 
receive this assistance will remain excluded (UNECA, 2013).
Developing countries stay excluded from global value chains 
if they fail to provide the specialized inputs increasingly 
demanded by EI companies. This increased specialization 
can increase barriers to entry for “less efficient and special-
ized countries” (Hansen 2014) and diminishes the scope for 
upstream linkages.
Some analysis of GVCs has shown that the extent and depth 
of countries’ participation in GVCs is positively correlated 
with income, growth, and development, but GVC participa-
tion has been happening differently from one country to 
another. For roughly 65% of countries, their increased par-
ticipation in GVCs over the past 20 years has led to a reduc-
tion in the share of domestic value-added in their exports. 
However, thanks to their increased participation in GVCs, 
countries’ export growth significantly overcompensated the 
decline in the share of domestic value-added in exports, caus-
ing greater participation in GVCs to overall increase GDP. 
Another 15% of countries (mostly in East Asia) increased the 
share of domestic value-added in their exports, often after 
initially experiencing rapid surges in GVC participation, 
mostly by upgrading within and across GVCs. Nevertheless, 
the remaining 20% of countries have neither seen improve-
ments in GVC participation nor in the share of domestic 
value added in their exports, with the former occurring either 
because their participation first increased and then dropped 
below the starting point or because it stayed at a low level 
or dropped (UNCTAD 2013, p. 171). Figure 3.2 illustrates 
those different paths of GVC upgrading.
For most resource-rich developing countries, GVC partici-
pation “stems from upstream participation, presumably from 
exports of natural resources and raw materials.” (Bruhn 2015). 
However, “low growth in downstream participation” (Bruhn 
2015) is avoidable, as the examples of Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines show in the figure above. 
Greater and deeper integration in the GVCs could start at the 
regional level as regional integration leads to higher integra-
tion in GVCs. Countries within the East African Commu-
nity,76 the most integrated trade block in Africa, have a higher 
participation in GVCs than their neighbouring countries 
and other regional economic communities on the continent 
(Ramdoo, 2015). It is also consistent with the finding high-
lighted in Chapter 2 that regional integration helps expand 
the impact of linkage policies and makes market-driven link-
ages more viable (see recommendation G9). 
75 According to WEF (2012), intermediate inputs constitute more than half of 
imports in OECD countries and nearly 75% of imports in countries like China and 
Brazil .
76 The EAC’s member countries include Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, 
Tanzania, and Uganda .
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As Milanovic alludes to, GVCs can also worsen the con-
ditions of workers and suppliers, and increase inequality 
between and within countries. To mitigate those risks, EI 
companies should at the very least conduct human rights due 
diligence to “identify, address and mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts” with which they may be implicated – ei-
ther directly or indirectly through their transactions with 
contractors and suppliers (Shift, 2012). In the context of 
GVCs, doing so may not be feasible, especially as there may 
be hundreds, if not thousands of supply chain relationships 
that an EI company would need to investigate. Therefore, EI 
companies often need to prioritize those upstream business 
relationships for which it is most critical to conduct human 
rights due diligence. EI Companies can address this very 
briefly by mapping out their supply chains, focusing on busi-
ness relations in their supply chains above a certain thresh-
old, obtaining these relations’ buy-in in the mapping process, 
and then working with those entities to address and mitigate 
human rights grievances (Shift, 2012). 
3 .2 .2 Automation
There is an increasing trend in the EI sector to move towards 
automation. This will increase productivity and improve 
the health and safety record of the industry, but, at the same 
time, it will further reduce the number of people employed 
in the sector and alter procurement requirements. 
In turn, spatial linkages from the EI sector can be a catalyst 
for regional integration (Toledano, 2015; World Bank, 2015) 
if the EI project and export point are located in different 
countries. EI companies are powerful and influential players 
with profit maximization objectives that will favor the most 
direct route to export their commodities in order to mini-
mize capital and operational expenditures. The most direct 
route may require crossing borders. EI companies will insist 
on competitive transport pricing and timely delivery, which 
will require neighboring countries to cooperate and agree on 
cross-border arrangements. Improvements for the EI project 
are also likely to improve cross-border hard and soft infra-
structure for other sectors. Such resource corridor collabora-
tion can catalyze further regional integration. 
The malign side of GVCs
“Globalization thus has two faces: a benign side accelerating the 
participation of developing countries into the world economy 
with positive impacts on industrialization and income levels, 
and a malign side increasing inequality and leading to major 
stress on workers and the environment.“ (Milanovic, 2003)
77 From World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and  
Trade for Development by UNCTAD, © 2013 . United Nations . Reprinted with the 
permission of the United Nations .
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Figure 3 .2: GVC Development Path by Country
Source: UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development 
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unprecedented transformation with regard to automation’s 
scale and distribution, especially during the next decade (see 
figure below). Australia is today at the forefront of this evolu-
tion (see Box 3-2).
Recent decades have seen substantial process innovation 
in the EI sector (such as larger, more durable and efficient 
shovels, haul trucks, crushers, grinding mills, flotation cells, 
and better chemistry to improve processing recoveries). In 
the nearby future, the EI industry will likely experience an 
Box 3 2: Automation is already happening
Rio Tinto’s Pilbara mine in West Australia is the epit-
ome of the mine of the future . In April 2013, Rio Tinto 
 announced that the project had moved more than 100 
million tons of earth since automating their trucks fab-
ricated by Komatsu Ltd .78 Rio Tinto has also designed a 
fully automated train network for its mine . The project 
is estimated to cost $518M USD and will be the world’s 
first automated long-distance heavy-haul rail operation .79 
Similarly, BHP Billiton has been working with Caterpillar 
since 2007 to produce autonomous driver technology at 
its Australian mines .80 
 
Beyond Australia, Sandvik, a mining supplier of equip-
ment, has introduced an automated loading and hauling 
system for underground hard rock mining, called  Sandvik 
Automine . It is currently in use at a Codelco Mine in 
Chile (since June 2004), a mine in Finland (since January 
2005), a mine in South Africa (since August 2005) and a 
mine in Canada (June 2007) . Atlas CopCo, another mining 
supplier of equipment, has also tested remote  haulage 
zones with two fully automated trucks at Nordana’s 
 Brunwick Ore Mine in Quebec, Canada (Horberry, 2012) . 
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Figure 3 .3: The shifting nature of value chain integration
Source: Peterson et al . (2001), New Forces at Work in Mining: Industry Views of Critical Technologies
78 http://www .riotinto .com/media/media-releases-237_8441 .aspx 
79 Rio Tinto pushes ahead with driverless trains in Pilbara, Sydney Morning Herald, March 10, 2015 http://www .smh .com .au/business/mining-and-resources/rio-tinto-pushes-
ahead-with-driverless-trains-in-pilbara-20150309-13z28v .html 
80 Top Driverless Trucks in the Mining Industry Today Plus Future Concepts, Mining Global http://www .miningglobal .com/machinery/947/Top-Driverless-Trucks-in-the-Mining-
Industry-Today
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Figure 3 .4: Employment impact of different technologies implemented over time
Source: Peterson et al . (2001), New Forces at Work in Mining: Industry Views of Critical Technologies
Automation will probably decrease the number of low to 
semi-skilled operational jobs (drilling, blasting, train and 
truck driving) and create new jobs in the development, 
observation, servicing and maintenance of autonomous and 
remotely controlled equipment. Other traditional jobs such 
as site rehabilitation, road building and other site works are 
likely to remain.
Figure 3.4 shows the employment impact of the diffusion of 
different technologies by plotting the estimated duration of 
a technology’s diffusion (x-axis) against the number of dis-
placed employees at a representative high-production mining 
site (y-axis). 
Caption:
1 . Autonomous Haul Trucks and Loaders 
2 . Autonomous Long Distance Haul-Trains
3 . Tele-remote Ship-Loaders
4 . Semi-autonomous Crushers/Shovel Swings/Rock Breakers 
5 . Automated Drilling Systems
6 . Automated Dragline/Long-wall Plough and Shearers/Earth Moving Systems
7 . Geographic Information Systems and GPS
8 . Autonomous Equipment Monitoring
9 . Programmable Logic Controllers 
10 . Control Systems
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Along with automation’s impact on direct employment, 
which in turn will have an impact on consumption linkages, 
procurement will also be affected. Given that in-pit mine 
staff is likely going to decrease, the demand for catering, 
protective gear, and other goods and services used by in-pit 
mining staff will also decrease. These items are often the 
“low hanging fruits” which can be sourced locally even in 
countries with a less developed supplier base, as they do not 
require high-skilled inputs. Other upstream services such as 
mining and drilling, transport and logistics, analysis and test-
ing will likely require higher technological content. This in 
turn will increase the barriers to entry for suppliers and will 
require government efforts to build NSIs to help suppliers 
adapt to these new technologies.
3 .2 .3 Lessons Learned 
Globalisation and automation restrict the tools available to 
governments for the promotion of linkages between foreign 
investors and the domestic economy. 
Host governments have limited control over  globalisation 
and automation of the EI sector, two processes run by 
market forces. Resource-rich countries that do not adopt a 
forward-looking policy centred on education, skills training, 
and technology development incur the risk of being excluded 
from global value chains and suffering from drastic job losses 
in an automated world. This also speaks to the need for gov-
ernments to improve their “capacity to embrace policy shifts” 
(Ramdoo, 2015) as the economic situation of their countries 
evolves in response to globalization. To develop linkages, 
governments need to adopt forward-looking policies in line 
with changing circumstances. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
BY STAKEHOLDER
This section provides recommendations on how EI 
 companies (“E”), governments (“G”) and development 
cooperation (“D”) can contribute to the creation of linkages 
to the EI sector. The linkage type that each recommenda-
tion addresses most directly is listed in brackets.81 The figure 
below summarizes the recommendations to stakeholders by 
linkage type. 
UPSTREAM
 - EI Companies: 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10
 - Governments: 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
 - Int . development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
DOWNSTREAM
 - EI Companies: 2,5
 - Governments: 1,2,4,8,9,10
 - Int . development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,8,10
HORIZONTAL
 - EI Companies: 7,8
 - Governments: 1,2,4,5
 - Int . development cooperation: 1,2,4,7,8,10
KNOWLEDGE
 - EI Companies: 1,2,3,4,7,8
 - Governments: 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
 - Int . development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10
SPATIAL
 - EI Companies: 1,2
 - Governments: 1,2,7,8,9
 - Int . development cooperation: 1,2,3,5,10
CONSUMPTION
 - EI Companies: 1,2
 - Governments: 1,2,8
 - Int . development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,10
Figure 4 .1: Relevant recommendations by linkage type and stakeholder
81 It is difficult to draw a line as to when a linkage type is directly or only indi-
rectly affected by a recommendation . Efforts were made to be consistent in this 
somewhat subjective selection process .
Source: Authors
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expenditure can be reduced significantly through economies 
of scale if infrastructure investments in power plants and 
transmission lines, water facilities, railways, pipelines, and 
ports are shared among EI companies. Standardizing policies, 
such as the prequalification criteria for suppliers, can reduce 
the tendering costs of SMEs. EI activities may be coordi-
nated through the respective chamber of mines or chamber 
of oil & gas. The creation of such chambers or alternative 
coordination mechanisms should be considered, if they do 
not already exist.
[Upstream, knowledge and technology, spatial linkages]
Recommendation E4
Manage expectations regarding the impact of linkages on the 
domestic economy to avoid disappointments on the side of 
the government or at the national, local, and community lev-
els. This is especially important in countries and regions not 
experienced in resource extraction, since the industry is not 
yet well understood and the domestic skills needed to create 
linkages do not exist. Rather than providing total procure-
ment opportunities or employment figures, companies should 
provide a breakdown of the number of national, provincial 
and local opportunities along the project life phases. Public 
awareness campaigns explaining how the sector works and 
what impacts the project may have on the day-to-day life of 
citizens, including those not directly or indirectly employed 
by EI companies, should also be rolled out. Communication 
strategies should also help manage suppliers’ expectations in 
order to avoid overcapacity without outlet.83  
 [Upstream, knowledge and technology linkages]
Recommendation E5 
Provide governments with pre-feasibility studies on down-
stream processing projects to assess whether such projects are 
economically feasible. Vertically integrated EI companies, 
such as Shell in the petroleum sector and ArcelorMittal in 
the iron and steel sector can explore the possibilities to setup 
downstream industries themselves. Non-vertically integrated 
companies can assist the government in preparing pre-feasi-
bility studies and reach out to the businesses specialized in 
downstream processing that will assess whether the invest-
ment is commercially feasible.84
[Downstream linkages]
4.1 Extractive industry companies
Recommendation E1
Instil the importance of linkage creation in the corporate 
identity to ensure a common understanding and goal of 
the employees within an EI company to be embedded in 
the countries of operation. A corporate vision and a team 
championing linkages can support this. More importantly, 
though, such considerations should be taken into account by 
operational departments. Therefore, in-house trainings on 
linkage opportunities should be given throughout the com-
pany at various management levels and in-country offices. 
These trainings should explain what the EI company’s re-
sponsibility to respect human rights means in the context of 
linkages and GVCs. An early social impact assessment prior 
to the start of operations, bringing up baseline information 
on local economic conditions, would help embed the need 
for linkages in the corporate mindset while also accommo-
dating the planning needs related to the development of con-
sumption linkages in particular. A cross-departmental linkage 
committee integrating the key business functions could be 
created to achieve a buy-in across the whole company.82  
[Upstream, knowledge and technology, spatial, consumption 
linkages]
Recommendation E2
Liaise with relevant government agencies prior to making 
investment decisions to understand the priorities and as-
sess opportunities for linkage creation. Within the govern-
ment, the agencies responsible for education, industry, and 
infrastructure are of strategic importance. Existing national 
development strategies should be reviewed and companies’ 
actions should be adapted to fit them. Utility providers (wa-
ter, power and telecommunications) should also be consulted 
to explore potential synergies with EI–related infrastructure. 
While not related to the core business of EI companies, 
support for agriculture programmes as in Mozambique can 
be critical to save companies’ social license to operate and in 
turn facilitate the creation of consumption linkages. 
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology, 
consumption, linkages]
Recommendation E3
Coordinate among EI companies before making invest-
ment decisions in order to explore synergies and oppor-
tunities for linkage creation. EI companies operating and 
desiring to operate in the region should be contacted. Capital 
82 GIZ, Policy Note: Maximizing Local Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector, 
 Lessons learned from Madagascar and abroad, September 2014
83 In Madagascar such overcapacity occurred, as the mining company supported 
farmers, set up a training center, and enhanced their productivity, but the company 
ended up not being able to buy all of the farmers’ produce (Interview with GIZ 
South Africa, August 2015) . 
84 In 2005 Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (today Vale) provided the Government of 
Mozambique with pre-feasibility studies for seven satellite projects that could 
be linked to the coal mining project (cement plant, coking coal plant, aluminium 
smelter, bio-fuel project, steel mill, ferro-alloy plant and charcoal project) the 
company was developing at the time . The Ministry of Industry and Trade then 
provided these studies to interested investors .
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Recommendation E9
Adapt tenders to local realities, have woman employment 
as a bidding criterion, update local procurement plans, 
and impose local content requirements on international 
sub-contractors to ensure that domestic gender balanced 
procurement opportunities can be maximized. This may 
require using different communication channels such as local 
newspapers, online portals, radio announcements, events 
at the national and regional level, and announcements at 
town halls. It may also involve unbundling large tenders that 
require different levels of expertise. Furthermore, local pro-
curement plans will need to be updated on a regular basis to 
reflect changing project needs and local market conditions. 
In addition, when the company outsources a lot of its opera-
tions to international subcontractors, the company could 
require or reward local content commitments of subcontrac-
tors when awarding tenders in order to foster linkages further 
up the value chain. In order to prevent adverse human rights 
impact in their business relationships, companies should 
communicate their human rights policy to their business 
partners and carry out human rights due diligence. Finally, to 
encourage woman participation in the supply chain, woman 
employment can be a criterion in bid for suppliers.
[Upstream linkages]
Recommendation E10
Provide financial assurances and support to local suppli-
ers in order to help SMEs grow to a size at which access to 
finance is less problematic. This may be done by engaging 
with banks and sharing information about the project and 
supplier to reduce the perceived risk and thereby borrow-
ing rates. Funds can be created that provide direct financing 
for domestic suppliers at beneficial rates. Forward purchas-
ing agreements and advance instalments at the time of 
awarding the bid may help smaller enterprises, which do 
not have sufficient capital to purchase the required inputs, 
thereby lowering borrowing and production costs. Finally, 
equity partnerships with domestic suppliers may provide 
the required capital and reduce the risk perceived by banks, 
thereby lowering borrowing costs. 
[Upstream linkages]
Recommendation E6
Prepare long-term procurement plans during the feasi-
bility study of the project so that potential suppliers have 
sufficient time to prepare for tenders and support can be pro-
vided to satisfy the standards required by EI companies. This 
will require a needs assessment that defines the companies’ 
demand for labour, capital goods, consumables, and services. 
A gap analysis, which assesses what is needed to increase 
local procurement in the medium- and long-term, should ac-
company this process. The figures in Annex 1 illustrate how 
opportunities can be assessed and how the procurement plan 
will need to reflect the various stages of the mining life cycle. 
[Upstream linkages]
Recommendation E7
Support vocational training for both men and women to 
train them to become future employees and service providers 
of the EI companies, and to develop skills applicable in other 
sectors of the economy. In order to create a curricula tailored 
to the EI sector’s needs, companies need to help identify the 
level of technological know-how required for the production 
of various capital goods, consumer goods, and services over 
the lifetime of the project. This should be part of an early 
assessment, which feeds into the procurement plan. During 
operations, training to suppliers should focus on increasing 
the quality standards required for technically more advanced 
tenders. Transferrable skills required by both the EI and 
other sectors in the economy include management skills (ac-
counting, business planning, budgeting procedures, interna-
tional standard requirements, etc.) and mechanical skills such 
as welding. Such skills will also be valuable to employees and 
suppliers once they no longer work for EI companies. To ad-
dress women unemployment, specific training modules need 
to be designed to specifically address woman entrepreneur-
ship needs.
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]
Recommendation E8
Create joint research projects with universities, like in Bra-
zil and Norway, with the aim to specialize and improve the 
technology suited for the geology in the host country. Apart 
from potentially creating an environment that may lead to 
technological innovation, which in turn may reduce costs 
to EI companies, such projects have the potential to create 
knowledge spillovers and enhance the comparative advantage 
of the country. 
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]
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The industrial diversification policy should be supported 
by the corresponding allocation of government resources 
as well as incentives and sanctions for the private sector in 
order to make it effective.87 GIZ-UNIDO’s EQuIP toolbox88 
can be used as a guide for this purpose. Economic zones 
with specialized infrastructure as well as targeted vocational 
training aimed at the identified sectors and linkages can 
support the strategy. The formation of clusters with indus-
tries that have synergies with the EI should be encouraged to 
increase the possibility of horizontal linkages. Support needs 
to be provided at the local government level to implement 
the strategy. Monitoring and evaluating the impact of these 
policies is key to determine when they should be adapted or 
abandoned.
 [All linkages]
Recommendation G3
Develop a local content policy to provide EI companies 
with a framework in which to operate in. Focus should be 
placed on local value added rather than local ownership as 
Nigeria and Mexico have done.89 The policy should be de-
veloped in close coordination with the EI sector, for example 
through public-private dialogues, to set the right targets.90 
The targets should be updated on a regular basis to reflect 
the development of the country and the resource sector. 
To ensure that the company complies with its local con-
tent commitments the government should set detailed and 
regular reporting requirements and define a clear process for 
approval.91 The local content policy should however consider 
that the realization of upstream linkages anchored on these 
local content targets is a shared responsibility between the 
public and private sector. Thus, the government should iden-
tify what investments are necessary to complement, facilitate, 
and maximize the private sector’s intervention. The local 
content policy should also be forward looking and take into 
account the technological changes that the EI is undergoing. 
[Upstream, knowledge and technology linkages]
4.2 Governments
Recommendation G1
Prepare a long-term development strategy in order to guide 
policy coherence and achieve development goals and targets. 
In resource-rich countries, the EI sector should play an im-
portant role in economic development (see  recommendation 
G3). Clear policies, laws and regulations should guide 
sustainable investments.85 Import exemptions, for example, 
should be reviewed as they can be a roadblock if ill-designed, 
as in the case of Nigeria. Coordination among government 
agencies is crucial to implement such a strategy, given that 
linkage creation is a multi-disciplinary endeavour. 
[All linkages]
Recommendation G2
Develop an industrial/diversification policy, which sets out 
how the country aims to develop economically. An impor-
tant aspect of this policy should be improving the business 
environment by, for example, cutting red tape. The policy 
should also target sectors based on the competitive advan-
tages the country has to offer, the objectives that the country 
wants to achieve (see recommendation G1), and the expected 
future developments in terms of demand and technologi-
cal progress. The linkages to the EI sector should be part 
of the assessment needed to develop an industrial strategy 
in resource-rich countries.86 Downstream linkages, how-
ever, should be analysed with care, given that the location 
advantage does not seem to be a major factor determining 
comparative advantage. The assessment should also take into 
account the future role that the country can hope to play in 
the global value chain and which impact the automation of 
processes in the extractive industry will have. The forecasted 
domestic demand (consumption linkages) resulting from 
increased economic activity in the zones where EI companies 
are or will be operating should also feature in the assessment. 
Special focus should be placed on sectors where domestic 
demand is going to increase most rapidly and where the  
location advantage is large; in countries with a low GDP  
per capita, these include mainly the agriculture and construc-
tion sectors.
85 Experience shows that the lack of coherence and clarity is the biggest 
 roadblock to linkage creation (Interview with GIZ, South Africa, August 2015) .  
86 However, especially the downstream sector should not be treated significantly 
differently from other sectors in the economy; given that the location advantage 
of the resources does not seem to be a key determinant of countries’ ability to 
move downstream competitively, cost-benefit analyses are needed . The govern-
ment should be aware that the use of prescriptive methods aimed at fostering 
downstream integration may adversely affect the EI sector and reduce associated 
revenues in the short term (Interview with EI advisor, August 2015) . 
87 Positive incentives, for example tax deductibility for training expenses, are 
thought to be more effective than sanctions (GIZ, Policy Note: Maximizing Local 
Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector, Lessons learned from Madagascar and 
abroad, September 2014) . 
88 www .equip-project .org
89 Local ownership can lead to the creation of trading companies, which do not 
create many employment opportunities or knowledge and technological spillovers 
since they often import the goods and services demanded by the EI sector instead 
of producing them locally . 
90 If the targets are too low, there is a missed opportunity for the domestic 
economy . If they are too ambitious, extractive companies will not accomplish them 
and rather pay penalties in place where they are in place . 
91 CCSI offers a series of local content legal and policy profiles, which highlight 
sectors’ reporting requirements (see: http://ccsi .columbia .edu/work/projects/local-
content-laws-contractual-provisions/) .
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diligence analysis on each local company’s structure, manage-
ment processes and technical and financial qualifications.93 
Financial support should be provided to SMEs as in Austra-
lia. Special attention should be paid to those SMEs that are 
not yet sufficiently qualified to win tenders of EI companies 
and therefore do not benefit from supplier programmes. 
Feedback from unsuccessful bids is crucial to improve 
performance and the government should liaise with the EI 
company in order to provide this feedback. In many coun-
tries, there is also a large geographical disparity in terms of 
expertise of SMEs. Governments can incentivize business as-
sociation between SMEs located in the capital city and SMEs 
in rural areas, where EI projects are often located, in order to 
promote “local local content”.94  Furthermore, governments 
should leverage companies’ and development partners’ help 
to ensure women’s organizations receive support in the form 
of trainings on business skills. Helping these organizations’ 
capacity to support each other can lead to further empower-
ment and female entrepreneurship.  
[Upstream, knowledge and technology linkages]
Recommendation G7
Create the legal framework to allow for shared-use in-
frastructure access and include existing and planned EI 
investments in the infrastructure planning process in order  
to ensure that the economies of scale and scope of private 
sector infrastructure investments foster the development of 
infrastructure linkages. However, sharing infrastructure can 
come at a cost to both the EI company and the country (in 
the form of lower tax receipts). Therefore, project-specific 
cost-benefit analyses are required rather than a blanket shared-
use rule. There should however be a clear legal framework 
allowing the government to intervene into infrastructure 
projects if the intervention’s benefits exceed its costs. For 
infrastructure investments covering long tracks of land (such 
as pipelines, transport, power infrastructure), governments 
should also always keep the ‘right of way’ in order to facilitate 
the construction of additional infrastructures at a lower cost 
as is done in Brazil. When trunk infrastructure is shared, the 
government will need to develop feeder infrastructure in order 
for surrounding regions to benefit from access. A regulatory 
entity responsible for arbitrating disputes is also necessary.95 
[Spatial linkages]
Recommendation G4
Strengthen the absorptive capacity of the local popula-
tion. The lack of human capital in resource-rich countries is 
one of the key constraints to the creation of linkages to the 
EI sector. This issue affects all levels of education, including 
primary education. Governments and companies can only 
provide specialized trainings where there is a good education-
al base to build upon. Governments should also encourage 
vocational training by co-investing into relevant programmes 
and ensure that training curricula serve the needs of the EI 
and other sectors, as was done in South Africa. This issue 
especially affects women and girls, which is why their specific 
needs should be taken into account in the design of such 
programmes.
[Upstream, downstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology 
linkages]
Recommendation G5 
Promote higher education and R&D programmes and 
include such components with clear targets and monitoring 
mechanisms in the local content policy (see  recommendation 
G3) in order to increase the productivity of the country 
through higher skills and expertise. This will require a 
technological gap assessment measuring the existing techno-
logical know-how, what is required, and how new tech-
nological expertise can be developed. Intellectual property 
rights should be adapted to the existing level of technological 
know-how. Targets for EI companies could include a dollar 
value that the company needs to pay into an R&D fund as 
in Brazil92 and/or a number of scholarships that the EI will 
fund. Governments should also contribute financially to 
these R&D programmes on a matching grant basis – espe-
cially in countries where labour turnover is likely to be high 
and therefore incentives for the EI to provide higher educa-
tion low. R&D programmes looking to create horizontal 
linkages are unlikely to be financed by EI companies. There-
fore, governments should place a special focus on them. 
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]
Recommendation G6
Create SME support mechanisms to help the EI sector 
meet its local content targets (see recommendation G3) and 
support women’s economic participation. A local content 
policy will only be successful if the government also com-
mits funds and resources to its achievement. The government 
should create enterprise maps that include all available goods 
and service providers in the country, as well as a brief due 
92 In Brazil such a fund finances the National Petroleum Agency for Human 
Resources Programme, which includes higher level training for petroleum specific 
disciplines into the curriculum of research institutions and grants scholarships for 
studies in this area (UNCTAD, 2012) . 
93 Positive experiences have been reported by programmes in Ethiopia, Ghana 
andTanzania, which were supported by the International Growth Centre (http://
www .theigc .org) . The enterprise maps contain sector profiles, detailed supply 
chains, and in-depth information on major companies within each sector and on 
their sources of inputs . This information should be useful to both governments 
identifying potential areas for the promotion of upstream linkages and to potential 
suppliers (Africa Development Bank et al ., 2013) . 
94 Interview with GIZ South Africa, August 2015 . 
95 For more specific recommendations, see: CCSI: “A Framework to Approach 
Shared-Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure” (March 2014), available at: http://
ccsi .columbia .edu/files/2014/05/A-Framework-for-Shared-use_March-2014 .pdf
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Recommendation G10
Ensure that international commitments in new trade and 
investment agreements leave governments space to use 
policy tools that can help to create linkages. Many govern-
ments are already subject to WTO rules that restrict mea-
sures favouring the use of local goods. Governments should 
review their existing commitments to avoid being taken to 
court. Furthermore, new trade and investment agreements 
increasingly go beyond WTO restrictions and impose ad-
ditional restraints on what measures may be taken to support 
local service providers, build up domestic capacity, and 
require domestic research and technology transfer.
[Upstream, downstream, knowledge and technology linkages]
4.3 International Development  
 Cooperation
Recommendation D1
Support the government in addressing the institutional 
failures constraining linkage creation. These failures result 
from a lack of coordination both between the relevant min-
istries and government agencies and EI companies as well 
among the government bodies themselves.100 Policy cohesion 
and coordinated actions in support of linkage creation are 
crucial in order to be successful. Development partners’ expe-
rience with inter-ministerial coordination could be beneficial 
here. Furthermore, specific linkages would benefit from key 
institutions that are often missing. For instance, a strong 
independent regulatory authority making impartial deci-
sions is required for the creation of spatial linkages. For the 
creation of upstream linkages, a dedicated agency in charge 
of planning for and implementing local content require-
ments is often seen as being effective. International develop-
ment cooperation can play a key role in supporting the setup 
of such entities. Herein, German Development Cooperation 
may benefit from being widely perceived as a neutral agent 
and honest broker between governments and EI companies. 
[All linkages]
Recommendation D2
Align policy advice and coordinate development  assistance 
in order to provide coherent and consistent support to 
resource-rich countries. As with governments (see recom-
mendations G1, D1), it is crucial for development partners 
Recommendation G8
Cooperate and coordinate with the EI sector when 
 developing linkage plans to ensure that these are realistic and 
manageable. The EI companies are best placed to provide 
needs assessments and inputs regarding targets and timelines 
based on their experience in other countries. In particular, 
governments should require EI companies to carry out social 
impact assessments as a condition for obtaining a mining 
licence in order to ensure that EI companies collect baseline 
information on local economic conditions, which can then 
be used to properly assess and plan the creation of consump-
tion linkages. If a state-owned company manages a country’s 
extractive sector, consider partnering with EI companies in 
order to maximize knowledge and technology spillovers. The 
cooperation agreement should point out how this may be 
achieved.
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology 
linkages, consumption linkages]
Recommendation G9
Consider regional markets when assessing the opportuni-
ties for linkages to benefit from regional cooperation, as 
larger markets are often necessary for the viability of linkages. 
Larger pools of resources make ‘regional content’ more at-
tractive to investors,96 especially when a significant operating 
scale is required for procured goods (such as chemicals and 
plastics). Regional procurement could count towards local 
content.97 To support such policies, regional bodies could 
create regional supplier lists, help standardize the definition 
of local content and set standards.98 High-capacity down-
stream projects, such as smelters, are more likely to be viable 
if viewed from a regional rather than national perspective.99 
Specialized regional training centres can also reduce costs 
for participating countries. Spatial infrastructure solutions 
should be considered at the regional level. Given that ore 
deposits cross national boundaries, there are opportunities 
for economies of scale in infrastructure investments. 
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology 
linkages]
96 Interview with corporate expert, August 2015 . 
97 Interview with advisor, August 2015 . 
98 Interview with corporate expert, August 2015 . 
99 There is only demand for a limited number of smelters and refineries on the 
African continent, for example . It is therefore unrealistic for each country having 
oil or mineral reserves to build refineries and smelters . Of course, it is politically 
difficult to decide where a refinery should be built .
100 Morris, Kaplinsky, and Kaplan (2011) believe that the lack of coordination and 
misalignment within agencies and between the public and private stakeholders 
has been the key obstacle to creating linkages in Africa . 
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Recommendation D4
Help develop industrial policies, given that the laissez-faire 
approach has not worked in creating linkages to the extrac-
tive sector. Industrial policy support is still very uncommon 
among international development cooperation (there are 
exceptions, as shown by the EQuIP Toolbox103, which aims 
to support governments to develop evidence-based structural 
industrial policies). This is largely because the role of devel-
opment partners in the 1980s and 1990s was often limited 
to privatizing state-owned EI and liberalizing investment 
and trade regimes to allow FDI to flow freely. Attracting 
investment was seen as an end rather than a means to an end, 
which should be sustainable economic development. This 
has led to a very suboptimal exploitation of linkage potential 
in the past.104 Apart from focusing on general policy advice 
that may foster linkage creation such as the improvement of 
the business environment, international development coop-
eration should help countries assess what sectors may have a 
comparative advantage and what type of linkages to existing 
FDI projects could be developed. The analysis should in-
clude how national and local demand (in particular for local 
produce) will develop due to the economic activity related 
to the EI sector (as also discussed in recommendation G2) 
and, consequently, how development partners’ intervention 
in support of small-scale agriculture would help maximize 
consumption linkages.
[Upstream, downstream, horizontal, consumption, knowledge 
and technology linkages]
Recommendation D5
Assess which private sector actors would benefit most 
from support initiatives in order to maximize the impact of 
development assistance. While the largest oil, gas and mining 
companies have the largest EI projects in their portfolio, 
which in turn may create large opportunities for linkages in 
absolute terms, these companies are also the most advanced 
in thinking about linkages and can draw on experiences 
from other projects. Mid-tier companies, however, may not 
possess the internal knowledge on how to create linkages, so 
the impact of supporting these companies may be larger. By 
working through the national chambers of mines or of oil 
and gas, international development cooperation may reach 
a larger group, which is likely to be composed of companies 
from all tiers and could help to coordinate EI companies’ 
to develop a strategy determining which policies will be 
supported. Without an internal alignment, conflicting policy 
advice may be given. For example, as highlighted in section 
2.5 and Chapter 3, advice on intellectual property rights 
and trade and investment treaties can be in direct conflict 
with advice given on local content or industrialisation poli-
cies. Advice on these topics is generally provided by differ-
ent departments, which often have different views about 
the  optimal level of government intervention.101 It is also 
important to liaise with other development partners advis-
ing in a particular resource-rich developing country to avoid 
duplication of efforts or conflicting programmes. Germany 
has a number of agencies that invest in, provide financial 
resources to, and advice to resource-rich countries on issues 
closely related to linkage creation.102 Coordination among 
these stakeholders is key to maximize the benefits of German 
Development Cooperation in creating linkages to the extrac-
tive sector.
[All linkages]
Recommendation D3
Provide project and infrastructure financing in order to 
make EI projects located in developing countries financially 
viable if they are too risky for commercial banks to invest 
initially. Apart from making financial support conditional on 
high social and environmental standards, financial devel-
opment institutions should also review and support any 
associated investments that help to create linkages. Especially 
capital-intensive investments in infrastructure solutions and 
opportunities for spatial linkages should be assessed in detail. 
Apart from the trunk infrastructure, financial development 
institutions can also support the feeder infrastructure (see 
recommendations G7). In both of these areas, Germany can 
draw on the financing experience of the KfW banking group. 
[Upstream, downstream, consumption, spatial, knowledge and 
technology linkages]
101 By the very nature of their training and experience, trade economists, for 
example, will be more likely to support policies geared towards less government 
intervention . 
102 These agencies include the following: (i) GIZ, which (among else) provides 
technical advice on good governance, private sector development, and trade policy; 
(ii) the International Project and Export Finance Bank (KfW IPEX-bank), which 
invests in the development of oil, gas, mining, and infrastructure projects; (iii) the 
Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (KfW DEG), which supports 
German companies with their foreign investments and provides financing for SMEs 
in developing countries; (iv) the KfW Entwicklungsbank (KfW), which provides 
financing for developing country governments to build up financial systems and 
invest in energy and water infrastructure; (v) the Bundesanstalt für Geowissen-
schaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), which provides technical support to developing 
countries on matters related to geology and extractive resources; and (vi) the 
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), which provides advice on intellectual 
property rights and helps companies in developing countries meet certification 
standards for export purposes . 
103 www .equip-project .org  
104 Morrissey (2012) argues that “The fact that organizations such as the World 
Bank (and donors more generally) did not advocate industrial policy diminished 
the importance of such policy issues on the domestic agenda . For sub-Saharan 
 African countries, this is one of the reasons why they failed to develop the 
 domestic capacity to benefit from FDI .”
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Recommendation D7
Leverage the experience and expertise of private sector 
development initiatives and vocational training pro-
grammes. While EI companies understand what is needed 
to make their operations efficient and profitable, they are less 
familiar with private sector development not directly related 
to their operations. However, governments’ policy deci-
sions on private sector development are often constrained by 
political pressures, wherefore they might design unrealistic 
local content targets (see recommendation G3). Develop-
ment partners, although not necessarily focused on linkages 
to the EI sector, do often have experience in private sector 
development initiatives elsewhere. They are therefore well 
placed to advise both governments and companies on how to 
create linkages.107 The most critical factor in developing link-
ages in resource-rich countries is the lack of local industrial 
capacity and expertise. Educational support and training is 
another area in which international development cooperation 
is  heavily involved. Especially Germany is well known for 
its dual education system and its vocational training pro-
grammes. 
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]
Recommendation D8
Long-term support programmes are required in order to 
create linkages given that it takes time to build and sus-
tain these successfully.108 While aid might be subject to the 
diplomatic and political cycles of donor countries, a cyclical 
approach to linkages is unlikely to succeed. 
[Upstream, downstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology 
linkages]
Recommendation D9
Place cautious focus on artisanal mining, given that this 
sector provides substantial employment opportunities109 and 
therefore can be a driver in poverty reduction, but at the 
same time has had devastating impacts on health and the 
environment. Furthermore, EI company investments often 
clash with local communities if a large-scale mine is to be 
action with regard to linkage creation across the industry, 
thereby achieving economies of scale. Development partners 
should also carefully assess which companies to support in 
their supplier programmes. While international development 
cooperation often prioritizes the promotion of SMEs, the 
technology gap of these companies in developing countries 
may be too large to create lasting upstream linkages. It may 
therefore be worthwhile for development partners to con-
centrate on supporting those larger local firms able to create 
lasting upstream linkages. 
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology 
linkages] 
Recommendation D6
Help local companies, in particular those owned by 
women, access finance and meet the standards required 
to service EI companies in order to increase local procure-
ment opportunities. International development cooperation 
can provide financing since many resource-rich developing 
countries’ financial markets suffer from severely limited 
access to credit and high interest rates. In some countries, 
female entrepreneurs are excluded from this by limited access 
to finance, as discussed in section 2.2. Development partners 
should adapt their programmes to increase the financial 
inclusion of women. Technical Cooperation can also support 
local companies by linking them up with their peers in the 
investors’ countries, which may lead to joint ventures and 
knowledge transfer.105 More developed local companies’ 
access to foreign markets can be supported by helping them 
to achieve certification standards and providing contacts to 
mining subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, as was done in 
Chile. Given the well-recognized “Mittelstand” companies in 
Germany, German Development Cooperation is well placed 
to provide support to small and medium sized companies.106 
This is also a key component of German Technical and 
Financial Cooperation.
[Upstream and knowledge and technology linkages]
105 This is also an approach in development at a leading oil company (Interview 
with corporate expert, August 2015) . 
106 In this context, please note recommendation D5, which states that it may also 
be worth to consider supporting larger national companies and not only SMEs .
107 For instance, GIZ South Africa organized a workshop with the Chamber of 
Mines in Madagascar to present government officials with international experienc-
es on linkages and local content (Interview with GIZ South Africa, August 2015) . 
108 As highlighted by Buur et al (2013), “[t]he start-up and development of 
industries linked to extractive industries is slow, takes time and requires funds as 
well as the technical and institutional knowhow that some donors may be able to 
provide” . 
109 ASM is estimated to directly or indirectly employ over 100 million people 
around the globe and to account for over one-sixth of the world’s non-fuel mineral 
output (Communities and Small-Scale Mining, Working Together: How Large-Scale 
Mining Can Engage with Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, (Washington, World 
Bank IFC, January 2008), 5) . In a 2013 report, the World Bank estimates that 13 
million people in 30 countries work in micro and small artisanal mining (World 
Bank (2013): Small-Scale Mining in: http://webworldbankorg) .
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built in an area that was previously home to artisanal  mining. 
While artisanal mining is complex and politically very sensi-
tive because these operations are largely occurring in the 
informal sector, development partners could play an impor-
tant role in trying to help formalize the sector and provide 
trainings and tools that reduce its adverse impacts on health 
and the environment. 
[No immediate linkage]
Recommendation D10
Be aware of the political economy of resource-rich 
 developing countries before assisting governments and 
promote good governance in order to both determine the 
‘political will’ for broad-based linkage creation and avoid 
clientelism and patronage. The EI sector is characterised by 
large investment flows and rent-seeking behaviour. Further-
more, linkage creation is a long-term endeavour where results 
are unlikely to be highly visible within one election cycle. 
These attributes create incentives for the political elite to per-
sonally benefit from short-term upstream and downstream 
contracts or infrastructure solutions that are sub-optimal 
from an economic and regional perspective. Such decisions 
may impede longer-term broad-based transfer of knowl-
edge and technology as well as diversification and regional 
integration. Thus, development partners face the difficult 
challenge of designing their linkage support programmes in 
a way that reflects good practices while fitting local contexts, 
institutions, and politics. Trade-offs regarding good practices 
may be required to get the political buy-in necessary for a 
successful implementation of linkage creation programmes. 
In jurisdictions where corruption is high and governance is 
weak, it will be very difficult to create sustainable long-term 
linkages that do not only benefit a selected few in the politi-
cal elite. In such cases, international development coopera-
tion may want to consider placing greater emphasis on the 
development institutions and the promotion of transparency 
on who owns the companies that benefit from EI contracts. 
[All linkages]
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Overview of linkages
• ICMM (2014): The Role of Mining in National Econo-
mies (2nd edition): Mining’s Contribution to Sustainable 
Development.
• World Bank (2012): Gender Dimensions of Artisanal and 
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Bank Group’s Oil, Gas, and Mining Unit.
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ANNEX6
Annex 1 - Visualization of frameworks designed to expand  
local procurement opportunities over the life of an EI project 
Figure 6 .1: Opportunities for upstream linkages along the mine life cycle
Source: World Bank (2012), Increasing Local Procurement By the Mining Industry in West Africa .
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Figure 6 .2: Procurement opportunities along the oil and gas value chain 
Source: World Bank (2013), Small-Scale Mining .
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Figure 6 .3: Assessing available upstream linkage opportunities 
Source: World Bank (2012), Increasing Local Procurement By the Mining Industry in West Africa .
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Figure 6 .4: Adjusting local content policy throughout the mine cycle 110 
Source: GIZ (2014), Maximizing Local Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector, Lessons learned from Madagascar and abroad .
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110 Two other phases could be added to this figure, namely, the expansion phase and the cost reduction phase . The former requires high quality and fast response suppliers, 
while the latter requires cost effective suppliers . Those requirements will only be met through intensified partnerships with training organizations (GIZ, Policy Note: Maximiz-
ing Local Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector, Lessons learned from Madagascar and abroad, September 2014) .
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When the WTO came into being in 1995, three new inter-
national agreements entered into force that set out certain 
rules relevant for linkage policies. One is the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement); 
the second is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Measures (SCM Agreement); and the third is the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
1. TRIMs Agreement 
Briefly, the TRIMs Agreement bars two main types of provi-
sions: (1) those that favour the use of domestic over foreign 
goods, i.e., measures inconsistent with Article III of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),111 or (2) 
that impose certain quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports (i.e., measures inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the 
GATT).112 Importantly, it only covers measures relating to 
trade in goods, not trade in services. 
The first category of measures prevents countries from im-
posing measures that would, for example, require or incen-
tivize companies (i.e., by providing tax breaks, subsidies, or 
other advantages contingent upon the use of domestic goods) 
to purchase or use locally manufactured equipment instead 
of foreign-manufactured equipment. 
In 2013, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopt-
ed rulings finding that Canada had breached its obligations 
under the TRIMs Agreement by requiring renewable energy 
projects’ participation in a sub-national “feed-in-tariff ” (FIT) 
programme in order to achieve a certain amount of domes-
tic content. Evidence submitted during the dispute showed 
that the requirements adopted by the Canadian province of 
Ontario could not be satisfied through expenditures on do-
mestic labour and services alone, which would be permitted 
under the TRIMs Agreement. Instead, meeting the domestic 
content targets would also require the use of goods manu-
factured, formed, or assembled in Canada, which resulted in 
the requirement being inconsistent with the TRIMs Agree-
ment and Article III of the GATT.113 In order to comply with 
the DSB’s rulings and recommendations, Ontario dropped 
the domestic content requirements it had imposed on large 
renewable energy projects and lowered the domestic content 
requirements on small and “microFIT” renewable projects.114
The second category prohibits WTO Members from impos-
ing certain trade-balancing and exchange-balancing measures 
restricting imports and forbids them to restrict exports. 
Measures restricting imports can be used to favour or require 
the use of locally produced goods, while measures restricting 
exports can be used to encourage or require the domestic 
processing or beneficiation of raw materials. 
In 2014, China was held to have breached its WTO obligation 
not to restrict exports by imposing duties and quotas on the 
export of various forms of rare earths, molybdenum, and 
tungsten. China argued that its export restrictions were 
imposed in order to conserve its exhaustible natural resources 
and were necessary to reduce harmful environmental pollution 
caused by mining. Consequently, China argued, those export 
duties and quotas were covered by relevant exceptions under 
the WTO, namely Articles XX(b) and XX(g) of the GATT, 
which, respectively, safeguard measures “necessary for the 
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health” and 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”
The WTO panel agreed that mining of the raw materials had 
in fact caused grave harm to the environment in China, and 
that, in principle, such export duties or quotas on extrac-
tion of natural resources could be shielded by Article XX. 
Nevertheless, the panel determined that neither exception 
applied. The panel determined that under the terms upon 
which China had become a party to the WTO, the Article 
XX exceptions were not available to it. More relevant for the 
purposes of linkage policies, the panel concluded that even 
if the Article XX exceptions were available to China, they 
would not have covered the measures imposed by China. Ac-
cording to the panel, China’s export duties and quotas were 
not truly or adequately tailored to address those environmen-
tal, health, or conservation issues. Instead, at least some of 
the evidence submitted in the dispute, including statements 
by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
“seem[ed] to indicate that, contrary to China’s assertions, the 
export duties at issue are designed and structured to promote 
increased domestic production of high value-added down-
stream products that use the raw materials at issue in this 
dispute as inputs”.115 Similarly, with respect to the quotas, 
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Detailed information 
111  These are measures violating Article III of the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . There are certain exceptions under which such measures 
may be permitted, e .g ., if they are either imposed in connection with government 
procurement (GATT Art . III (8)) or covered by one of the GATT’s general exceptions 
(GATT Art . XX) . 
112  These measures would violate Article X1:1 of the GATT .  
113  Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff Programme, 
paras . 7 .155-7 .166, WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (December 19, 2012) . The panel’s 
finding was not challenged before the Appellate Body .  
114  Communication from Canada, Canada – Renewable Energy/Feed-In Tariff 
Programme, WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (June 6, 2014) . 
115  Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para . 7 .169, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, 
WT/DS433/R (March 26, 2014) .
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the panel stated that the allocations did not seem to relate to 
the “abundance or scarcity of a given rare earth material,” but 
instead “seem[ed] to focus on industrial policy concerns, in-
cluding prior export performance and overall value of exports 
from China”.116 
The key lesson of this decision is that restrictions on exports 
of raw materials can be permitted in some cases. But when 
such restraints are imposed in order to promote domestic 
industrial policy, they are likely to conflict with WTO law 
unless covered by a relevant exception for measures appropri-
ated targeted at environmental or other policy aims protected 
under WTO law. Evidence of an illegitimate industrial policy 
aim may, as in China’s dispute on export bans on rare earths, 
cause a panel to determine that the government’s measure was 
in fact not aimed at a legitimate purpose. As some commenta-
tors have noted, however, motives are often mixed, and measures 
aimed at developing and deepening linkages may be seen as 
producing benefits needed to compensate for the costs of 
mineral extraction.117  The case of China is described below.
 
Box 6.1: China’s rare earths dispute from the point of 
view of Chinese policy-makers
Today, China bears a disproportionate share of the world’s 
“dirty” mining . With only one-third of global reserves, 
China supplies 97% of the world’s rare earths . The United 
States, once the world’s leading producer, shut down all 
production in 1998, following environmental outcry over a 
radioactive spill into a California desert . The same story 
is true of other raw materials such as fluorspar . Other 
than Spain, no industrialized country mines fluorspar 
because of the associated environmental hazards, even 
though both the United States and France have an ample 
base of reserves .  
 
As China has grown wealthier and its domestic manu-
facturing base has expanded, its policymakers ask: Why 
should China aggressively mine an exhaustible natural 
resource - and incur the resultant environmental harm - 
simply to supply the world market, when the rest of the 
world refuses to do so? Why not limit the use of exhaust-
ible natural resources to its home market, as the United 
States has done with liquefied natural gas? 
 
For Chinese policymakers, a key factor in analysing the 
cost-benefit equation at hand is whether the minerals are 
used domestically or exported . Under both scenarios, the 
costs are the same: upstream extraction and processing 
generates negative environmental externalities . However, 
the offsetting benefits differ greatly, at least in Chinese 
eyes, depending on whether the mineral is subsequently 
exported for use by a foreign manufacturer or kept for 
domestic use . 
 
When kept in China, the downstream Chinese manufac-
turer later remits taxes back to the Chinese government 
on profits made from use of the mineral as an input . 
Although such taxes are not designated for environmental 
cleanup, they increase the central government’s fiscal 
capabilities to cover remediation costs . The same is not 
true of an overseas manufacturer who needs not remit 
any share of its profits to the Chinese government . 
 
More importantly, the extracted minerals serve as key 
inputs for several strategic industries, such as defence, 
high tech, and pharmaceuticals . When kept in China, the 
inputs presumably increase Chinese capabilities in these 
sectors and generate positive spillover effects for the 
rest of the economy (through supply chain linkages, inno-
vation, jobs, etc .) . For example, lanthanum extracted from 
Chinese mines is a key input for Chinese manufacturing 
of rechargeable car batteries . This, in turn, has sparked 
the development of an electric car industry in China and 
innovation in hybrid technologies . 
 
Put crudely, China’s view is that so long as the mineral 
is consumed within its borders, the positive externalities 
that emerge from domestic downstream use will more 
than compensate for the negative externalities that result 
from upstream extraction . Potentially environmentally 
harmful acts are acceptable if they trigger greater down-
stream benefits that will more than cover the remediation 
costs . However, once the mineral is exported, China fails 
to capture any positive downstream externalities but is 
left with the cost of upstream environmental harm . Export 
restrictions, unlike overall production limits, allow China 
to account for this difference (Wu and Salzman, 2014) . 
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116  Id . para . 7 .484 .  
117  Not all such measures will give rise to a formal dispute . In inter-state  
discussions in the WTO’s Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures,  
a number of countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia,  
and the European Union have similarly raised questions regarding the measures 
adopted by Indonesia to encourage the domestic processing of minerals, and  
increase investment (by foreign and domestic companies) in local suppliers 
of goods and services to the mining industry . These countries have questioned 
whether the measures are consistent with the TRIMs Agreement, and have  
asserted that the measures risk discouraging foreign investment in Indonesia .  
Nevertheless, as of July 30th, 2015, they had not initiated any formal dispute 
settlement proceedings to challenge Indonesia’s actions . See, e .g ., Committee  
on Trade-Related Investment Measures – Minutes of the Meeting Held on  
October 8, 2014, paras . 17-43, G/TRIMS/M/37 (November 21, 2014) .
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case were certain collaborative agreements for R&D that the 
US airplane manufacturer, Boeing, entered into with the US 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and 
Department of Defence (DoD). As the WTO panel de-
scribed, those agreements constituted subsidies that were part 
of “strategically-focused R&D programmes” undertaken by 
the government “in collaboration with the U.S. industry to 
provide competitive advantages to U.S. industry by funding 
research into high risk, high pay-off research of the sort that 
individual companies are unlikely to fund on their own”. 118
Because the R&D agreements were neither contingent 
on the use of local goods, nor on exports, they were not 
prohibited per se. Nevertheless, according to the panel, they 
were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement due to their 
adverse effects on the interests of other WTO Members. 
More specifically, the panel stated that the government’s 
R&D incentives aimed at and were effective in overcoming 
the “large disincentives for private sector investment in long 
term, high risk […] R&D (stemming from the inability of 
individual companies to fully capture the benefits from the 
research efforts)”.119  Those R&D incentives made a “genuine 
and substantial contribution” to technological development 
and innovation that, among other effects, enabled Boeing to 
build better and cheaper products and to do so more quickly 
than it would have without the subsidy. As a result, the panel 
concluded, the agreements gave the US company a competi-
tive advantage that caused “adverse effects”. 120  
This case helps illustrate that policies that aim to use public-
private collaboration to advance R&D and increase domestic 
competitiveness can violate WTO rules and that the more 
effective policies are from an industrial policy perspective the 
more likely it is that they will be deemed inconsistent with 
the SCM Agreement. Nevertheless, not all such measures 
will result in a claim or a finding of liability as establish-
ing “adverse effects” in WTO disputes, which necessitates 
a complex, fact-specific analysis, and can be a difficult and 
time-consuming element to establish. This, in turn, may 
discourage governments from initiating formal claims before 
WTO bodies to challenge subsidies that are not prohibited 
(export-contingent and import-substitution subsidies). 121  
Notably, neither the TRIMs Agreement nor the GATT 
prevents governments from giving subsidies or incentives to 
domestic producers of goods, even if those subsidies or incen-
tives may result in those domestic goods being more com-
petitive than imported goods. Consequently, if a government 
wishes to increase the EI sector’s use of products produced by 
domestic manufacturers, while also abiding by its obligations 
under the TRIMs, it should consider granting subsidies or 
other assistance to domestic companies to help increase their 
competitiveness as opposed to imposing requirements on 
or incentivizing EI companies to purchase domestic goods. 
Similarly, a government wishing to ensure compliance with 
the TRIMs Agreement should seek to promote beneficiation 
by granting subsidies to improve the competitiveness of its 
relevant domestic industries and increase the attractiveness of 
local beneficiation, as opposed to imposing quotas or other 
restrictions on exports of raw materials.
As noted below, however, depending on the design and/or the 
effects of the subsidies, they might violate the SCM Agreement, 
GATS, or the provisions of international investment treaties.
2. SCM Agreement
While subsidies to domestic producers are allowed under the 
TRIMs Agreement and the GATT (even though subsidies 
to consumers contingent upon purchase of domestic as op-
posed to foreign goods are not), some subsidies to domestic 
producers are restricted under the SCM Agreement. This 
can limit the policy tools available to governments seeking 
to increase the competitiveness of their domestic companies, 
and build and strengthen linkages between those companies 
and EI projects. 
More specifically, subsidies to domestic producers are prohib-
ited under the SCM Agreement if the subsidies are contin-
gent on (1) the use of domestic instead of imported goods or 
(2) export performance. 
If a measure does not fall within one of those two categories 
of subsidies that are per se prohibited, it will only be barred 
if there is proof that it causes “adverse effects” to other WTO 
Member States. In brief, this requires proof that the industry 
of another Member States has been harmed, or that their 
benefits under the GATT have been impaired or nullified. 
The panel and Appellate Body decisions in United States – 
Large Civil Aircraft help illustrate the implications of these 
rules for linkage policies. Some measures challenged in that 
118  Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
para . 7 .1764, WT/DS353/R (Mar . 31, 2011) . 
119  Ibid . 
120  The panel’s findings were later upheld on appeal . Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, paras . 960-1012, 
WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar . 12, 2012) . 
121  Under the SCM Agreement, governments that do not wish to initiate a case 
before the WTO’s dispute resolution bodies may in certain cases pursue unilateral 
actions, imposing “countervailing duties” on products produced by companies that 
received the subsidy . 
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in their ability to adopt measures supporting domestic service 
providers and encouraging EI companies to contract with 
them if those measures result in the less favourable treatment 
of foreign-based service providers.123 
- Market Access:
The article on market access (Article XVI) prevents members 
from applying measures that fall into an exhaustive list of six 
prohibited measures. These are measures that:
(a) limit the number of service suppliers, 
(b) limit the total value of service transactions or assets, 
(c) limit the total number of service operations or quantity  
of service output, 
(d) limit the total number of natural persons permitted  
to be employed, 
(e) restrict or require certain types of legal entities, and 
(f ) limit the participation of foreign capital.  
For scheduled sectors without reservations, these rules can 
allow the unrestricted entry of foreign investors into the 
domestic market, which may crowd out domestic compa-
nies and cause them to go out of business. Moreover, Article 
XVI(e) and (f ) can prohibit such measures as joint ventures 
or domestic equity requirements, tools that governments 
have used in the past to help promote technology transfer. 
4. Summary of Relevant WTO Rules
Overall, the WTO imposes various rules restricting the use 
of measures that, in the past, have been used – though not 
always with success – to create linkages between investments 
in the EI and the domestic economy. 
While these restrictions are significant and – according to 
at least some countries – too stringent, they are weaker in 
a number of respects than what has been emerging under 
international investment treaties.
3. GATS
While the TRIMs Agreement and SCM Agreement deal 
with measures relating to trade in goods, the GATS covers 
measures relating to trade in services. The provisions most 
relevant to linkage policies are its market access (Article XVI) 
and national treatment (Article XVII) obligations.
Importantly, the GATS is based on a “positive list” system. 
This means that countries are only bound to those obliga-
tions if and to the extent they have agreed to be committed. 
If they have not “scheduled” a sector, they can maintain or 
adopt new measures relating to that sector that would other-
wise be inconsistent with GATS provisions. Moreover, when 
scheduling sectors, they can negotiate for exceptions limiting 
the scope of the commitments they make.
When, however, a country schedules a sector and subjects it 
to the national treatment and market access commitments, 
and does not insist on any relevant exceptions, several im-
portant rules can apply that might prohibit the use of various 
tools aimed at developing and deepening linkages.
- National Treatment:
With respect to the national treatment obligation, which 
prevents governments from treating foreign service suppliers 
less favourably than domestic service suppliers, a government 
might breach this obligation by providing subsidies or other 
benefits to locally owned and established service companies 
but not providing those same subsidies or benefits to foreign-
owned and domestically established companies.
The national treatment rule can also prevent a WTO 
Member from implementing measures that favour locally 
established service companies over service companies located 
in other countries if those measures negatively affect the com-
petitive position of those foreign service suppliers.122 
Consequently, depending on the national treatment commit-
ments made under the GATS, governments may be limited 
122  Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 
paras . 10 .291, 10 .307-10 .308, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb . 11, 2000) . 
123  More recently, the panel in China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic 
Payment Services – came to a similar conclusion, stating:  
  Furthermore, in the particular circumstances of this case, we do not see how our 
  conclusion on “likeness” of services could be different depending on whether EPS 
  suppliers of other Members supply EPS through mode 1 or through mode 3 . 
Panel Report, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services,  
7 .704, WT/DS413/R, (July 16, 2012) . 
Although service suppliers based in different locations can be “like”, the GATS 
– in footnote 10 to the national treatment provision – also recognizes that the 
article does not require “any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive 
disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or 
service suppliers .” 
122  Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 
paras . 10 .291, 10 .307-10 .308, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb . 11, 2000) . 
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